Summary
A model is presented which places the decision to vote or abstain in a rational choice framework. It is shown that casting a vote may well be a rational act, following from an individual cost-benefit analysis. It is argued that (reference-)group interests play an important role when an individual determines actions in the political sphere. Through its (relative) turnout, a group can affect future tax rates to which its members are liable, and an optimal turnout-level is derived for each group. Using this optimal level, within-group processes are analyzed, where certain group members (‘producers of social pressure’) try to convince others to go and vote. For these producers, voting is shown to be a rational act. Other members may give in to this pressure and be induced to cast a vote. These members may be thought to vote out of a sense of ‘civic duty’. Equilibria for the model, characterized by positive turnout, are derived, an example is presented, and the results are discussed.
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Schram, A., van Winden, F. (1994). Why People Vote: The Role of Inter- and Intragroup Interaction in the Turnout Decision. In: Brandstätter, H., Güth, W. (eds) Essays on Economic Psychology. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48621-0_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48621-0_11
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