Abstract
Network structure plays a significant role in determining the outcome of many important economic relationships; therefore it is crucial to know which network configurations will arise. We analyze the process of network formation in a dynamic framework, where self-interested individuals can form and sever links. We determine which network structures the formation process will converge to. This information allows us to determine whether or not the formation process will converge to an efficient network structure.
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Watts, A. (2003). A Dynamic Model of Network Formation. In: Dutta, B., Jackson, M.O. (eds) Networks and Groups. Studies in Economic Design. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24790-6_15
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24790-6_15
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-07719-7
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-24790-6
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