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Common-Property Exploitations under Risks of Resource Extinctions

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Dynamic Games and Applications in Economics

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems ((LNE,volume 265))

Abstract

For a renewable resource under the random hazards of extinction, a variational correspondence principle is introduced to show under what conditions, joint optimization can increase both the resource stock in stasis and the survival prospect of the resource. The analysis is independent of the assumption of particular function forms.

We acknowledge helpful discussions with M. Ma jumdar, L. Olsen, R.E. Schuler, and M. Yano. Thanks are due to A. Haurie, who first suggested we consider jump processes during our work on Clemhout and Wan (1985a). We claim full property rights over any mistakes and shortcomings in the final product.

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© 1986 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Clemhout, S., Wan, H. (1986). Common-Property Exploitations under Risks of Resource Extinctions. In: Başar, T. (eds) Dynamic Games and Applications in Economics. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 265. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-61636-5_11

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-61636-5_11

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-16435-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-61636-5

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