Abstract
We have analyzed the fundamental “logical structure” of the neo-classical theory of choice (CCT), in its conceptually prior form, as a necessarily true, normative idealization. Now it is to be remembered that we have understood CCT as assuming that the individual consumer chooses under conditions of certainty. But the theory of economic choice has been developed by neoclassical theorists to also deal with cases in which an agent must deliberate on the basis of uncertain evidence. The most entrenched theory in neo-classical economics for situations of uncertainty focuses on conditions of risk: here no unique outcomes can be predicted with certainty for alternative action-choices, but probabilities can be assigned to all the possible consequences of each of the available alternatives. As the theory of choice under risk provides the most settled analysis of uncertain choice in contemporary economics, our investigations in this chapter will concentrate on this model. (From this point in our discussion, when reference is made to uncertainty, the specific conditions of risk shall be understood.) More particularly, we shall begin by arguing for a ramification thesis — viz., that our conception of the basic features of the “logical structure” of the neo-classical theory of choice under certainty (CCT) need not be modified, but is indeed reinforced in moving to the neo-classical model for choice under uncertainty. This investigation will be followed by an examination of proposals by certain economists themselves for alternatives to the conventional maximizing models of choice in an uncertain environment: Simon’s “satisficing” framework and Loomes’s and Sugden’s. “regret theory”.
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Reference
R. Sugden, “Rational Choice: A Survey of Contributions from Economics and Philosophy”, The Economic Journal, Vol. 101 (July 1991) p. 757.
L. J. Savage, The Foundations of Statistics, 2nd edn. ( New York: Dover, 1972 ).
A lucid exposition of these features of subjective probability can be found in M. D. Resnick, Choices: An Introduction to Decision Theory,(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), ch. 3, pp. 68–80. I follow Resnick (pp. 13–14 and 6880) in classifying action-choices in situations wherein only subjective, not objective, probabilities can be assigned to possible consequences of alternatives as genuine cases of decision under risk. Some decision-theorists would prefer to reserve risk situations to those wherein objective probabilities can be assigned, and classify cases where subjective estimates are made as those of decision under uncertainty (simpliciter).
L. J. Savage, The Foundations of Statistics,p. 19.
L. J. Savage, M. Bartlett, . The Foundations of Statistical Inference: A Discussion (London: Methuen, 1962), p. 11. Or as de Finnetti clearly stateschrw(133) “in order to avoid frequent misunderstanding it is essential to point out that [subjective] probability theory is not an attempt to describe actual behaviour; its subject is coherent behaviour, and the fact that people are only more or less coherent is unessential”. (B. de Finnetti, “Foresight: Its Logical Laws; Its Subjective Sources”, in H. E. Kyburg, Jr. and H. E. Smokier (eds.), Studies in Subjective Probability,2nd edn. (Huntington, N.Y.: Krieger, 1980), p. 71, note e.
Originally in J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour. On its use in economics see J. C. Harsanyi, “Morality and the Theory of Rational Behaviour”, in A. Sen and B. Williams (eds.), Utilitariansim and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 52ff. A clear explanation of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility theory can be found in M. D. Resnick, Choices,Chap 4, sec. 3.
G. H. von Wright, Norms and Obligation ( New York: The Humanities Press, 1963 ), p. 111.
H. A. Simon, “A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice” in his Models of Man: Social and Rational,p. 241.
H. A. Simon, “A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice”, or “Rationality and Administrative Decision Making”, in his Models of Man, p. 246; p. 203.
H. A. Simon, “Progress in Philosophy”, in W. Sieg (ed.), Acting and Reflecting: the Interdisciplinary Turn in Philosophy,p. 61.
H. A. Simon, “Rationality and Administrative Decision Making”, p. 202.
For the contrast between substantive and procedural rationality, see esp. H. Simon, “From Substantive to Procedural Rationality” in F. Hahn and M. Hollis (eds.), Philosophy and Economic Theory,pp. 67f.
H. A. Simon, “Rationality and Administrative Decision Making”, pp. 204–05.
Others have reached a similar conclusion for their own reasons. See, for instance, W. Riker and P. C. Ordeshook, An Introduction to Positive Political Theory ( Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973 ), pp. 21–23.
H. A. Simon, “A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice”, pp. 246ff.
Ibid.,p. 247.
cSee, e.g., A. C. Michalos, “Rationality Between the Maximizers and the Satisfiers”, Policy Sciences, Vol. 4 (1973), p. 237.
I. Levi, “Rationality Unbound” in W. Sieg (ed.), The Interdisciplinary Turn in Philosophy,p. 213.
R. E. Bales, “Act-utilitarianism: Account of Right-Making Characteristics or Decision-Making Procedure?”, American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 3, July 1971, pp. 257–65.
A. Michalos, “Rationality Between the Maximizers and the Satisfiers”, p. 232.
Ibid.,p. 232.
R. E. Bales, “Act-utilitarianism: Account of Right-Making Characteristics or Decision-Making Procedure?”, esp. pp. 260ff.
A. Michalos, “Rationality Between the Maximizers and the Satisfiers”, p. 233.
Ibid.,p. 232; H. A. Simon,“Rationality and Administrative Decision Making”, p. 202.
C. G. Hempel, “Typological Methods in the Natural and Social Sciences” in Aspects of Scientific Explanation,p. 168.
C. G. Hempel, “Studies in the Logic of Explanation” in Aspects of Scientific Explanation,p. 248.
G. Loomes and R. Sugden, “Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of Rational Choice Under Uncertainty”, Economic Journal, Vol. 92, 1982, pp. 805–24. See also R. Sugden, “Rational Choice: A Survey of Contributions From Economics and Philosophy”, pp. 761ff. and D. Bell, “Regret in Decision Making Under Uncertainty”, Operations Research, Vol. 30, 1982, pp. 961–81.
G. Loomes and R. Sugden, “Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of Rational Choice Under Uncertainty”, p. 820.
R. Sugden, “Rational Choice: A Survey of Contributions from Economics and Philosophy”, p. 762.
G. Loomes and R. Sugden, “Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of Rational Choice Under Uncertainty”, p. 809.
See the Aristotelian principle described in the last section, p. 204.
G. Loomes and R. Sugden, “Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of Rational Choice Under Uncertainty”, sec. iv.
Ibid.,sec. v.
Ibid.,p. 809.
See esp. p. 46f. above.
G. Loomes and R. Sugden, “Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of Rational Choice Under Uncertainty”, see esp. pp. 808–09 and p. 820.
Ibid.,p. 820.
R. Sugden, “Rational Choice: A Survey of Contributions from Economics and Philosophy”, p. 763.
This theme will be more extensively discussed in Chapter 16.
See J. Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality,especially Chap. II, for an extended discussion of the meaning and rationality of “self-binding” policies.
See p. 72 above.
For an economist’s appreciation of the significance of this phenomenon see S. Hargreaves Heap, Rationality in Economics,Chap. 6, sec. 3 and Chap. 8, sec. 4.
See, e.g., J. Mackie, Ethics:Inventing Right and Wrong (Harmondsworth, Eng.: Penguin Books, 1977), Chap. 7, sec. 6.
See note 38 to this chapter.
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Hodgson, B. (2001). Economic Uncertainty and Logical Structure. In: Economics as Moral Science. Studies in Economic Ethics and Philosophy. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-04476-6_12
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