Abstract
The accident of unit 4 at the NPP Chernobyl from 1986 was arguably the worst disaster of a nuclear power plant that happened so far. It became apparent to the broader public that the vast amount of radioactive fission products that accumulate during operation of a nuclear reactor have the potential to render large areas inhabitable. The root cause of the accident was therefore of major interest for all countries who operated nuclear power plants, or who had nuclear power plants in its vicinity. Considering all information available today it is safe to draw the conclusion that the reactor design was too complex at that time, and therefore errors have been made. It is not so easy to exclude that this could happen with other designs in other countries as well.
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Mullner, N. (2019). Three Decades after Chernobyl: Technical or Human Causes?. In: Haas, R., Mez, L., Ajanovic, A. (eds) The Technological and Economic Future of Nuclear Power. Energiepolitik und Klimaschutz. Energy Policy and Climate Protection. Springer VS, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-25987-7_15
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