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Wirtschaftskriege

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Handbuch Staat

Zusammenfassung

Wirtschaftskriege beruhen auf Zwangsmaßnahmen, mit denen Staaten ihre Gegner ökonomisch schwächen oder für unilaterale Handlungen bestrafen wollen. Besonders häufig verhängen die am Konflikt beteiligten Parteien Sanktionen. Diese haben zum Ziel, dass der Kontrahent auf einen geplanten Schritt verzichtet oder eine bestimmte Handlung zurücknimmt. Die Führung eines Wirtschaftskriegs ist oft militärischen oder politischen Strategien untergeordnet. Besonders während der Zwischenkriegszeit waren einseitige handels- und währungspolitische Maßnahmen auch Teil der allgemeinen Wirtschaftspolitik.

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Correspondence to Gerald Schneider .

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Schneider, G., Weber, P.M. (2018). Wirtschaftskriege. In: Voigt, R. (eds) Handbuch Staat. Springer VS, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-20744-1_179

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-20744-1_179

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