Abstract
For normal form games the Nash equilibrium concept has to be refined since a Nash equilibrium of such a game need not be robust, i.e. it may be unstable against small perturbations in the data of the game. In this chapter, we will consider various refinements of the Nash concept for this class of games, all of which require an equilibrium to satisfy some particular robustness condition.
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Harsanyi uses the term strong (resp. quasi-strong) instead of strict (resp. quasi-strict). We have changed his terminology in order to avoid confusion with the notion of strong equilibrium from Aumann [1959]
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© 1987 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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van Damme, E. (1987). Games in Normal Form. In: Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-96978-2_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-96978-2_2
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-96980-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-96978-2
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