Abstract
When Wittgenstein returns to Cambridge in 1929, there are many intersecting paths in his thought, and we would do him wrong by following just one path and seeing in this path the only true starting-point of his later philosophy of psychology. In the preface to the Philosophical Investigations he remarks that he is obliged to move criss-cross in all directions through a vast area of thought, and we should take this remark seriously. In this chapter, therefore, I shall follow a path without cutting off all kinds of other paths and intersections; many of these other paths, however, will be traced more extensively in the following chapters. In this chapter I start by focusing on Wittgenstein’s reaction to the psychological or causal theory of meaning developed by Russell and Odgen & Richards, since this reaction illustrates a number of ramifications occurring in Wittgenstein’s thought in 1929 and the first years after. At the same time Wittgenstein’s reaction to the psychological or causal theory of meaning provides a convenient link to his emphasis on language-games as the reference point for his logical or grammatical inquiry into the meaning of concepts. Section 1 deals with the psychological theory of meaning, section 2 with language-games.
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Reference
The manuscripts are: MS 105, MS 106, MS 107, and the first half of MS 108.
An exception must made for S. Hilmy (1987), to whom this section owes much.
Hilmy (1987, p. 301, quote 429) argues convincingly that the several drafts for a foreword in MS 109 were intended as a foreword to TS 213 and not to what is published as Philosophical Remarks.
Odgen & Richards put less emphasis on ‘images’ and their terminology can more readily be interpreted in a behaviouristic fashion. See Hilmy (1987, pp. 118–119).
See Hilmy (1987, pp. 110–112).
I am not saying that the attack on the psychological meaning-theory and its various offshoots were Wittgenstein’s sole point of departure. On the contrary, it is one of many. Other points of departure are two topics that were discussed by the Vienna Circle in the 1920’s, the relation of physical space to visual space and the problem of solipsism and other minds (see further chapter 4, §la). Still another point of departure has of course to do with the philosophy of mathematics, which is not our topic here, however.
See especially Fodor (1975, pp. 2–9) for this misleading interpretation of Wittgenstein and also Ryle.
In saying that criteria are not an object of knowledge in the sense that the description of criteria does not inform us about something we did not know previously, I dissociate myself from the standard epistemological view of criteria, initiated by Albritton (1957). The best criticism of this tradition is found in Cavell (1979).
Hintikka (1986, pp. 217 ff.) also opposes this linguistic interpretation, but he forgets to involve the meaning of ‘forms of life’ in the discussion. See for ‘forms of life’ chapter 3, § 2 and 3.
The same sort of distinction is made by Hintikka (1986, chapter 11). His terminology (‘primary versus secondary language-games’) is misleading, however, for it is in these terms that Wittgenstein describes one specific example of vertical relations between language-games, i.e. the language-games of primary word-meanings and secondary word-meanings. These language-games have rather idiosyncratic features that cannot be predicated of all language-games vertically related to other language-games. See chapter 6, § 5 for the logic of secondary word-meanings.
Not only his Der Untergang des Abendlandes (1923) but also his far less well-known Der Mensch und der Technik (1931) contain passages that probably influenced Wittgenstein’s use of ‘technique’. Spengler defines ‘technique’ as the ‘Anwendung’, the practical handling of things (p. 8). The products of technique are not the result of abstract reasoning but of a practice. Just as a way of acting underlies thinking, so speaking underlies grammar. The opposite relations are considered by Spengler to be typical of rationalistic philosophy, a philosophy based on the prejudice ‘that the sentence expresses a judgement or thought’ (p. 41). For a striking resemblance with this quote, see Philosophical Investigations, § 317.
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Ter Hark, M. (1990). Language-Games as Context of Meaning. In: Beyond the Inner and the Outer. Synthese Library, vol 214. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2089-7_2
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