Abstract
In his event-causal libertarian theory of free will, Robert Kane maintains that in the moments leading up to an undetermined free choice the agent engages in competing efforts of will and he regards this as crucial in establishing agent control over and responsibility for such undetermined free choices. In contrast, Mark Balaguer puts forward an event-causal theory of undetermined free choice in which such competing efforts of will are not a required element. In a recent published exchange between these two, Kane has made the argument that without including the dual efforts as an essential component of undetermined free choice Balaguer’s view falls prey to a certain version of the luck argument. Balaguer has argued that (1) his position is immune to such a luck argument and (2) if it is not immune to it, then Kane’s view suffers from the same problem. In this paper the author explains the nature of their different views as well as the nature of this recent debate in which they’ve engaged. He shows that despite Balaguer’s attempt at rebutting Kane’s arguments he fails to offer adequate defense of points (1) and (2).
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Notes
- 1.
For discussion of Balaguer’s and Kane’s views on whether determined free acts should be viewed as proceeding from motivational states formed by prior undetermined SFAs, see Lemos 2014.
References
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Lemos, J. (2018). Kane, Balaguer, Libertarianism, and Luck. In: Grgić, F., Pećnjak, D. (eds) Free Will & Action. Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action, vol 6. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99295-2_4
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