Abstract
Self-reference or self-applicability is an important theme throughout Computer Science, from recursive programs to undecidability results, from bootstrapping to program semantics. A relative latecomer to this list is Artificial Intelligence, for only recently has self-reference been seen as an important attribute of intelligent systems. This paper will give a bird’s-eye (and personal) overview of some of the issues surrounding self-reference in AI, especially those related to non-monotonicity, reification, and intentionality.
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Perlis, D. (1990). Thing and Thought. In: Kyburg, H.E., Loui, R.P., Carlson, G.N. (eds) Knowledge Representation and Defeasible Reasoning. Studies in Cognitive Systems, vol 5. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-0553-5_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-0553-5_5
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