Abstract
In this chapter surplus sharing problems are considered, i.e. it is assumed that synergetic gains can be obtained by cooperating and the question is how these gains should be divided. Although traditionally such problems belong to the realm of cooperative game theory, we will study them by non-cooperative methods. The objectives are twofold: (1) to show how concepts from cooperative game theory can be implemented by means of noncooperative methods and (2) to illustrate the strength of the subgame perfectness concept ( and the weakness of the Nash equilibrium concept ) in dynamic games with perfect information.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1987 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
van Damme, E. (1987). Bargaining and Fair Division. In: Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-96978-2_7
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-96978-2_7
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-96980-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-96978-2
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive