Abstract
Which ideas and patterns of thought are suited to guiding a science of coevolution ? The point of departure is a scenario that illustrates the differences between coevolutionary research and the conceptual separation of knowledge and action. Jetzkowitz underlines that coevolutionary research is supposed to produce knowledge about a world that is yet unknown since it is one of the future, which can take different paths. As a consequence, he pursues the questions of how the science of coevolution identifies its problems, how it produces knowledge, whom it benefits, and how this knowledge takes effect. Subsequently, various concepts and ideas are combined to outline an understanding of reality which opens up possibilities of sustainable development and unfolds the meaning of coevolutionary research.
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Notes
- 1.
Paul Crutzen in the French science magazine La Recherche, quoted in: Frankfurter Rundschau, 4 July 2006, 1.
- 2.
Crutzen, q uoted in: Frankfurter Rundschau, 4 July 2006, 1.
- 3.
Crutzen, qu oted in: Frankfurter Rundschau, 4 July 2006, 1.
- 4.
Other climate researchers agree, e.g. Hans Joachim Schellnhuber, who also opposes “restrictions on thinking”. Cf. Frankfurter Rundschau, 4 July 2006, 1.
- 5.
In environmental history, all knowledge about the harmful impact of human action on nature is considered part of the tradition of sustainability and environmental studies. Cf. for a very striking example, William Kovarik’s “Environmental History Timeline” (Kovak 2004) where he firmly warns against “dangerous myths” like the myth that one book—Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring—“started all the uproar”.
- 6.
Cf. e.g. Quine (1994, 49), who holds the opinion that the formation of hypotheses is not science, but the “art of science”.
- 7.
Cf. e.g. Popper (1994, 7), who considers any kind of theorizing irrational as theories are developed intuitively.
- 8.
The original title of Bryson’s (2003) book is ‘A short history of nearly everything’.
- 9.
Kuhn (1977) acknowledged these theoretical shortcomings of his theory.
- 10.
As we saw above, already Hume and Kant struggled with these limitations.
- 11.
In much of the English-language literature the term “inference to the best explanation” (Lipton 1991) is used instead, to describe the creative aspects of the scientific process. Lipton attributes the tradition of this aspect of the philosophical discussion to Peirce (cf. Lipton 1991, 58). But it is doubtful that Lipton engaged deeply with Peirce’s concept of abduction , as Peirce’s name is misspelled both in the text and the bibliography. Already Peirce himself realized that the concept of abduction would be hard to establish within logic discourse. Thus he writes in 1903 that the majority of logicians see abduction not as an argument but as a means. He stressed that this is an error of classification. Each of such means constitutes ipso facto an argument, since it tends towards a conclusion. The same authors would most likely accept an abduction in another part of their books as a generalization (cf. Peirce 1983, 96).
- 12.
“One comes to the conclusion that it is a question that may well be asked, and rightly so. This then is described as the forming of an explanatory hypothesis ” (Peirce 1983, 95).
- 13.
Peirce does not fundamentally distinguish between thought and language. Both consist of signs and have, as have signs in general, a representative function. This is why Peirce says: “My language is the sum total of myself” (Peirce 1934b, 189/ CP 5.314).
- 14.
It is interesting to note here the similarities between Kant and Peirce’s views. Kant (1899, 62) writes: “Thoughts without content are void; intuitions without conceptions, blind.”
- 15.
Peirce kept elaborating and changing his concept of abduction , partly due to crises in his personal life, and partly because of the on-going development of pragmatism, which he had previously developed. This resulted in a wide potential for misunderstandings in the later reception of the concept, and led, especially in qualitative social research, to excessive expectations (cf. Reichertz 2003). The following remarks are based on the systematic reconstruction of Peirce’s philosophical ideas (cf. Pape 1989, 2002) and his concept of abduction , as it has been defined by Helmut Pape (cf. Pape 1999).
- 16.
“Abductive hypotheses are entry points into the space of logical relations whether within a theory, or a system of logical relations between linguistic or mental representations and their cognitive role can only be appreciated if their singularity and context-dependence is taken into account” (Pape 1999, 250).
- 17.
It is helpful in this context to recall that Peirce developed the concept of abduction as an answer to Kant’s question about the conditions of the possibility of thought. But unlike Kant , Peirce accepts the irreducibility of perceptions (cf. Pape 1989, 126). No matter how one views Peirce’s answer to Kant’s question—to reinterpret the concept of abduction on the basis of Piaget’s insights, as Grunenberg suggests (2005), misses the point. For the distinction between logic and psychological principles (cf. Peirce 1934a, 118f./CP 5.192).
- 18.
Social science theories taking issue with this conceptual strategy base their opposition on the sources of empirism. This is true for approaches as varied as rational choice theory, as proposed by e.g. Hartmut Esser (1996), and the theory of autopoietic social systems by Niklas Luhmann (1984, 1997).
- 19.
“The purpose of every sign is to express ‘fact,’ and by being joined with other signs , to approach as nearly as possible to determining an interpretant which would be the perfect Truth, the absolute Truth, and as such (at least, we may use this language) would be the very Universe” (Peirce 1976, 239). It is this correlation of purpose and sign that marks the difference between a linguistic understanding following Peirce and Jürgen Habermas ’ views. Habermas adheres to the dualistic conception of nature and society; he sees subject and object as fundamental ontological categories (cf. Habermas 1999). For Habermas ’ reception of Peirce (cf. Habermas 1971, 1995; Oehler 1995; Pape 1989, 63) (fn. 16) and 183 (fn. 86).
- 20.
Peirce uses the expression “desperate forlorn hope” (1976, 343) to describe the presumption that the dynamic object may guide the semiotic process at least to a small degree.
- 21.
“If the improvement of astronomy should rather be achieved, as you suggest, a priori with the help of the relations of those regular bodies, and not because of a posteriori facts gained by observation, then we will have to wait very long and maybe forever until somebody will be able to do so,” Tycho Brahe writes in a letter from April 21, 1598, to the mathematician and astronomer Michael Maestlin, Kepler’s mentor during his studies in Tübingen. Quoted from Lemcke (2002, 43).
- 22.
Voelkel (2001, 23) lists Tycho Brahe, Nicolas Reimers Ursus and Johannes Praetorius as proponents of the geoheliocentric model .
- 23.
This story would make a great historical whodunit, perhaps? Cf. Gilder and Gilder (2004).
- 24.
At the beginning of his time as Tycho Brahe ’s assistant, Kepler had to work on a defense Brahe’s against the attacks of another astronomer, Nicolaus Reimers Ursus. Trying to refute Ursus’ arguments, Kepler was particularly concerned with the problem of formulating hypotheses (cf. Lemke 2002, 51–56).
- 25.
Popper (1994) dates this insight all the back to David Hume’s analysis of inductive reasoning.
- 26.
The chosen form of presentation in “Astronomia Nova” is often seen as an indication of Kepler’s underdeveloped sense of the stylistic requirements of scholarly texts. Thus, for instance, Koestler (1959, 314) writes: “Fortunately, [Kepler] did not cover up his tracks, as Copernicus, Galileo and Newton did, who confront us with the result of their labours, and keep us guessing how they arrived at it. Kepler was incapable of exposing his ideas methodically, text-book fashion; he had to describe them in the order they came to him, including all the errors, detours, and the traps into which he had fallen. The New Astronomy is written in an unacademic, bubbling baroque style, personal, intimate, and often exasperating. But it is a unique revelation of the ways in which the creative mind works.” Whereas Stephenson (1987) shows that the book’s rhetorical structure is by no means the result of stylistic inaptitude. Rather, Kepler conceived the book in exactly the form it was published, to assert his view of an astronomy that sees planetary motions as a result of physical forces (cf. Voelker 2001), for this point also Krafft (1973).
- 27.
“When Kepler discovered the ellipticity of the orbit of Mars, he met a surprising fact (the initial positions of the planet), then he had to choose between various geometrical curves, whose number was not infinite, however. Some previous assumptions about the regularity of the universe suggested to him that he had to look only for closed not transcendental curves (planets do not make random jumps and do not proceed by spirals or sine waves” (Eco 1983, 206f.; Cf. also Hanson 1965, 70–92).
- 28.
This is Peirce’s (1986, 396) interpretation of Kepler’s strategy: “He did not chose this test because he expected a favorable result. He did not know that this would be the case. He chose it because reason itself dictated him to perform this test. Continue on this course, and no theory will hold but the ones which are true.”
- 29.
There is no doubt that in the span of the last 100 years, Earth has grown unusually warmer. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2001, 2007) the mean global temperature increased by 0.6° Celsius (1° Fahrenheit) since the late nineteenth century. Since the 1970s, the increase has become particularly pronounced. The 1990s was the warmest decade since measuring of global temperatures began in 1860: 1998 was the warmest year, 2002 the second warmest, 2001 the third warmest, 1997 the fourth warmest and so on. Notably, global warming increased in (so far) two phases: from 1910 to 1945, and since 1976. There is no prominent increase in the period from 1946 to 1975.
- 30.
The IPCC (2001) assumes the net contribution to global temperature changes (solar radiation and volcano eruptions) during the last two, perhaps even four decades, was rather negative than positive.
- 31.
The IPCC (1996, 5) concludes that “the balance of evidence suggests that there is a discernible human influence on global climate.”
- 32.
“There is new and stronger evidence that most of the warming observed over the last 50 years is attributable to human activities” (IPCC 2001, 10).
- 33.
As already mentioned above (cf. p. 19) the concept of a regulative idea goes back to Kant. Whereas constitutive ideas are at work in reality, regulative ideas (or principles) originate from reason alone and are not derived from experience. Kant clarifies this concept specifically in his letter to Karl Leonhard Reinhold from May 19, 1789: “Mathematics is the most excellent model for all synthetic use of reason, just because the intuitions with which mathematics confers objective reality upon its concepts are never lacking. In philosophy, however, and indeed, in theoretical knowledge, this demand for intuitions is one with which we cannot always sufficiently comply. When intuitions are lacking, we must be resigned to forgo the claim that our concepts have the status of cognitions of objects. We must admit that they are only Ideas, merely regulative principles for the use of reason directed toward objects given in intuition, objects that, however, can never be completely known in terms of their conditions” (Kant 1999, 306).
- 34.
“An institution is, after all, nothing but an organization of attitudes which we all carry in us, the organized attitudes of the others that control and determine conduct” (Mead 1967, 211).
- 35.
Here Mead as well as Durkheim side against the so-called social contract theory, today termed rational choice or rational action theory and similar approaches. Central for Mead is the understanding that social relations that go beyond purely physiological coordination are based on normative elements. These follow rules which make behavior expectable. At the same time, modes of behavior can vary. Durkheim’s (1996, 256–286) opposition to social contract theory is based on his concept of society.
- 36.
The discovery of genetic coding has moved this debate from cultural anthropology to evolutionary biology . Cf. e.g. Ridley (2003).
- 37.
Psychobiologists (cf. e.g. Bonner 1980) differentiate between genetic and tradigenetic information reception. However, the underlying paradigm of information transfer does not pay attention to what media are used in this process. Hence, neither the inner logic of genes, nor the inner logic of culture/language is adequately considered.
- 38.
Cf. e.g. Jetzkowitz (2010, 262f.).
- 39.
Referring to the quotation of Mead above (p. 97), it should be noted that the physiological aspect of sociality is conceived as a prerequisite for the emergence of symbolic sign systems, the institutional aspect is synonymous with symbols .
- 40.
“Culture ” therefore stands for symbols as a whole, not only for the ones which are in fact used by persons or communities. This distinction is crucial when trying to understand and explain social processes. Unsanctioned norms are part of culture and inform the potential for future social developments. Section 175 of the German Criminal Code, which made homosexual acts between men a crime, was no longer applied since the early 1970s. But until its deletion from the German Criminal Code in 1994 it was still possible for legislation to refer to this symbol .
- 41.
- 42.
- 43.
In this way Mead’s ideas about society are corrected and defined more precisely with a concept of indexicality. Cf. Pape (1995). Thus, when Mead talks about “society”, more often than not “sociality” is the more appropriate term.
- 44.
Durkheim (1995, 109 and 203) views society as a reality sui generis.
- 45.
Elias (1998) rejects the idea of a “zero point” in the development of nature and society. He does, however, not distinguish between human sociality in general and specific societies in the sense described above.
- 46.
For a critique of social theories developed from the end of history, cf. Stark (2003).
- 47.
When social learning is discussed in sustainability discourse, it is usually with this question in mind (cf. Wals 2007).
- 48.
This class of philosopher kings rules justly by definition and its decisions are above criticism—the elite of a totalitarian regime (cf. Popper 1950).
- 49.
“Thus the true positive spirit consists above all in seeing for the sake of foreseeing; in studying what is, in order to infer what will be, in accordance with the general dogma that natural laws are invariable,” Comte writes (1903, 26).
- 50.
Cf. Radkau (2008), who published his overview of environmental history under the slogan “Nature and Power”.
- 51.
There is a third possibility from the point of view of Luhmann’s systems theory, for the knowledge of coevolutionary science to take effect: the moral appeal. Knowing that the cultivation of mid-winter strawberries will result in the desertification of entire regions in Andalusia, consumers may decide to give up buying strawberries in winter to not become complicit in the development. But moral communication is, in Luhmann’s systems theory, a parasite which only interferes with the operations of the subsystems of modern society (cf. Luhmann 1989a, 127–132).
- 52.
One perspective is Luhmann’s response to criticism of his theory of autopoietic systems: Since the end of the 1980s he developed the concept of structural coupling (Luhmann 1997, 92–120).
- 53.
- 54.
A simple combination of views from systems and action theory does not solve the problems. Ulrich Beck ’s concept of the risk society illustrates this point quite well. Beck uses theoretical elements from both conceptual worlds, but he does not systematically combine views of social order with intentional action. He refers to elements of social order theory, to show the problems brought forth by the institutions of contemporary society. The chances for reflexive modernization arise from these very problems. However, members of society need to realize these problems, act accordingly and resist the inner logic of the social subsystems. When he conceptualizes this inner logic, Beck relies on Luhmann’s argumentation and adopts his concept of rigid systems. Consequently, Beck can only imagine that ecological problems will be solved by extensive cultural change, fundamentally transforming the structures of expectation—and with them the social and legal order (cf. Beck 1988). Thus Beck assumes historical periods and proclaims a second modernity (cf. Beck et al. 1996; Beck 1999). Such a hypothesis is irrefutable. A social event has either arrived or not yet arrived. The degrees of freedom to act within systemic orders—and thus the chances to change an order—cannot be substantially accounted for, as the concepts of action and order have not been set in relation to each other.
- 55.
- 56.
Cf. e.g. Ott and Döring (2008).
- 57.
Hence we avoid what Whitehead (1925, 52) called the “fallacy of misplaced concreteness” and in this form criticized in Kant , namely that when cognition and action are differentiated analytically, they are turned into concrete units which then are treated as different categories.
- 58.
Peirce adopts the term phenomenology from Hegel, and he agrees with him “that it was the business of this science to bring out and make clear the Categories or fundamental modes” (Peirce 1998, 143). That Peirce is not, however, in agreement with Hegel’s results, can only be inferred from Peirce’s explanation of why he adopts the term: “This is the science which Hegel made his starting point, under the name of the Phänomenologie des Geistes,—although he considered it in a fatally narrow spirit, since he restricted himself to what actually forces itself on the mind and so colored his whole philosophy with the ignoration of the distinction of essence and existence and so gave it the nominalistic and I might say in a certain sense the pragmatoidal character in which the worst of the Hegelian errors have their origin” (Peirce 1998, 143). That Peirce here distances himself from Hegel needs to be emphasized, especially in regards to interpretations which see Peirce in closer agreement with Hegel (cf. Habermas 1971, 142). A more complex assessment of the relationship of the two philosophers can be gained from their respective referencing of Kant: Both Hegel and Peirce observe that Kant’s epistemic theory ignores the state of Being-in-the-world. Hegel starts with the observation that it is not philosophy that marks the beginning of thought but that everyone has a “faculty of thought”. His objective is then to lead consciousness to what it is, and by being conscious of itself develop what everyone already latently knows and needs to know. Peirce , on the contrary, holds on to Kant’s objective to explore the world as it seems to us. Being-in-the-world is not the constitutive principle of Peirce’s own theory but a starting condition of scientific knowledge (see Pape 1991, 25–31).
- 59.
Latour refers to “things” but he does not reproduce the classic ontological differentiation in objects and events already used in ancient Greece. A thing in actor–network theory is a stabilized actor–network where different actants are securely welded into one constellation. When we look at, for instance, the thing milk, it is not only about the white liquid but about “cows, feedstuff, milking machines, microbes, people and other components” (Kropp 2006, 224). Latour’s understanding of the concept follows Whitehead’s usage of the term nexus. But with the outline of a symmetrical ontology , Latour loses the capital which he could gain by the reception of Whitehead’s metaphysics . Whitehead’s theory takes into account the differences in reality (cf. Whitehead 1979, 331), which Latour simply ignores.
- 60.
“Final causation” can be defined as follows: “We must understand by final causation that mode of bringing facts about according to which a general description of result is made to come about. Quite irrespective of any compulsion for it to come about in this or that particular way; (…). Final causation does not determine in what particular way it is to be brought about, but only that the result shall have a certain general character” (Peirce 1931, 92/C.P. 1.211; Cf. Pape 1991, 60–66).
- 61.
Pape (1989, 372; translation J.J.) describes this concept of final causation like this: “A final causation is an only generally defined type of final state of a process, influencing earlier phases of this process in such a way that they show a tendency towards this final state.”
- 62.
“It is (…) a widespread error to think that a ‘final cause’ is necessarily a purpose . A purpose is merely that form of final cause which is most familiar to our experience” (Peirce 1931, 91/C.P 1.211). For Peirce , the evolution of species is an example “of a result of ‘final causes’ taking an actual effect in the history of nature” (Pape 1989, 373). Can a final cause be conceived of for social systems or societies, as well? It is a question demanding extensive discussion. The reader is reminded in this context of Aristotle who saw city-state moving towards self-sufficiency (Aristotle 1978, 154–157/Pol 1261b 12–13) and of Parsons (1966) who builds on this idea.
- 63.
Natural laws describing reversible processes do not yield final states. Only irreversible processes and the laws governing them are finious. Peirce describes this as follows: “Those non-conservative actions which seem to violate the law of energy, and which physics explains away as due to chance action among trillions of molecules, are one and all marked by two characters. The first is that they act in one determinate direction and tend asymptotically toward bringing about an ultimate state of things. If teleological is too strong a word to apply to them, we might invent the word finious, to express their tendency toward a final state. The other character of non-conservative action is that they are irreversible” (Peirce 1958, 286f./CP 7.471).
- 64.
- 65.
The present then becomes a “Nascent state of the Actual” (Peirce 1934c, 313/CP 5.462), a birth state of the real.
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Jetzkowitz, J. (2019). Coevolutionary Science. In: Co-Evolution of Nature and Society. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-96652-6_3
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