Abstract
As I stated previously, there is a passage in Sneed’s [48], p. 132, which most readers find incomprehensible. Having stated the thesis that theoretical concepts are used in science as described by the Ramsey method, Sneed continues: “This is an empirical claim about how science is actually practiced. It must, of course, be defended against alternatives … But it need not be defended against objections that the Ramsey method is in some way epistemologically suspect. That empirical scientists do not live up to someones favorite epistemological credo is for them to defend, not me.” (my italics). In other words: whoever has objections against the Ramsey method, should address himself to the scientists but not to the philosopher of science. Here we have the usual reaction to this: “Surely Sneed does not seriously mean that! The Ramsey method is a philosopher’s invention and, what is more, a very artificial one. If there exists an activity at all by means of which the philosophers meddle in things they are not really competent in, and which therefore is in need of careful justification, then it is the construction of Ramsey sentences.”
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1979 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Stegmüller, W. (1979). The Force of T-Theoreticity and the Ramsey-View Emended. Non-Statement View2 and Non-Statement View2,5. In: The Structuralist View of Theories. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-95360-6_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-95360-6_4
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-09460-9
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-95360-6
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive