Abstract
On p. 359f. of [13], Feyerabend gives one of my arguments in favour of the structuralist view: “the statement view makes Kuhn appear irrational while Stegmüller’s procedure does not.” This could create the impression as if, in my opinion, there consists a ‘chain of justification’, beginning with Kuhn’s philosophy of science and ending with the non-statement view. Some of the criticisms which have meanwhile come to my attention seem to go one step further, identifying the non-statement view with an formalistic ad-hockery, devised only for the purpose of defending Kuhn’s philosophy of science. Undoubtedly, Feyerabend would never say something like this. But for the critics mentioned, his remark quoted is certainly grist to their mill. Actually, in my view, there is something like a chain of justification. Alas, it seems to run in exactly the opposite direction!
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1979 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Stegmüller, W. (1979). Kuhn-Interpretation and Withdrawal of Objections Against Kuhn. In: The Structuralist View of Theories. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-95360-6_9
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-95360-6_9
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-09460-9
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-95360-6
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive