Following Zermelo’s (1912) pioneering analysis of chess and similar games, von Neumann (1928) devised a standard paradigm, according to which multiperson decision problems in modern economic analysis and other social science are nearly always modeled as noncooperative games in strategic form. This paradigm relies on two key assumptions, of which the first can be stated as follows: Assumption 1. A multiperson decision problem is fully described by a game in extensive form, whose structure is commonly known to all players in the game.
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Hammond, P.J. (2008). Beyond Normal Form Invariance: First Mover Advantage in Two-Stage Games with or without Predictable Cheap Talk. In: Pattanaik, P.K., Tadenuma, K., Xu, Y., Yoshihara, N. (eds) Rational Choice and Social Welfare. Studies in Choice and Welfare. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-79832-3_12
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