Abstract
In this chapter, we study 2-person normal form games, zero-sum games (matrix games) as well as nonzero-sum games (bimatrix games). It is our objective to investigate whether for this special class of games the results of the previous chapter can be refined and specialized.
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This question has also been considered in Ponssard [1976].
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© 1987 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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van Damme, E. (1987). Matrix and Bimatrix Games. In: Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-96978-2_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-96978-2_3
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-96980-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-96978-2
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