Abstract
Two equilibrium concepts are frequently used in connection with noncooperative games. When there is no cooperation among the players and they make decisions independently, the natural solution concept is the Nash equilibrium solution where no single player has an incentive to deviate unilaterally from that solution. On the other hand, when one or several player(s) has (have) dominant role(s) vis-a-vis the rest of the players, one has to introduce a hierarchical equilibrium concept, known as the Stackelberg equilibrium solution.
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© 1986 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Bagchi, A. (1986). Some Economic Applications of Dynamic Stackelberg Games. In: Başar, T. (eds) Dynamic Games and Applications in Economics. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 265. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-61636-5_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-61636-5_5
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