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Limits of a Deductive Construal of the Function of Scientific Theories

A Comment

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Science in Reflection

Part of the book series: Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science ((BSPS,volume 110))

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Abstract

In the course of preparing this comment I have come to realize that a large proportion of my philosophy-of-science classes, both as a student and as a teacher, have been devoted, in one way or another, to the discussion of Professor Hempel’s numerous papers. Contemporary philosophy of science is, to some extent, a comment on Hempel’s work.

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References

  1. G. Hempel, “Studies in the Logic of Confirmation,” in: C. G. Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation, New York: The Free Press, 1965, pp. 3–52.

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  2. C. G. Hempel, “The Theoretician’s Dilemma: A Study in the Logic of Theory Construction,” in: C. G. Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation, New York: The Free Press, 1965, pp. 173–228.

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  3. J. English, “Partial Interpretation and Meaning Change,” The Journal of Philosophy 75 (1978): 57–76.

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  4. M. Katz, “Real-Valued Models with Metric Equality and Uniformly Continuous Predicates,” Journal of Symbolic Logic 47 (1982): 772–792.

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  5. M. Katz, “The Logic of Approximation in Quantum Theory,” Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1982): 215–228.

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Authors

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Edna Ullmann-Margalit

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© 1988 Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Ben-Menachem, Y. (1988). Limits of a Deductive Construal of the Function of Scientific Theories. In: Ullmann-Margalit, E. (eds) Science in Reflection. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 110. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2957-9_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2957-9_2

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-277-2713-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-2957-9

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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