Abstract
It is evident that the vagueness of coalitional pay-offs implies also the vagueness of such concept like the vector of Shapley values. Its formal reformulation into the language of fuzzy coalition game theory appears to be obvious and purely mechanical. Anyhow, it is worth some closer attention.
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© 2001 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Mareš, M. (2001). Fuzzy Shapley Value. In: Fuzzy Cooperative Games. Studies in Fuzziness and Soft Computing, vol 72. Physica, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7908-1820-8_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7908-1820-8_9
Publisher Name: Physica, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-7908-2489-6
Online ISBN: 978-3-7908-1820-8
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