Abstract
Wigmore thought that there was a science of proof underlying legal reasoning that could be displayed in any given case as a graphic sequence of argumentation from the evidence in the case leading to the ultimate probandum. Argumentation technology has now vindicated this approach by providing useful qualitative methods that can be applied to identifying, analyzing, and evaluating the pro and con arguments put forward by both sides in a trial. In this chapter, it is shown how to apply argumentation schemes, such as argument from witness testimony, using argument diagrams applied to typical sequences of evidence-based legal reasoning in which there is a successive refinement of arguments displayed as the evidence comes into a case. It is shown how argument from applying rules to cases, teleological (goal-directed reasoning), argument from expert witness testimony, and abductive reasoning (represented as inference to the best explanation) are centrally important for this purpose.
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Walton, D. (2018). Legal Reasoning and Argumentation. In: Bongiovanni, G., Postema, G., Rotolo, A., Sartor, G., Valentini, C., Walton, D. (eds) Handbook of Legal Reasoning and Argumentation. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9452-0_3
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