Abstract
The core C of the deterministic coalition game without side-payments (I, W) is, due to (3.21), a set of imputations which are accessible for some coalition structure (in the superadditive case for the coalition of all players), and which cannot be protested by any coalition.
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© 2001 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Mareš, M. (2001). Fuzzy Core and Effectivity in Games Without Side-Payments. In: Fuzzy Cooperative Games. Studies in Fuzziness and Soft Computing, vol 72. Physica, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7908-1820-8_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7908-1820-8_12
Publisher Name: Physica, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-7908-2489-6
Online ISBN: 978-3-7908-1820-8
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