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Article 19

Formulation of reservations

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Abstract

The notion of reservation is defined in Art 2 para 1 lit d of the Convention. According to this definition, “reservation” means “a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State.” Before the adoption of the Convention, several other definitions had been used in practice and discussed in literature. These definitions are, however, largely similar to the definition given in the Convention. The definition thus reflects the customary law notion of a reservation.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For reference, see Kühner (1986), p. 9 et seq; → Art 2 lit d.

  2. 2.

    Giegerich (2010), MN 1.

  3. 3.

    Tomuschat (1967), pp. 464–465; Hafner (2013), p. 115.

  4. 4.

    As to the Guide to Practice → MN 38–41.

  5. 5.

    Guideline 1.1 of the ILC Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties, UN Doc A/66/10/Add.1 (2011). The Guidelines—which will be referred to repeatedly throughout this commentary—are reprinted as Annex to Art 23.

  6. 6.

    ILC Guide to Practice (2011), Guideline 1.3 (including Guidelines 1.3.1 to 1.3.3) → Annex to 23.

  7. 7.

    See, eg the amendments submitted by China, UN Doc A/Conf.39/C.1./L.13, Chile, UN Doc A/Conf.39/C.1/L.22 and Hungary, UN Doc A/Conf.39/C.1/L.23, compiled in UNCLOT III 111–112, para 35.

  8. 8.

    UNCLOT II 37, para 20.

  9. 9.

    Kühner (1986), p. 29, n 159–161; Schweisfurth (1970), p. 56.

  10. 10.

    ILC Guide to Practice (2011), Guideline 1.6.1; see the commentary of the ILC on that Guideline which contains a detailed analysis notably of the practice of the United States of America; ILC Guide to Practice, Commentary to Guideline 1.6.1, UN Doc A/66/10/Add.1, para 9, p. 111 (2011).

  11. 11.

    The 1815 General Treaty of the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna, 64 CTS 454; Horn (1988), p. 7; Kühner (1986), p. 57; Pellet (2011a), Art 19 MN 3.

  12. 12.

    Pellet (2011a), Art 19 MN 2 n 9.

  13. 13.

    Huber (1911), p. 827, n 2.

  14. 14.

    Kühner (1986), p. 57, n 27 (12 conventions); there are slightly varying figures: Horn (1988), p. 7, speaks of “11 out of 13 conventions […] subject to 67 reservations” referring to a study initiated by the Carnegie Endowment (Scott 1915) while at the same time criticizing these figures.

  15. 15.

    Ruda (1975) p. 112.

  16. 16.

    Ruda (1975), p. 112; Schweisfurth (1970), p. 49 et seq; Wolkwitz (1968), p. 53 et seq; Imbert (1978), p. 25 et seq; Koh (1982), pp. 71–116; in the Harvard Research Draft the practice on the universal level is characterized as: “[…] the Secretariat of the League of Nations […] apparently does not regard an accession which is subject to reservations as definitively deposited until those reservations have been communicated to and accepted by the States signatories of or parties to the treaty concerned”, Harvard Draft 910.

  17. 17.

    International Opium Convention 81 LNTS 317; see the detailed account and analysis by Malkin (1926).

  18. 18.

    (1927) 8 LNOJ 881.

  19. 19.

    For further examples, see Kühner (1986), pp. 60–61.

  20. 20.

    Havana Convention on Treaties PAULTS 3.

  21. 21.

    ICJ Genocide Convention Opinion [1951] ICJ Rep 15 et seq.

  22. 22.

    The position of the ILO is reproduced in ICJ Genocide Convention Opinion (Written Statement) [1951] ICJ Rep 15, 227 et seq.

  23. 23.

    Ibid.

  24. 24.

    See the Report of the Secretary General to the 5th General Assembly, 20 September 1950, UN Doc A/1372; Wolkwitz (1968), p. 56 et seq; Holloway (1958); Holloway (1967), p. 126 et seq and pp. 136–137; Ruda (1975), p. 133.

  25. 25.

    See the position of the Secretary General in his report to the Sixth Committee of the UNGA, 20 September 1950, UN Doc A/1372, paras 3–50.

  26. 26.

    Schweisfurth (1970), pp. 49, 59–60.

  27. 27.

    1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 78 UNTS 277.

  28. 28.

    Report of the Secretary General to the Sixth Committee of the UNGA, 20 September 1950, UN Doc A/1372.

  29. 29.

    19 November 1950, UN Doc A/517.

  30. 30.

    ICJ Genocide Convention Opinion [1951] ICJ Rep 15, 24 et seq.

  31. 31.

    Ibid 29.

  32. 32.

    Ibid 30.

  33. 33.

    Ibid 32.

  34. 34.

    Ruda (1975), p. 135 et seq; Schweisfurth (1970), pp. 49, 51 et seq; Wolkwitz (1968), p. 81 et seq; Koh (1982), pp. 71–116; Redgwell (1993), p. 252.

  35. 35.

    [1951-I] YbILC 100–106, 125–129 and 133, 159–213 and 366–394.

  36. 36.

    ILC Report 3rd Session, UN Doc A/1858, para 24 (1951).

  37. 37.

    UNGA Res 598 (VI), 12 January 1952, [1963-II] YbILC 24.

  38. 38.

    Rosenne (1989), p. 430.

  39. 39.

    289 UNTS 48; for an account of the debate, see Schachter (1960); Ruda (1975), p. 153 et seq.

  40. 40.

    “Unless otherwise provided by the treaty, a signature, ratification, accession or any other method of accepting a multilateral treaty is void if accompanied by reservations not agreed by all parties to the treaty. “Lauterpacht I 123 et seq.

  41. 41.

    Ruda (1975), p. 158.

  42. 42.

    Waldock I 64.

  43. 43.

    Waldock I 60.

  44. 44.

    Waldock I 65 et seq.

  45. 45.

    Waldock I 66.

  46. 46.

    Art 18 para 1 lit a of the 1962 Draft, [1962-II] YbILC 176.

  47. 47.

    Commentary to Art 18 of the 1962 Draft, [1962-II] YbILC 180, para 15.

  48. 48.

    UN Doc A/C.6/SR.736, 13 et seq.

  49. 49.

    Pellet (2011a), Art 19 MN 55.

  50. 50.

    Final Draft, Commentary to Art 16, para 8, p. 206.

  51. 51.

    Waldock IV 52, para 9.

  52. 52.

    For references see Pellet (2011a), Art 19 n 162.

  53. 53.

    Final Draft, Commentary to Art 16, 207, para 21.

  54. 54.

    [1993-II] YbILC 96, paras 427–430.

  55. 55.

    [1994-II] YbILC 179, para 381.

  56. 56.

    For details of the Commission’s work on the Guidelines see Pellet (2011a), Art 19 MN 138 et seq; Pellet 3rd Report [1998-II-1] YbILC 221, 235 et seq, para 31 et seq.

  57. 57.

    First Report [1995-II-1] YbILC 122–155; 2nd Report [1996-II-1] YbILC 38–83; 3rd Report [1998-II-1] YbILC 221–300; 4th Report, UN Doc A/CN.4/499 (1999); 5th Report, UN Doc A/CN.4/508 (2000); 6th Report, UN Doc A/CN.4/518 (2001);7th Report, UN Doc A/CN.4/526 (2002); 8th Report, UN Doc A/CN.4/535 (2003); 9th Report, UN Doc A/CN.4/544 (2004); 10th Report, UN Doc A/CN.4/558 (2005); 11th Report, UN Doc A/CN.4/574 (2007); 12th Report, UN Doc A/CN.4/584 (2007); 13th Report, UN Doc A/CN.4/600 (2008); 14th Report, UN Doc A/CN.4/614 (2009), 15th Report UN Doc A/CN.4/624 (2010), 16th Report UN Doc A/CN.4/626 (2010).

  58. 58.

    ILC Report 62nd Session, UN Doc A/65/10, para 45 (2010).

  59. 59.

    17th Report, UN Doc A/CN.4/647 (2011) and UN Doc A/CN.4/647/Add.1 (2011).

  60. 60.

    An overall assessment of the development of the work of the ILC on the topic is presented by Pellet (2013), pp. 1062–1075.

  61. 61.

    ILC Report 63rd Session, UN Doc A/66/10/Add.1, 37–72 (text only) and 73–599 (text and commentary) (2011).

  62. 62.

    UNGA Res 68/111, 19 December 2013, UN Doc A/RES/68/111.

  63. 63.

    Wood (2013), pp. 1099–1112.

  64. 64.

    See →Annex to Art 23.

  65. 65.

    The term was used for the first time in the 8th Report, UN Doc A/CN.4/536, Add. 1, para 70 (2003).

  66. 66.

    For examples see 17th Report, UN Doc A/CN.4/647, paras 8–27 (2011).

  67. 67.

    17th Report, UN Doc A/CN.4/647 (2011), para 68.

  68. 68.

    UN Doc A/66/10/Add.1—Annex (2011).

  69. 69.

    Wood (2013), p. 1108.

  70. 70.

    For details see 17th Report UN Doc A/CN.4/647/Add.1, paras 88–94 (2011); see also Cede (1999), pp. 30–33.

  71. 71.

    Ibid para 101.

  72. 72.

    A/RES/66/98 (2011) and A/RES/68/111 (2013); see Wood (2013), p. 1111.

  73. 73.

    Topical Summary of the Discussion held in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly during its 63rd Session, prepared by the Secretariat, UN Doc A/CN.4/650/Add.1, para 8, p. 4 et seq (2012); similarly Topical Summary of the Discussion held in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly during its 68th Session, prepared by the Secretariat, UN Doc A/CN.4/666, para 86 et seq, p. 20 et seq (2014).

  74. 74.

    Giegerich (2010), MN 4.

  75. 75.

    An example may be found in the original version of Art 32 para 1 lit b of the 1989 European Convention on Transfrontier Television ETS 132 (the provision has been amended in 2002): “At the time of signature or when depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession: […] the United Kingdom may declare that it reserves the right not to fulfil the obligation, set out in Article 15, para 1, to prohibit advertisements for tobacco products, in respect of advertisements for cigars and pipe tobacco broadcast by the Independent Broadcasting Authority by terrestrial means on its territory.”; for a critical discussion of the notion of “negotiated reservations see Pellet 5th Report, UN Doc A/CN.4/508, paras 164–171 (2000).

  76. 76.

    An example for a negotiated reservation with temporary limitation may be found in Art 17 (plus Annex) of the 1973 European Convention on Civil Liability for Damage caused by Motor Vehicles ETS 73: “Belgium may, at the time of signature or when depositing its instrument of ratification or acceptance of the Convention, declare that she reserves the right to exclude from the scope of the Convention material damage to vehicles, for a period of three years from the date of the entry into force of the Convention in her respect.”; for further examples see Spilioupoulou Åkermark (1999a), pp. 499–500.

  77. 77.

    Giegerich (2010), MN 4.

  78. 78.

    See notably ICJ Nicaragua (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) [1984] ICJ Rep 392, para 59: “Declarations of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court are facultative, unilateral engagements that States are absolutely free to make or not to make. In making the declaration a State is equally free either to do so unconditionally and without limit of time for its duration, or to qualify it with conditions or reservations. In particular, it may limit its effect to disputes arising after a certain date; or it may specify how long the declaration itself shall remain in force, or what notice (if any) will be required to terminate it.”; for further details see Tomuschat (2012), MN 75 et seq.

  79. 79.

    ICJ Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v Canada) [1998] ICJ Rep 432, para 54.

  80. 80.

    Tomuschat (2012), MN 91.

  81. 81.

    Notably the so-called Vandenberg Reservation is a problematic example, see Alexandrov (1995), pp. 113–119.

  82. 82.

    Nowak (2005), Art 41 MN 41.

  83. 83.

    UNCLOT 121, para 2 (explanations by China), and 126, para 13 (statement by the Expert Consultant Waldock).

  84. 84.

    Ruda (1975), p. 190.

  85. 85.

    Ibid.

  86. 86.

    See Pellet’s 1st Report [1995-II-1] YbILC, para 105, p. 143.

  87. 87.

    Ibid para 97 et seq, p. 142.

  88. 88.

    Pellet 10th Report, UN Doc A/CN.4/558, para 2 (2005).

  89. 89.

    Pellet 10th Report, Addendum 2, UN Doc A/CN.4/558/Add.2, para 200 et seq, p. 25 (2005).

  90. 90.

    ILC Report 58th Session, UN Doc A/61/10, paras 138–143 and 157, pp. 302–303 (2006).

  91. 91.

    ILC Report 62nd Session, UN Doc A/65/10, Commentary to Draft Guideline 4.5.1, para 3, p. 182 (2010); for further details → MN 109–113.

  92. 92.

    Waldock I 180, para 15, and 207, para 17 (emphasis added).

  93. 93.

    A good example is Art 10 para 1 of the 1999 International Convention on Arrest of Ships, UN Doc A/CONF.188.6, which provides that “[a]ny State may, at the time of signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, or at any time thereafter, reserve the right to exclude the application of this Convention to any or all of the following […]”.

  94. 94.

    ILC Guide to Practice, Guideline 2.3 (2011).

  95. 95.

    ILC Guide to Practice, Guideline 2.3.1 (2011).

  96. 96.

    ILC Guide to Practice, Commentary to Guideline 2.3, UN Doc A/66/10/Add.1 (2011), para 23, p. 181.

  97. 97.

    ILC Guide to Practice, Guideline 2.3.4 (2011).

  98. 98.

    2187 UNTS 90, Art 120.

  99. 99.

    1673 UNTS 126, Art 26 para 1.

  100. 100.

    ETS 114, Art 4 AP 6.

  101. 101.

    An example may be found in Art 4 para 1 of the 1954 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 189 UNTS 150: “At the time of signature, ratification or accession, any State may make reservations to articles of the Convention other than to articles 1, 3, 4, 16 (1), 33, 36–46 inclusive.”; for details, see Pellet (2011c).

  102. 102.

    The draft uses the term “category or categories of reservations“, Waldock I 60.

  103. 103.

    1064 UNTS 219 (emphasis added).

  104. 104.

    ILC Guide to Practice, Commentary to Guideline 3.1.1, UN Doc A/66/10/Add.1, para 12, p. 340 (2011); see also Pellet 10th Report, UN Doc A/CN.4/558, para 30 et seq (2005).

  105. 105.

    ILC Guide to Practice (2011), Guideline 3.1.1.

  106. 106.

    Sometimes also the word ‘implied’ is used.

  107. 107.

    Giegerich (2010), MN 9; Tomuschat (1967), p. 469 et seq; Pellet (2011a), Art 19 MN 153 et seq.

  108. 108.

    Final Draft, Commentary to Art 16, 207, para 17.

  109. 109.

    See Spilioupoulou Åkermark (1999b), p. 492.

  110. 110.

    Tomuschat (1967), p. 471.

  111. 111.

    This is also the conclusion by Pellet 10th Report, UN Doc A/CN.4/558, paras 25–26 (2005).

  112. 112.

    See again Giegerich (2010), MN 9.

  113. 113.

    Imbert (1978), pp. 84–85.

  114. 114.

    See notably Pellet 10th Report, UN Doc A/CN.4/558, para 15 (2005).

  115. 115.

    Villiger (2009), Art 19 MN 5.

  116. 116.

    UNCLOT III 134, para 177(iv)(c), UN Doc A/Conf.39/C.1/L.136.

  117. 117.

    Pellet 10th Report, UN Doc A/CN.4/558, para 37 (2005).

  118. 118.

    ETS 116.

  119. 119.

    Spilioupoulou Åkermark (1999b), p. 495.

  120. 120.

    499 UNTS 311.

  121. 121.

    93 LNTS 343.

  122. 122.

    ICJ Aegean Sea Continental Shelf [1978] ICJ Rep 3 et seq.

  123. 123.

    Ibid 3, 55.

  124. 124.

    Ibid 3, 56.

  125. 125.

    Pellet 10th Report, Addendum 1, UN Doc A/CN.4/558/Add.1, para 55 (2005).

  126. 126.

    ICJ Genocide Convention Opinion [1951] ICJ Rep, 18, 24 et seq; → Art 20 MN 28.

  127. 127.

    Pellet 10th Report, Addendum 1, UN Doc A/CN.4/558/Add.1, para 58 (2005); for details → Art 20 MN 25.

  128. 128.

    The provision reads: “At the time of signature, ratification or accession, any State may make reservations to articles of the Convention other than to articles 1 to 3 inclusive.”

  129. 129.

    “[…], the Court considers the view expressed by both Parties that Article 12 cannot be read as committing States to accept in advance any and every reservation to article other than Articles 1, 2 and 3 to be clearly correct. Such in interpretation of Article 12 would amount almost to a license to contracting States to write their own treaty and would manifestly go beyond the purpose of the Article. Only if the Article had authorized the making or specific reservations could parties to the Convention be understood as having accepted a particular reservation in advance. But this is not the case with Article 12, which authorizes the making or reservations to articles other than Articles 1 to 3 in quite general terms. Article 12, as the practice of a number or States recorded in Multilateral Treaties in respects of which the Secretary-General Performs Depositary Functions confirms leaves contracting States free to react in any way they think fit to a reservation made in conformity with its provisions, including refusal to accept the reservations. Whether any such reaction amounts to a mere comment, a mere reserving of position, a rejection merely of the particular reservation or a wholesale rejection of any mutual relations with the reserving State under the treaty consequently depends on the intention of the State concerned.” Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between the United Kingdom and France (United Kingdom v France) (1977) 18 RIAA 3 para 39.

  130. 130.

    Draft Guideline 3.1.3, ILC Report 2006, UN Doc A/61/10, p. 324.

  131. 131.

    Draft Guideline 3.1.4, ibid.

  132. 132.

    Buffard and Zemanek (1998), p. 342.

  133. 133.

    Aust (2013), p. 123.

  134. 134.

    Reuter (1995), p. 82.

  135. 135.

    See notably the discussion of various approaches in Pellet’s 10th Report, Addendum 1, UN Doc A/CN.4/558/Add.1, paras 75–89 (2005).

  136. 136.

    “The question of the admissibility of reservations could only be determined by reference to the terms of the treaty as a whole. As a rule it was possible to draw a distinction between the essential clauses of a treaty, which normally did not admit of reservations, and the less important clauses, for which reservations were possible.” [1962-I] YbILC 141, para 35.

  137. 137.

    Pellet 10th Report, Addendum 1, UN Doc A/CN.4/558/Add.1, para 93 (2005); see also ILC Guide to Practice, Commentary to Guideline 3.1.5, UN Doc A/66/10/Add.1, para 8, p. 362 (2011).

  138. 138.

    Ibid paras 96–146.

  139. 139.

    In fact, the Draft Guidelines also treated reservations concerning norms of ius cogens character in that context (see Draft Guideline 3.1.9, UN Doc A/65/10 (2010)). However, during the final drafting process the respective Guideline was for systematic reasons moved to part 4 of the Guidelines which deals with legal effects of reservations and interpretative declarations, see Oral Report by the Chairman of the Working Group on Reservations to Treaties, Vázquez Bermúdez, ILC 63rd Session, 20 May 2011, http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/63/pdfs/reservations_to_treaties_report_20may2011.pdf. Accessed 22 November 2017, p. 6 et seq.

  140. 140.

    See, for example, the statement of Chile at the Vienna Conference, UN Doc A/Conf.39/11/Add.1 UNCLOT I 5.

  141. 141.

    Italics added.

  142. 142.

    Waldock IV 15.

  143. 143.

    General Comment No 24, 4 November 1994, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6, para 19.

  144. 144.

    “The formal requirement in para 2 of Article 64 of the Convention is essentially a supplementary condition, which must be interpreted together with para 1 of that provision. It is recalled that the latter requires a reservation to refer to “any law in force” and prohibits reservations of a general character. This concern probably underlies the existence of paragraph 2. In other words, the information requested of States making a reservation should help to avoid the possibility of reservations of a general character being made.” ECommHR Temeltasch v Switzerland App No 9116/80 (1983) 31 DR 120, 150; for a similar approach see the decision in ECtHR Belilos v Switzerland App No 10328/83, Ser A 132, para 55 (1988).

  145. 145.

    → MN 91–93.

  146. 146.

    30 ILM 800.

  147. 147.

    “Inasmuch as under the Canadian constitutional system legislative jurisdiction in respect of environmental assessment is divided between the provinces and the federal government, the Government of Canada in ratifying this Convention, makes a reservation in respect of proposed activities (as defined in this Convention) that fall outside of federal legislative jurisdiction exercised in respect of environmental assessment.”, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General (2009), UN Doc ST/LEG/SER.E/26, Vol III 678 (ch XXVII.4).

  148. 148.

    Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General (2009), UN Doc ST/LEG/SER.E/26, Vol III, 679 (ch XXVII.4).

  149. 149.

    Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General (2009), UN Doc ST/LEG/SER.E/26, Vol I 410 n 24 (ch IV.11).

  150. 150.

    See the quotation of the Norwegian objection in Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General (2009), UN Doc ST/LEG/SER.E/26, Vol I 404 (ch IV.11).

  151. 151.

    660 UNTS 195, 212.

  152. 152.

    Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General (2009), UN Doc ST/LEG/SER.E/26, Vol I 154 (ch 11A.15).

  153. 153.

    Ibid 168.

  154. 154.

    See, for instance, the Austrian Declaration referring to reservations by Guatemala to the VCLT according to which “Austria is of the view that the Guatemalan reservations refer almost exclusively to general rules of [the said Convention] many of which are solidly based on international customary law. The reservations could call into question well-established and universally accepted norms. Austria is of the view that the reservations also raise doubts as to their compatibility with the object and purpose of the [said Convention]. Austria therefore objects to these reservations.” Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General (2009), UN Doc ST/LEG/SER.E/26, Vol III 531 (ch XXIII.1).

  155. 155.

    ICJ North Sea Continental Shelf [1969] ICJ Rep 3, para 65.

  156. 156.

    Klein (2004), pp. 61–62.

  157. 157.

    General Comment No 24, 4 November 1994, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6, para 8.

  158. 158.

    Pellet 10th Report, Addendum 1, UN Doc A/CN.4/558/Add.1, para 123 (2005).

  159. 159.

    Giegerich (2010), MN 11; but see the more skeptical position by Pellet 10th Report, Addendum 1, UN Doc A/CN.4/558/Add.1, 124 et seq (2005).

  160. 160.

    Villiger (2009), Art 18, MN 38.

  161. 161.

    General Comment No 24, 4 November 1994, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6, para 10.

  162. 162.

    Pellet 10th Report, Addendum 1, UN Doc A/CN.4/558/Add.1, para 139 (2005).

  163. 163.

    Giegerich (2010), MN 12.

  164. 164.

    Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General (2009), UN Doc ST/LEG/SER.E/26, Vol I 410 n 24 (ch IV.11).

  165. 165.

    Ibid 402 (ch IV.11).

  166. 166.

    See the convincing critique in Pellet 10th Report, Addendum 1, UN Doc A/CN.4/558/Add.1, para 104 (2005).

  167. 167.

    See, for instance, the objection entered by Norway: “A reservation by which a State Party limits its responsibilities under the Convention by invoking general principles of national law may create doubts about the commitments of the reserving state to the object and purpose of the Convention and, moreover, contribute to undermining the basis of international treaty law. It is in the common interest of states that treaties to which they have chosen to become parties also are respected, as to object and purpose, by all parties. The Government of Norway, therefore, objects to this reservation.” Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General (2009), UN Doc ST/LEG/SER.E/26, Vol I 404 (ch IV.11).

  168. 168.

    Literature on the subject is abundant: Baratta (2000); Goodman (2002); Lijnzaad (1995); Neumayer (2007); Pellet (2011a), Art 19 MN 81 et seq; Schabas (1994); Seibert-Fohr (2004); Simma (1998); Tyagi (2000); Ziemele and Liede (2013).

  169. 169.

    See notably the formulation of the Human Rights Committee in its General Comment No 24, 4 November 1994, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6, para 7: “In an instrument which articulates very many civil and political rights, each of the many articles, and indeed their interplay, secures the objectives of the Covenant. The object and purpose of the Covenant is to create legally binding standards for human rights by defining certain civil and political rights and placing them in a framework of obligations which are legally binding for those States which ratify; and to provide an efficacious supervisory machinery for the obligations undertaken.”

  170. 170.

    [1997-II] YbILC 56, paras 2 and 3; a similar position is taken by the Human Rights Committee in its General Comment No 24, 4 November 1994, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6, para 6, and in the Final Working Paper “Specific Human Rights Issues: Reservations to human rights treaties” submitted by Mrs. Françoise Hampson on request of the then so-called Sub-commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 19 July 2004, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/42, para 71.

  171. 171.

    Anand (1960), p. 88; Imbert (1978), p. 249; Coccia (1985), p. 16; Schabas (1994), p. 46. For commentaries on Human Rights Committee General Comment No 24 see: Baylis (1999); Redgwell (1997); Korkelia (2002).

  172. 172.

    1249 UNTS 13.

  173. 173.

    1577 UNTS 3.

  174. 174.

    1465 UNTS 85, 113.

  175. 175.

    ICCPR and ICESCR.

  176. 176.

    See Giegerich (2010), MN 33.

  177. 177.

    1144 UNTS 143.

  178. 178.

    Frowein (2009), p. 628 et seq; Jacobs and White (2006), p. 451 et seq; van Dijk et al (2006), Ch 38, p. 1101 et seq.

  179. 179.

    Draft Guideline 3.1.12, UN Doc A/65/10 (2010).

  180. 180.

    Oral Report by the Chairman of the Working Group on Reservations to Treaties, Vázquez Bermúdez, ILC 63rd Session, 20 May 2011, http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/63/pdfs/reservations_to_treaties_report_20may2011.pdf. Accessed 22 November 2017, p. 7.

  181. 181.

    Ziemele and Liede (2013), pp. 1147–1148.

  182. 182.

    See the quotation of the Human Rights Committee in its General Comment No 24, 4 November 1994, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6, para 7.

  183. 183.

    ICJ Legality of the Use of Force (Yugoslavia v Spain; Yugoslavia v United States) [1999] ICJ Rep 761, paras 29–33, and 916, paras 21–25; see also the similar approach in the case of Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (DRC v Rwanda) (Provisional Measures) [2002] ICJ Rep 219, para 72.

  184. 184.

    For references see Pellet 10th Report, Addendum 1, UN Doc A/CN.4/558/Add.1, para 96 with n 224 (2005).

  185. 185.

    “It is clear that the first Optional Protocol is itself an international treaty, distinct from the Covenant but closely related to it. Its object and purpose is to recognize the competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications from individuals who claim to be victims of a violation by a State Party of any of the rights in the Covenant. States accept the substantive rights of individuals by reference to the Covenant, and not the first Optional Protocol. The function of the first Optional Protocol is to allow claims in respect of those rights to be tested before the Committee. Accordingly, a reservation to an obligation of a State to respect and ensure a right contained in the Covenant, made under the first Optional Protocol when it has not previously been made in respect of the same rights under the Covenant, does not affect the State’s duty to comply with its substantive obligation. A reservation cannot be made to the Covenant through the vehicle of the Optional Protocol but such a reservation would operate to ensure that the State’s compliance with that obligation may not be tested by the Committee under the first Optional Protocol. And because the object and purpose of the first Optional Protocol is to allow the rights obligatory for a State under the Covenant to be tested before the Committee, a reservation that seeks to preclude this would be contrary to the object and purpose of the first Optional Protocol, even if not of the Covenant.” General Comment No 24, 4 November 1994, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6, para 13.

  186. 186.

    HRC Rawle Kennedy v Trinidad and Tobago Comm No 845/1999, UN Doc CCPR/C/67/D/845/1999, para 6.7 (1999); but see the joint dissenting opinion of the Committee members Ando, Bhagwati, Klein and Kretzmer; see on that decision Stahn (2000), p. 607 et seq; McGrory (2001), p. 804 et seq.

  187. 187.

    ECtHR Loizidou v Turkey (GC) (Preliminary Objections) App No 15318/89, Ser A 310, para 77 (1995).

  188. 188.

    Ibid para 76.

  189. 189.

    General Comment No 24, 4 November 1994, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6, para 8.

  190. 190.

    ILC Guide to Practice, Commentary to Guideline 3.1.5.3, UN Doc A/66/10/Add.1, para 17, p. 375 (2011); see already Pellet 10th Report, Addendum 1, UN Doc A/CN.4/558/Add.1, para 134 (2005).

  191. 191.

    Ibid para 132.

  192. 192.

    This is, in fact, the solution proposed by Pellet 10th Report, Addendum 1, UN Doc A/CN.4/558/Add.1, para 136 (2005).

  193. 193.

    Giegerich (2010), MN 11.

  194. 194.

    Greig (1995), pp. 52–53.

  195. 195.

    See the detailed description of the negotiation history by Redgwell (1993), pp. 259–260.

  196. 196.

    SR Pellet 10th Report, Addendum 2, UN Doc A/CN.4/558/Add.2, paras 195–200 (2005).

  197. 197.

    Redgwell (1993), p. 260.

  198. 198.

    Ruda (1975), p. 190.

  199. 199.

    Redgwell (1993), p. 261.

  200. 200.

    See the analysis by Redgwell (1993), pp. 259–261.

  201. 201.

    Pellet 10th Report, UN Doc A/CN.4/558, para 52 (2005); and Addendum 2, UN Doc A/CN.4/558/Add.2, para 183 (2005).

  202. 202.

    Pellet 10th Report, Addendum 2, UN Doc A/CN.4/558/Add.2, para 184 (2005).

  203. 203.

    ILC Guide to Practice, Guideline 3.3.1 (2011).

  204. 204.

    ILC Guide to Practice, Guideline 4.5.1 (2011).

  205. 205.

    Cameron and Horn (1990), p. 119 et seq.

  206. 206.

    ILC Guide to Practice, Guideline 4.5.1 (2011).

  207. 207.

    Swaine (2012), p. 288.

  208. 208.

    Ibid.

  209. 209.

    See notably the references in Pellet 10th Report, UN Doc A/CN.4/558, para 50 (2005).

  210. 210.

    See also already Pellet 10th Report, Addendum 2, UN Doc A/CN.4/558/Add.2, para 187 (2005).

  211. 211.

    ILC Guide to Practice, Guideline 3.3.3 (2011).

  212. 212.

    Draft Guideline 3.3.3, UN Doc A/65/10 (2010).

  213. 213.

    Oral Report by the Chairman of the Working Group on Reservations to Treaties, Vázquez Bermúdez, ILC 63rd Session, 20 May 2011, http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/63/pdfs/reservations_to_treaties_report_20may2011.pdf. Accessed 22 November 2017, p. 7.

  214. 214.

    See also → Art 20 MN 16.

  215. 215.

    Coccia (1985), p. 25 et seq.

  216. 216.

    ICJ Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros [1997] ICJ Rep 7, para 47; Pellet 10th Report, Addendum 2, UN Doc A/CN.4/558/Add.2, para 191 (2005).

  217. 217.

    ILC Guide to Practice, Guideline 3.3.2 (2011).

  218. 218.

    Giegerich (2010), MN 21.

  219. 219.

    See the examples quoted by Giegerich (1995), p. 776; Simma (1998), p. 666; Frowein (1996), p. 408 et seq.

  220. 220.

    ICJ Genocide Convention Opinion [1951] ICJ Rep 15, 21.

  221. 221.

    Baratta (2000), p. 413 et seq; Bradley and Goldsmith (2000), p. 438.

  222. 222.

    Del Mar (2014), p. 297; Simma and Hernández (2011), p. 82.

  223. 223.

    As early as 1976 Bowett suggested to distinguish the intention to be bound by the treaty from the intention to formulate a reservation and accords precedence to the intention to be bound, Bowett (1976), p. 76 et seq.

  224. 224.

    Giegerich (2010), MN 22.

  225. 225.

    Giegerich (1995), p. 775 et seq.

  226. 226.

    ECtHR Belilos v Switzerland App No 10328/83, Ser A 132 (1988); Weber v Switzerland App No 11034/84, Ser A 177, para 38 (1990); Loizidou v Turkey (Merits) App No 15318/89, ECHR 1996-VI, para 97; Simma (1998), p. 670 et seq; Giegerich (1995), p. 761 et seq.

  227. 227.

    IACtHR Hilaire v Trinidad and Tobago (Preliminary Objections) Ser C No 80, para 78 et seq (2001); see Gómez (2002), p. 303 et seq.

  228. 228.

    General Comment No 24, 4 November 1994, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6, para 18.

  229. 229.

    Report of the Human Rights Committee, GAOR 50th Session Supp 40, Vol I, 104, 130, 126, UN Doc A/50/40 (1996).

  230. 230.

    HRC Rawle Kennedy v Trinidad and Tobago Comm No 845/1999, UN Doc CCPR/C/67/D/845/1999 (1999).

  231. 231.

    Giegerich (1995), pp. 768–769 and 776 et seq; Simma (1998), pp. 675 and 680; Redgwell (1997), p. 408 et seq; Baylis (1999), pp. 277–329; Goodman (2002), pp. 531–560.

  232. 232.

    Martens (2001), p. 359 et seq; Graefrath (1996), p. 75.

  233. 233.

    CERD/C/62/Misc.20/Rev.3, para 4.

  234. 234.

    For details → Art 21 MN 33 et seq.

  235. 235.

    ILC Guide to Practice, Guideline 4.5.3 (2011). For further details concerning factors to be taken into account when determining the hypothetical will of the state concerned, see Commentary to Guideline 4.5.3., UN Doc A/66/10/Add.1, para 43 et seq; p. 539 et seq (2011).

  236. 236.

    It should nevertheless be recalled that over the years a number of proposals were made which aimed at establishing some procedure for determining the validity of reservations. Reference can be made to proposals presented as early as in 1953 by Lauterpacht (consent of two thirds of the States concerned required) Lauterpacht I.

  237. 237.

    Pellet 10th Report, Addendum 2, UN Doc A/CN.4/558/Add.2, para 155 (2005).

  238. 238.

    Final Draft, Art 72, 270.

  239. 239.

    For details see there.

  240. 240.

    → Annex to Art 23.

  241. 241.

    For details, see the Summary of Practice of the Secretary-General as Depositary of Multilateral Treaties (1999), UN Doc ST/LEG/7/Rev.1, para 168; Kohona (2005).

  242. 242.

    UNGA Res 598 (VI), 12 January 1952, UN Doc A/RES/598 (VI), [1963-II] YbILC 24, para 3b; UNGA Res 1452 B (XIV), UN Doc A/RES/1452 (XIV), 7 December 1959, [1963-II] YbILC 28, expanded this practice which originally was confined to treaties concluded after 12 January 1952 also to treaties concluded prior to that date (para 1 of the Resolution).

  243. 243.

    Summary of Practice of the Secretary-General as Depositary of Multilateral Treaties (1999), UN Doc ST/LEG/7/Rev.1, para 184.

  244. 244.

    For that reason, the ILC adopted Draft Guideline 2.1.8 according to which in case of a reservation which in the opinion of the depositary “is manifestly invalid, the depositary shall draw the attention of the author of the reservation to what, in the depositary’s view, constitutes the grounds for the invalidity of the reservation. If the author of the reservation maintains the reservation, the depositary shall communicate the text of the reservation to the signatory States and international organizations and to the contracting States and international organizations and, where appropriate, the competent organ of the international organization concerned, indicating the nature of legal problems raised by the reservation.”; see notably the commentary on that Draft Guideline in ILC Report 2006, 359–361.

  245. 245.

    Oral Report by the Chairman of the Working Group on Reservations to Treaties, Vázquez Bermúdez, ILC 63rd Session, 20 May 2011, http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/63/pdfs/reservations_to_treaties_report_20may2011.pdf. Accessed 22 November 2017, p. 4.

  246. 246.

    See notably the following decision by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination of 1978: “The Committee must take the reservations made by States Parties at the time of ratification or accession into account: it has no authority to do otherwise. A decision – even a unanimous decision – by the Committee that a reservation is unacceptable could not have any legal effect.” GAOR 33rd Session, Supp No 18, UN Doc A/33/18, para 374 lit a (1978); more generally Simma (1998), p. 671 et seq.

  247. 247.

    See the description of the development and the references in Pellet 2nd Report [1996-II-1] YbILC, paras 193–210, p. 72; Pellet 10th Report, Addendum 2, UN Doc A/CN.4/558/Add.2, para 155 (2005); Giegerich (2010), MN 34 et seq.

  248. 248.

    Cameron and Horn (1990), p. 119 et seq.

  249. 249.

    See ILC Guide to Practice (2011), Guidelines 3.2 and 3.2.1 to 3.2.5, → Annex to Art 23; for the commentary to these Guidelines see UN Doc A/66/10/Add.1, p. 391 et seq (2011).

  250. 250.

    See, eg Arts 32 and 46 ECHR.

  251. 251.

    See, eg Art 5 para 4 Optional Protocol ICCPR 999 UNTS 302.

  252. 252.

    HRC Wackenheim v France Comm No 854/999, UN Doc CCPR/C/75/D/854/1999, para 6.2 (2002); for the different practice prior to this case, see Scheinin (2004), p. 54 et seq.

  253. 253.

    [1997-II] YbILC 57.

  254. 254.

    For details → Art 21 MN 34.

  255. 255.

    Villiger (2009), Arts 19–23 – Subsequent Developments, MN 7.

  256. 256.

    Ibid.

  257. 257.

    → MN 104 et seq.

  258. 258.

    → Art 20 MN 44 et seq.

  259. 259.

    → Art 20 MN 53.

  260. 260.

    Unilateral character of withdrawal according to Art 22 (→ Art 22 MN 4); Requirement of formal confirmation under Art 23 (→ Art 23 MN 25).

  261. 261.

    Reuter IV 36.

  262. 262.

    For a detailed analysis, see Pellet (2011b), Art 19 VCLT II MN 2–17.

  263. 263.

    → Art 20 MN 58; Art 21 MN 35; Art 22 MN 47; Art 23 MN 30.

  264. 264.

    For further literature see also the references attached to the commentaries on Arts 20–23.

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Walter, C. (2018). Article 19. In: Dörr, O., Schmalenbach, K. (eds) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-55160-8_21

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