Abstract
This essay addresses the methodology of philosophy of science and illustrates how formal and empirical methods can be fruitfully combined. Special emphasis is given to the application of experimental methods to confirmation theory and to recent work on the conjunction fallacy, a key topic in the rationality debate arising from research in cognitive psychology. Several other issues can be studied in this way. In the concluding section, a brief outline is provided of three further examples.
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Work supported by a grant from the Spanish Department of Science and Innovation (FFI2008-01169/FISO).
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Crupi, V., Hartmann, S. (2010). Formal and Empirical Methods in Philosophy of Science. In: Stadler, F. (eds) The Present Situation in the Philosophy of Science. The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9115-4_7
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