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The Financing of French Political Life: From Self-control to Self-interested Regulation

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Political Corruption and Organizational Crime

Abstract

This chapter discusses the production of new rules of the political game and their effects on the functioning of this field. It therefore deals with particular rules, produced by and for those they concern. In the light of these problematic conditions of production, it covers the institutionalization of a legislation that is often left vague, or with loopholes, which the courts clarify a posteriori—and therefore co-produce—at the end of disputes arising from its application.

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Correspondence to Éric Phélippeau .

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Phélippeau, É. (2021). The Financing of French Political Life: From Self-control to Self-interested Regulation. In: Valarini, E., Pohlmann, M., Mitra, S. (eds) Political Corruption and Organizational Crime. Organization, Management and Crime - Organisation, Management und Kriminalität. Springer VS, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-34374-3_15

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