Abstract
Boyle articulated and defended a strict version of the mechanical philosophy, a theory about the ultimate structure of matter. According to that philosophy, the material world is made up of corpuscles of the one impenetrable matter possessing a definite shape and size and capable of motion. Boyle was also a pioneer of experimental science, best exemplified in his pneumatics. Boyle himself distinguished between the two forms of knowledge, arguing that the ‘intermediate causes’ involved in his experimental science, such as the weight and spring of air, were empirically accessible in a way that the ultimate mechanical corpuscles were not. As a consequence, Boyle’s experimental science could not be fruitfully guided by the mechanical philosophy and the success of his experimentation did not constitute significant support for it. This is at least implicit in some of Boyle’s own remarks. What was scientific about the scientific revolution, in my view, was the emergence of experimental science as distinct from philosophical theories about the ultimate structure of matter.
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Chalmers, A. (2009). Atomism, Experiment and the Mechanical Philosophy: The Work of Robert Boyle. In: The Scientist’s Atom and the Philosopher’s Stone. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 279. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-2362-9_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-2362-9_6
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-2361-2
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