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Article 3

International agreements not within the scope of the present Convention

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Abstract

The insertion of the provision was the logical consequence of the ILC’s decision to limit the scope of the Convention ratione formae (written form) and ratione personae (States). The sole purpose of Art 3 is to secure that no legal conclusions whatsoever can be drawn from the Convention’s pragmatic step to focus on written interstate treaties. Thus, Art 3 lit a and b decides neither on the legal regime nor on the legal force of international agreements that remain excluded from the scope of the Convention; those questions are exclusively answered by the relevant rules of international customary law. In that way, Art 3 lit b stresses the possible dual nature of substantive provisions of the Convention, which is reaffirmed in Art 4. And finally, Art 3 lit c clarifies that the Convention remains applicable between State Parties notwithstanding the fact that other parties to the same treaty are not bound by the Convention.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See the statement by the representative of Ethiopia UNCLOT I 37, para 21.

  2. 2.

    Villiger (1997), para 419.

  3. 3.

    Waldock I 35 (Draft Art 2 para 2).

  4. 4.

    Waldock IV 16; for the discussion in the Committee of the Whole, see UNCLOT I 36–42.

  5. 5.

    Cf Garner (1933), p. 494.

  6. 6.

    Barbeyrac (1739), Vol I (I) CCCCLXXIII.

  7. 7.

    Geßner (1887), p. 86.

  8. 8.

    de Martens (trans edn 1883), p. 541.

  9. 9.

    US Army Regulations 550–1, Foreign Countries and Nationals, International Agreements, 2008, 1 (“Although it is against (Department of Army) policy to enter into an oral international agreement, any oral agreement that meets the definition in subpara a (1)(a) through a (1)(c), above, of this definition is an international agreement”). See also Villiger (1997), paras 169–170.

  10. 10.

    (1993) 32 ILM 103; for further examples cf Qin (2005), pp. 472–476.

  11. 11.

    Brierley I 227; see also the ILC Commentary [1966-II] YbILC 190, para 3; but see Draft Art 17 of SR Lauterpacht “An agreement is void as a treaty unless reduced to writing.”, Lauterpacht I 159.

  12. 12.

    ICJ Nuclear Tests (Australia v France) [1974] ICJ Rep 253, para 45; for the PCIJ see Mavrommatis Jerusalem Concessions PCIJ Ser A No 5 (1925) 37.

  13. 13.

    Harvard Draft 689 (commentary to Art 1); Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law (1987) § 301, Garner (1933), p. 496.

  14. 14.

    McNair (1961), p. 8; disagreeing: Feder (1965), p. 61.

  15. 15.

    Cf the dispute between China and Japan in 1905 concerning a commitment recorded in a minute, Garner (1933), pp. 496–497.

  16. 16.

    ICJ Reparation for Injuries [1949] ICJ Rep 174, 179; Shaw (2014), p. 142.

  17. 17.

    Mosler (1962), p. 31.

  18. 18.

    For a different view see Secretariat of the UN, Memorandum to the Officer-in-Charge, Regional Bureau for Arab States and Europe, United Nations Development Programme, [1991] UNYB 296, 297, para 4: “International intergovernmental organizations which are the creation of States cannot in and of themselves create new international organizations, endowed with the same international legal personality, unless; they are specifically mandated to do so by States.”.

  19. 19.

    Founding members are OECD, IMF, IBRD, and BIS. The EBRD acceded to the agreement in 1998.

  20. 20.

    2029 UNTS 392.

  21. 21.

    1997 UNTS 424.

  22. 22.

    For an overview, see Kischel (1992), pp. 269–281.

  23. 23.

    See generally on the relation between legal capacity, authorization and restriction in international law PCIJ ‘Lotus’ PCIJ Ser A No 10, 18 (1927); ICJ Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons [1996] ICJ Rep 226, para 52.

  24. 24.

    Kischel (1992), p. 270; Rigaux (1978), p. 455; According to Mosler (1962), p. 44, States are only competent to confer treaty-making capacity on an entity for the purpose of the international legal order, ie for a common interest, which is not the case if a State confers that capacity unilaterally on a subject not known by the international legal order.

  25. 25.

    Villiger (2009), Art 3 MN 6.

  26. 26.

    Cf Yasseen (Chair of the Drafting Committee) UNCLOT I 146, para 5.

  27. 27.

    Le Bouthilliere and Bonin (2011), Art 3 MN 5.

  28. 28.

    Villiger (2009), Art 3 MN 7.

  29. 29.

    For the purpose of this commentary, the term ‘federal State’ is understood in a broad sense: it comprises not only ‘classical’ federal States whose constitutions qualify their component units as ‘states’ but also unitary States with (partially) autonomous subdivisions.

  30. 30.

    For an excellent overview, see Bernier (1973), pp. 13–82.

  31. 31.

    Art 2 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States 165 LNTS 19; Steinberger (1967), p. 416.

  32. 32.

    For the German notion of ‘Länder-statehood’, see Federal Constitutional Court (Germany) 34 BVerfGE 9, 19 (1972).

  33. 33.

    Briggs [1962-I] YbILC 59; para 21, Bernier (1973), pp. 17–24; Wildhaber (1971), p. 257; McNair (1961), p. 335.

  34. 34.

    Crawford (2006), p. 89; Wildhaber (1971), p. 257; Di Marzo (1980), pp. 4–12.

  35. 35.

    Bernier (1973), p. 29 with references to national jurisprudence; Wildhaber (1971), p. 259.

  36. 36.

    Brierly I 223 (Draft Art 1 lit c); Brierly, however, accepted that component units might have (limited) treaty-making capacity to conclude international treaties depending on the constitution of the federal State, see Brierly III 50.

  37. 37.

    Lauterpacht I 138.

  38. 38.

    See eg Arts 72, 79 of the 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation and its predecessor, Art 80 of the 1977 Constitution of the USSR; Art 32 of the 1949 German Basic Law and its predecessor Art 78 of the 1919 Weimar Constitution; Art 56 of the 1999 Swiss Federal Constitution and its predecessor, Art 9 of the 1848 Swiss Constitution; Art 16 of the 1920 Austrian Federal Constitution since 1988; Art I § 10 cl 2 of the 1787 US Constitution; Art 167 § 1 in conjunction with Art 127 § 1 Belgian Constitution of 1994; for further references related to these municipal provisions, see Schreuer (1993), p. 451.

  39. 39.

    Lauterpacht I 139.

  40. 40.

    Lauterpacht I 95.

  41. 41.

    Lauterpacht I 139.

  42. 42.

    Fitzmaurice III 24 (Draft Art 8); for this school of thought see also Kunz (1929), p. 664; Ghosh (1961), p. 81.

  43. 43.

    Waldock I 36 (Draft Art 3).

  44. 44.

    Waldock had the Ukrainian SSR and the Byelorussian SSR in mind when proposing this draft, both being component units of the USSR and founding members of the United Nations.

  45. 45.

    Waldock I 37.

  46. 46.

    [1962-I] YbILC 240, para 16: “In a federal state, the capacity of the federal State and its component states to conclude treaties depends on the federal constitution.”

  47. 47.

    Briggs objected the proposed phrase because it suggests that the capacity of the federal state to conclude treaties depends on the constitution, whereas–according to Briggs–it is based on international law, see [1962-1] YbILC 240, para 17 et seq.

  48. 48.

    Waldock I 35–36 (Draft Art 3).

  49. 49.

    ILC Report 14th Session [1962-II] YbILC 164.

  50. 50.

    Waldock [1965-I] YbILC 23, paras 2–3.

  51. 51.

    See eg the comments of Austria, Finland, Israel, Japan, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States [1965-II] YbILC 16–17. For a summary of the discussion, see Stanford (1969), pp. 60–61.

  52. 52.

    Waldock IV 18.

  53. 53.

    See Kearney and Dalton (1970), p. 507.

  54. 54.

    UNCLOT II 10–16.

  55. 55.

    (1995–1999) 6 RoP Supp No 9 Art 102, para 5: “During the period under review, the Secretariat declined to register an agreement concluded between the IFAD and the State of Bahia (Brazil), an administrative entity not usually considered to be governed by international law for the purpose of entering into treaties.”

  56. 56.

    Nawiasky (1920), p. 109 advocates the view that component units have inherent agreement-making capacity, subject to constitutional limits; for criticism (“purely theoretical viewpoint”), see Wildhaber (1971), p. 263. Nawiasky’s opinion, however, entails the validity of agreements in principle, without prejudice to Art 46 VCLT.

  57. 57.

    The notion of the PCIJ that “the right of entering into international engagements is an attribute of State sovereignty” (PCIJ SS ‘Wimbledon’ PCIJ Ser A No 1, 25 (1923)) is overruled by international practice, which accepts non-sovereign international organizations as international actors as well.

  58. 58.

    Cf Zellweger (1992), p. 52.

  59. 59.

    For constitutions which approve external activities such as the conclusion of agreements, see eg Arts 72, 79 of the 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation and its predecessor, Art 80 of the 1977 Constitution of the USSR; Art 32 of the 1949 German Basic Law and its predecessor Art 78 of the 1919 Weimar Constitution; Art 56 of the 1999 Swiss Federal Constitution and its predecessor, Art 9 of the 1848 Swiss Constitution; Art 16 of the 1920 Austrian Federal Constitution since 1988; Art I § 10 cl 2 of the 1787 US Constitution; Art 167 § 1 in conjunction with Art 127 § 1 Belgian Constitution of 1994; for a constitution of a federal State which centers the competence to conclude treaties on the federal State, see eg Art 246 para 1 Constitution of India, enacted 1950, in connection with Art 14 Union List 7th Schedule; for further references, see Morin (1965), pp. 148–155.

  60. 60.

    For a different view see Grant (2012), p. 127.

  61. 61.

    One school of thought denies the distinct legal position in international law, arguing that the rights of component units stem exclusively from the federal foreign affairs power and that the component units thus act as federal organs; cf Fitzmaurice III 24 (Draft Art 8); for this school of thought see also Kunz (1929), p. 664; Ghosh (1961), p. 81.

  62. 62.

    Or another traditional subject of international law such as the Holy See; cf the 1998 Agreement (concordat) between the German Land of Sachsen-Anhalt and the Holy See [1998] Gesetz- und Verordnungsblatt des Landes Sachsen-Anhalt No 13, 90 Acta Apostolicae Sedis 470.

  63. 63.

    See eg Art 32 para 3 German Basic Law of 1949; Art 16 para 2 Austrian Federal Constitution of 1920; Art I § 10 cl 3 US Constitution of 1787.

  64. 64.

    Supreme Court (Canada) Attorney General for Ontario v Scott 1 DLR (2nd) 433, [1956] SCR 137 (1956); see also the legal opinion of the Legal Bureau in the Canadian Department of External Affairs in Legault (1980), p. 316.

  65. 65.

    Fitzgerald (1966), p. 529; Bernier (1973), pp. 52–64; Rand (1967), p. 75.

  66. 66.

    Bernier (1973), p. 59 with references to the legal opinion of the Government of Canada and the dissenting opinion of the province of Quebec; for the legal position of the German Federal Government, see Schweitzer and Weber (2004), para 73: the Länder of the Federal Republic of Germany may subordinate their agreements with foreign States to a previous exchange of notes between the federal State and the relevant foreign State with the legal consequence that the Federal Republic of Germany acquires the position of a guarantor for both parties.

  67. 67.

    Grant (2012), p. 131.

  68. 68.

    Federal Constitutional Court (Germany) 2 BVerfGE 247, 371 (1953).

  69. 69.

    For Germany, see Beyerlin and Lejeune (1994); for Switzerland, see Lejeune (1982).

  70. 70.

    See the legal opinion of the Legal Bureau in the Canadian Department of External Affairs in Legault (1980), p. 316; Bernier (1973), p. 116; Steinberger (1967), p. 427.

  71. 71.

    Cf Wildhaber (1971), p. 271 para 150 (voidability).

  72. 72.

    Cf Bernier (1973), p. 119 without explicitly advocating the legal construction of the component unit acting as a federal organ.

  73. 73.

    Art 10 para 2 Austrian Federal Constitution of 1920 entrusted the exclusive competence to conclude international treaties to the federal State; the rule was abolished in 1988.

  74. 74.

    Seidl-Hohenveldern (1955), p. 474; for further examples see Hollis (2005), p. 151.

  75. 75.

    Federal Constitutional Court (Germany) 2 BVerfGE 247, 371 (1953).

  76. 76.

    Annex to UNGA Res 56/83, 12 December 2001, UN Doc A/RES/56/83.

  77. 77.

    ICJ LaGrand (Provisional Measures) [1999] ICJ Rep 9, para 28.

  78. 78.

    Cf the 1982 Agreement on Acid Precipitation between New York and Quebec 21 ILM 721.

  79. 79.

    See eg 2005 Outline Agreement between the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Government of the French Republic on Transfrontier Sanitary Cooperation [2006-II] German BGBl 1332; 1993 Outline Agreement between the Republic of Austria and the Italian Republic on Transfrontier Cooperation between Territorial Communities 1889 UNTS 431; both Outline Agreements follow the pattern of the 1980 European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Cooperation between Territorial Communities or Authorities ETS 106, 1272 UNTS 61.

  80. 80.

    Cf Art 4 para 6 of the 1996 Karlsruhe Agreement between Germany, France, Luxembourg, and Switzerland (on behalf of some of its cantons) on Transfrontier Cooperation between Territorial Communities and Local Public Bodies [1997-II] German BGBl 1159: cooperation agreements between these entities are subject to national law.

  81. 81.

    Waldock I 37; the same applies to ‘agreements’ between the federal States and one of its component units, see eg the 1994 ‘Agreement’ between the Russian Federation and Tatarstan, which defines Tatarstan as a State entitled to participate in international relations in accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, cf Danilenko (1994), p. 457; for the efforts of the Tatarstan authorities to place this arrangement under international law, see Quigley (1997), p. 717.

  82. 82.

    Cf Federal Constitutional Court (Germany) 36 BVerfGE 1, 24 (1973); Federal Administrative Court (Germany) 40 NJW 1826 (1980) (interpretation, termination).

  83. 83.

    For the historic discussion on the treaty-making capacity of Commonwealth countries, see → MN 37.

  84. 84.

    UK law differs between British Protectorates and British Protected States; the former is a non-self-governing territory.

  85. 85.

    ICJ Rights of US Nationals in Morocco [1952] ICJ Rep 176, 185.

  86. 86.

    For example, according to Art 4 of the 1884 Treaty of Protection between Britain and Transvaal (BFSP 75 (1883–1884), pp. 1–13), treaties entered into by Transvaal had to be approved by the UK government, which was assumed after the expiration of a 6-month time limit; the UK government claimed the invalidity of the 1895 Extradition Treaty between Transvaal and the Netherlands due to the disregard of this Art 4, see Heilborn (1896), p 166; for further examples, see Fawcett (1966), p. 129.

  87. 87.

    McNair (1961), p. 117.

  88. 88.

    Reprinted in Strack (1966), p. 3 (emphasis added).

  89. 89.

    Cf Geiger (1979), p. 85.

  90. 90.

    As recommended at the Imperial Conferences of 1923 and 1926, reprinted in Keith (1932), pp. 313, 320, and 380; on the international status of the British dominions, see Johnson (1927), p. 481; Keith (1923), p. 161.

  91. 91.

    For the overseas territories of EU Member States, see Annex II TFEU.

  92. 92.

    See eg the 1999 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air entered into by New Zealand in respect of Tokelau 2242 UNTS 350; Declaration of France to the effect that ratification of the Madrid Agreement shall apply to all the territories of the French Republic 828 UNTS 165.

  93. 93.

    Act No 577 of 24 June 2005 on the Conclusion of Agreements under International Law by the Government of Greenland and Act No 579 of 24 June 2005 on the Conclusion of Agreements under International Law by the Government of the Faroes; for the insertion of ‘colonial application clauses’ to limit or to clarify the territorial scope of the treaty entered into by the metropolitan State, see McNair (1961), p. 119 and Fawcett (1994), p. 106.

  94. 94.

    Territorially, these treaties do not apply to Denmark, the metropolitan territory.

  95. 95.

    The British Overseas Territories are parties to many agreements concluded under the auspices of CARICOM, see eg the 1974 Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Agriculture Research and Development Institute (2285 UNTS 607) to which the British Virgin Islands and Montserrat have acceded. Nonetheless, the Agreement has been registered with the United Nations in 2004. For the UN registration practice with regard to dependent territories, see (1945–1954) RoP Art 102, para 31 lit d; (1979–1984) 6 RoP Supp No 6 Art 102, paras 5–11.

  96. 96.

    See (1945–1954) 5 RoP Art 102, para 31 lit d; (1989–1994) 6 RoP Supp No 8 Art 102, paras 5–11.

  97. 97.

    For the participation of the Saar Basin Governing Commission (1920–1935) in international treaties, see eg 77 UNTS 199, 251 and 85 UNTS 451.

  98. 98.

    See eg the 2003 Free Trade Agreement between the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) on behalf of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government in Kosovo and Albania, UNMIK Official Gazette UNMIK/FTA/2003/1.

  99. 99.

    See the Energy Community Treaty concluded between the European Community on the one hand and, inter alia, UNMIK on the other hand [2006] OJ L 198, 18.

  100. 100.

    Araujo (2001), p. 322; Cismas (2014), p. 164 et seq; the Holy See holds the view that—based on Art 29 VCLT—treaties are only binding upon the Holy See on the territory of the Vatican City, see Comments of the Holy See on the Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, para 3 (5 February 2014) UN Doc CRC/C/OPSC/VAT/1.

  101. 101.

    In Art 1 (“definitions”) of an early ILC Draft, the term ‘treaty’ meant not only treaties between States but also between “other subjects of international law”. In this context, the ILC considered the Holy See as a typical “other subject” in the sense of Draft Art 1, “which enters into treaties on the same basis as States”; see ILC Report 14th Session [1962-II] YbILC 159, 162, para 8.

  102. 102.

    Treaties entered into by the Holy See fall into two categories: treaties covering conventional subject matters and concordats addressing issues concerning the affairs of the Catholic Church in the contracting State, see Maluwa (1987), p. 163.

  103. 103.

    See eg the 2006 Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the International Committee of the Red Cross on Visits to Persons Deprived of Liberty Pursuant to the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, ICC Doc ICC-Pres/02-01-06.

  104. 104.

    See eg the 1993 Agreement between the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Swiss Federal Council to Determine the Legal Status of the Committee in Switzerland (1993) 293 International Review of the Red Cross 152; according to the ICRC’s Annual Report 2003, 21, the ICRC has concluded headquarters agreements with 74 States.

  105. 105.

    (1970–1978) 5 RoP Supp No 5 Art 102, para 6.

  106. 106.

    D’Oliver Ferran (1954), p. 222; Karski (2012), pp. 19–32.

  107. 107.

    Due to the extraterritorial residence of the Order in Rome, its legal character in international law has been discussed in several decisions of Italian courts, see eg Court of Cassation Sovereign Order of Malta v Brunelli, Tacali et al (1931) 6 ILR 88; Nanni et al v Pace and the Sovereign Order of Malta (1935) 8 ILR 2; Tribunal of Rome Sovereign Order of Malta v Soc. An. Commerciale (1954) 22 ILR 1; Court of Appeal of Rome Piccoli v Association of Italian Knights of The Sovereign Order of Malta (1978) 77 ILR 613.

  108. 108.

    Monaco (1981), p. 27.

  109. 109.

    Judgment of a special tribunal established by a Pontifical Decree issued by the Holy See in December 1951, reprinted in Breycha-Vouthier and Potulicki (1954), p. 561.

  110. 110.

    D’Oliver Ferran (1954), p. 224.

  111. 111.

    For the postal agreement concluded between Austria and the Order in 1989, see [1989] Austrian öBGBl No 447; for an agreement registered with the United Nations, see the 1979 Postal Agreement between the Philippines and the Order of Malta 1195 UNTS 411; the latter appears to have been mistaken by the Treaty Section of the UN Office of Legal Affairs to be a treaty between the Philippines and the Republic of Malta which could explain why it was—contrary to the Secretary-General’s practice—registered and included in the UNTS.

  112. 112.

    For references, see Hafkemeyer (1988), pp. 427, 436; Himmels (1995), pp. 213, 229.

  113. 113.

    Frowein (1968), p. 4; van Essen (2012), p. 31.

  114. 114.

    For a survey of the international practice, see Frowein (1968), pp. 94–148; Bot (1968), pp. 67–123.

  115. 115.

    Federal Constitutional Court (Germany) 31 BVerfGE 1, 23 (1973), English translation 78 ILR 149, 166.

  116. 116.

    See Annex V to the Annan Plan of 31 March 2004 (final version), Reference No 829. Available via http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/. Accessed 30 March 2017.

  117. 117.

    The unilateral declaration of independence by the apartheid régime of Southern Rhodesia was condemned by UNSC Res 216, 12 November 1965, UN Doc S/RES/216, and UNSC Res 217, 20 November 1965, UN Doc S/RES/217.

  118. 118.

    Crawford (2006), pp. 74–83; Dugard (1998), p. 383.

  119. 119.

    (1954–1955) 2 RoP Supp No 1 Art 102, para 15; for the United Kingdom, see para 19.

  120. 120.

    Hoffmeister (2006), p. 168.

  121. 121.

    Chen (1951), p. 192; Bot (1968), p. 30.

  122. 122.

    For the British practice, see Whiteman (1963), p. 658.

  123. 123.

    For examples, see Frowein (1968), pp. 96–107.

  124. 124.

    The treaty-making capacity of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus has been indirectly recognized by the Annan Plan of 31 March 2004 (final version), Reference No 829. Available via http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/. Accessed 30 March 2017. It suggests that some of its bilateral treaties shall be binding for the future United Cyprus Republic, while others shall be determined according to international treaty law, Talmon (2006), p. 380.

  125. 125.

    See eg the reservation of Bahrain to the Genocide Convention: “[T]he accession by the State of Bahrain to the said Convention shall in no way constitute recognition of Israel or be a cause for the establishment of any relations of any kind therewith.”

  126. 126.

    Cf Art 1 para 4 of the 1977 Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 which classifies an armed struggle for self-determination as an international conflict when the legal requirements of Art 1 are fulfilled; for the practice of the Secretary-General as a depositary, see (1954–1955) 2 RoP Supp No 1 Art 102.

  127. 127.

    For details, see Travers (1976), p. 578; cf the non-recognition of the liberation movement SWAPO as an exclusive representative of Namibia due to the absence of free and democratic elections, see the statement of German Minister of State Wischnewski of 12 March 1976, Lower House of German Parliament Minutes of plenary proceedings 12 March 1976, 15,930 (B17).

  128. 128.

    For a comprehensive review on Israeli–Palestinian Agreements, see Watson (2000); Malanczuk (1996), p. 485; Quigley (1997), pp. 733–740.

  129. 129.

    Barbaris (1983), pp. 259–264.

  130. 130.

    British Parliamentary Paper (1968) Cmnd 3504.

  131. 131.

    19 ILM 398, 401.

  132. 132.

    13 ILM 1244.

  133. 133.

    13 ILM 1467.

  134. 134.

    14 ILM 39.

  135. 135.

    Cf Barbaris (1983), p. 261.

  136. 136.

    Reprinted in Official Records of the General Assembly 34th Session 1161st Meeting, UN Doc A/AC.109/PV.1161, 61 (1979).

  137. 137.

    Art 1 para 4 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions.

  138. 138.

    The proposal to require recognition by a competent regional international organization was not adopted, Sandoz et al (1987), Art 96 Protocol I para 3763 with further references.

  139. 139.

    This question has to be distinguished from a possible international personality of insurgents, which is commonly deduced from the common Art 3 of the four Geneva Conventions, Abi-Saab (1988), pp. 217, 223; for an opposite view Moir (2002), p. 65.

  140. 140.

    36 ILM 258.

  141. 141.

    27 ILM 954.

  142. 142.

    UN Doc S/1996/1034.

  143. 143.

    See eg Art 28 of the peace agreement between the Republic of Sierra Leone and the RUF, UN Doc S/1996/1034: “The Government of Côte d’Ivoire, the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the Commonwealth shall stand as moral guarantors that this Peace Agreement is implemented with integrity and in good faith by both parties.”

  144. 144.

    In favor of an international agreement-making capacity of civil war factions Kooijmans (1998), pp. 333, 339.

  145. 145.

    ILC Report 14th Session [1962-II] YbILC 159, 162; see also Fitzmaurice III 24, 32: “for instance, insurgents recognized as belligerents in a civil war would certainly possess the capacity to enter into international agreements with third Powers about the conduct of the civil war and matters arising out of it, affecting those powers”.

  146. 146.

    McNair (1961), p. 680; Neff (1995), p. 41; Cassese (2004), pp. 1134–1135.

  147. 147.

    Special Court for Sierra Leone Prosecutor v Kallon and Kamara (Appeals Chamber) (Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lomé Accord Amnesty) SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E), SCSL-2004-16-AR72(E), 13 March 2004.

  148. 148.

    See UN Doc S/1996/1034.

  149. 149.

    Special Court for Sierra Leone Prosecutor v Kallon and Kamara (Appeals Chamber) (Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lomé Accord Amnesty) SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E), SCSL-2004-16-AR72(E), 13 March 2004, paras 47–48.

  150. 150.

    Special Court for Sierra Leone Prosecutor v Kallon and Kamara (Appeals Chamber) (Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lomé Accord Amnesty) SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E), SCSL-2004-16-AR72(E), 13 March 2004, para 48.

  151. 151.

    Special Court for Sierra Leone Prosecutor v Kallon and Kamara (Appeals Chamber) (Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lomé Accord Amnesty) SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E), SCSL-2004-16-AR72(E), 13 March 2004, para 43.

  152. 152.

    Lauterpacht (1939), p. 4. If the treaty exceeds these functional limits, the third State unlawfully intervenes into the internal affairs of the contested de iure government, see Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law (1987) § 203.

  153. 153.

    McNair (1961), p. 680.

  154. 154.

    Letter of the Foreign Office addressed to Justice Bucknill (1939), reprinted in Lauterpacht (1939), p. 3.

  155. 155.

    Art 3 para 2 subpara 4 of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949.

  156. 156.

    Brownlie (1992), pp. 8–9.

  157. 157.

    Grotius (1646/1964 II), p. 397; de Vitoria implied the equality and the overall principle capacity of every human being and of all peoples, see de Vitoria (1532/1964), p. 120; see also Soder (1955), pp. 80–94. On early theories of the universality of international law, see Bull (1992), pp. 65, 80–83. On Grotius’ views with regard to indigenous peoples, see Higgins (1992), pp. 267, 278.

  158. 158.

    Tahvanainen (2005), p. 400.

  159. 159.

    Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v United States) (1928) 2 RIAA 829, 831; for an earlier case, Cayuga Indians (Great Britain v United States) (1926) 6 RIAA 173, 176, 179.

  160. 160.

    Final Report submitted by SR Martínez, Study on Treaties, Agreements and Other Constructive Arrangements between States and Indigenous Populations (1999) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/20, para 270; Brownlie (1992), p. 8; Wiessner (1995), pp. 576, 593. The US Supreme Court chose a somewhat similar approach in the so-called ‘Marshall trilogy’, notably in Worcester v Georgia 31 US 515, 559 (1832) where it ruled that Indian nations “rank among those powers who are capable of making treaties”, whereas in Cherokee Nation v Georgia 30 US 1, 17 (1831) it had established that Indian tribes as “domestic dependent nations” had no treaty-making power with foreign States. The aftermath of these decisions is complex, and the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has not always been consistent and unambiguous. Tribal sovereignty in the United States today is subject to treaties concluded before the Act of 1871, federal statutes passed by Congress (“plenary power doctrine”) and to limitations inherent to their status as “domestic dependent nations”, so that Indian tribes retain but “elements of ‘quasi-sovereign’ authority”; see Supreme Court (United States) Oliphant v Suquamish Indian Tribe 435 US 191, 208 (1978). In United States v Wheeler 435 US 313, 323 (1978), the Supreme Court concluded that “[t]he sovereignty that the Indian tribes retain is of a unique and limited character. It exists only at the sufferance of Congress and is subject to complete defeasance.”

  161. 161.

    Federal Court Trial Division (Canada) Pawis v The Queen 102 DLR (3rd) 602, 607 (1979): a contract which constitutes special relations between the Sovereign and a group of her subjects.

  162. 162.

    Grammond (1994), p. 57.

  163. 163.

    Privy Council (New Zealand) Haoni Te Heuheu Tukino v Aotea District Maori Land Board [1941] NZLR 590.

  164. 164.

    Supreme Court (Canada) Simon v The Queen [1995] 2 SCR 387, 24 DLR (4th) 690, para 33; see also R v White and Bob [1964] 50 DLR (2nd) 613 at 617.

  165. 165.

    The agreements were concluded in the framework of the Tribal Self Governance Demonstration Project of 1988; see for the history of US treaty practice with American Indian people, Prucha (1995), p. 1.

  166. 166.

    For example, the 1975 James Bay Agreement, the 1975 Northern Québec Agreement, the 1978 Northeastern Québec Agreement and the 1984 Inuvialuit Final Agreement; Final Report submitted by SR Martínez, Study on Treaties, Agreements and Other Constructive Arrangements between States and Indigenous Populations (1999) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/20, para 87.

  167. 167.

    The judicial ‘turning point’ in Australia was the High Court’s decision in Mabo v Queensland 107 Australian Law Reports 1, 175 CLR 1 (1992); the Native Title Act of 1993 was the Keating government’s affirmative legislative response to this judgment.

  168. 168.

    See § 35 subsection 1 Canadian Constitution Act of 1982: “The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed.” Subsection 3: “For greater certainty, in subsection (1) ‘treaty rights’ includes rights that now exist by way of land claims agreements or may be so acquired.”

  169. 169.

    But see Anaya (2004), p. 175: “agreements with indigenous peoples increasingly are acknowledged to be matters of international concern and hence, in their own rights, can be said to have an international character”.

  170. 170.

    The WHO concludes two types of contracts with NGOs: specific Project Agreements and Agreements for the Performance of Work, cf Lindblom (2005), p. 505.

  171. 171.

    See the UNHCR’s model Framework Agreement for Operational Partnership (FAOP).

  172. 172.

    The WFP has concluded so called ‘field level agreements’ with about 16 NGOs, some 2000 local NGOs. For details, see www.wfp.org/. Accessed 30 March 2017.

  173. 173.

    The perplexing confusion in terminology is unraveled by Götz (2008), p. 231.

  174. 174.

    For a survey of relevant Memoranda of Understanding, letters of understanding, partnership agreements, etc, see Lindblom (2005), p. 496 et seq.

  175. 175.

    Lindblom (2005), p. 508.

  176. 176.

    [1996] OJ L 163, 1.

  177. 177.

    Lindblom (2005), p. 520.

  178. 178.

    For the respective opinion in the ILC, see ILC Report 11th Session [1959-II] YbILC 87, 96, para 4; ILC Report 14th Session [1962-II] YbILC 159, 162, para 8.

  179. 179.

    See Schmalenbach (2016), pp. 102–103; Hummer (2000), pp. 45, 161–180. Charnovitz (2006), pp. 348, 352 et seq gives historic examples for the contributions of NGOs to “development, interpretation, judicial application, and enforcement of international law”.

  180. 180.

    See eg Charnovitz (2006), pp. 368–372. For the long-standing involvement of NGOs as ‘treaty-sanctioned’ consultation partners, see eg Charnovitz (2006), pp. 357–359.

  181. 181.

    1465 UNTS 85.

  182. 182.

    2056 UNTS 211.

  183. 183.

    2045 UNTS 224.

  184. 184.

    32 ILM 1480.

  185. 185.

    See eg Art IV § 11 of the 1947 Agreement Regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, UNGA Res 169 (II), UN Doc A/RES/169 (II), 11 UNTS 11. See also Hummer (2000), pp. 196–197.

  186. 186.

    For a definition, see UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements, State Contracts (2004), p. 3.

  187. 187.

    For further examples see Crawford (2012), p. 627.

  188. 188.

    1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 1833 UNTS 3, Annex III, Art 21.

  189. 189.

    ILC Report 11th Session [1959-II] YbILC 87, 96, para 4; ILC Report 14th Session [1962-II] YbILC 159, 162, para 8.

  190. 190.

    PCIJ Payment of Various Serbian Loans Issued in France PCIJ Ser A No 20 (1929) and Payment in Gold of Brazilian Federal Loans Contracted in France PCIJ Ser A No 21 (1929).

  191. 191.

    ICJ Anglo-Iranian Oil [1952] ICJ Rep 93, 112.

  192. 192.

    On stabilization clauses, see Coale (2002), pp. 220–223.

  193. 193.

    Maniruzzaman (2001), p. 316.

  194. 194.

    Böckstiegel (1971), p. 344.

  195. 195.

    Arato (2015), p. 241.

  196. 196.

    Mann (1967), pp. 1–37; Mann (1975), pp. 562–567.

  197. 197.

    (1979) 58-II AnnIDI 192–195.

  198. 198.

    It is disputed whether the proper law of the agreement chosen by the parties and the law from which the agreement’s binding force derives have to be distinguished. The doctrine of the ‘basic legal order’ (Grundlegung) answers this question in the affirmative: Weil (1981), pp. 549, 559; Tschanz (1984), pp. 245, 259; according to Maniruzzaman (1999), pp. 141, 150, 153 the crucial question is which legal order permits the parties to choose a proper law on which basis the contract’s binding force must be evaluated; this view is supported by Arbitrator Dupuy in Texaco v Libya (1977) 53 ILR 389, 443.

  199. 199.

    It is disputed whether the parties’ true intention to internationalize the contract may be presumed by certain contractual elements; see Jennings (1961), p. 177; Schachter (1991), pp. 305–314.

  200. 200.

    Verdross (1964), p. 230.

  201. 201.

    Bourquin (1960), pp. 860, 868.

  202. 202.

    Seidl-Hohenveldern (1975), pp. 567, 569; McNair (1957), pp. 1, 7; Di Marzo (1980), p. 147.

  203. 203.

    Jessup (1956), p. 2.

  204. 204.

    Lalive (1984), p. 185.

  205. 205.

    Lalive (1964), p. 1009.

  206. 206.

    Goldman (1964), p. 177.

  207. 207.

    Fouchard (1965), p. 423.

  208. 208.

    Schmitthoff (1963), p. 259.

  209. 209.

    Goldman (1964), p. 191.

  210. 210.

    For an overview, see Berger (1999); Schroeder (2007).

  211. 211.

    Delaume (1989), pp. 575, 583.

  212. 212.

    For a survey on international arbitral awards on State contracts and their place within the doctrinal debate, see Bernardini (2001), p. 51; see also Lillich (1994), p. 61.

  213. 213.

    For examples see: Begic (2005), p. 27. The investor’s acceptance of the host State’s offer to refer the dispute to an arbitration system (embodied in bilateral or multilateral investment treaties or in national legislation) includes the acceptance of the stipulated clause on the applicable law; Schreuer (2009), Art 42 para 55.

  214. 214.

    See eg Art 42 of the 1965 ICSID Convention 575 UNTS 159; Art 35 of the 2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, UNGA Res 65/22 of 6 December 2010; Art 17 of the 1998 ICC Arbitration Rules 36 ILM 1612; for an overview of arbitral practice based on these arbitration systems see Begic (2005), pp. 107–152.

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Schmalenbach, K. (2018). Article 3. In: Dörr, O., Schmalenbach, K. (eds) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-55160-8_5

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