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Public Choice — Economic Theory of Politics: A Survey in Selected Areas

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Essays on Economic Psychology

Summary

In this chapter an overview over some selected areas of economic theory of politics (public choice) is given. Politico-economic models are concerned with the interaction between politics and economics and analyze the relationships between voters, government, the central bank and interest groups. One major result from studies of these models is that politicians are often motivated by self interest, for example, they attempt to secure their re-election by applying expansionist economic policy measures before election. Public choice analysis has been widened to cover other aspects, too, like international organizations, and direct investment in developing countries is influenced by political and economic factors. In the next step, particular emphasis is given to compare and analyze alternative political and economic institutions and possibly vectify not only political but also market failure.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Linz, Austria

    Friedrich Schneider

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  1. Friedrich Schneider
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Social and Economic Psychology, University of Linz, A-4040, Linz/Auhof, Austria

    Hermann Brandstätter

  2. Institute of Economic Theory, Humboldt University Berlin, Spandauer Str. 1, D-10178, Berlin, Germany

    Werner Güth

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Schneider, F. (1994). Public Choice — Economic Theory of Politics: A Survey in Selected Areas. In: Brandstätter, H., Güth, W. (eds) Essays on Economic Psychology. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48621-0_9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48621-0_9

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  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-48623-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-48621-0

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