Abstract
Rao and Nam [7] proposed a secret-key cryptosystem based on error correcting codes. After breaking the original system by a chosenplaintext attack, Struik and van Tilburg [8] improved the Rao-Nam cryptosystem. However, the size of the key remains a practical problem also for their improved scheme. We discuss several modifications of the improved Rao-Nam system. The goal of these modifications is to reduce the amount of secret key that needs to be exchanged, while maintaining the security of the system.1
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References
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Barbero, Á.I., Ytrehus, Ø. (2000). Modifications of the Rao-Nam Cryptosystem. In: Buchmann, J., Høholdt, T., Stichtenoth, H., Tapia-Recillas, H. (eds) Coding Theory, Cryptography and Related Areas. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-57189-3_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-57189-3_1
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