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The USSR and the Iranian Revolution

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The Shah, the Islamic Revolution and the United States
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Abstract

This chapter examines the attitude of the USSR toward the Shah and the Revolution. The author argues that, in spite of many sore points and contrasting strategic postures, the Kremlin preferred stability under the Shah to uncertainties inherent in the revolutionary turmoil in which Moscow had played no role. When by the year-end the Kremlin concluded that the Shah was irreparably damaged, they opted for support of the radical clergy, which they deemed most inclined to shout out the West. The dormant Tudeh Party structure in Leipzig, German Democratic Republic, was revamped and the hard-nosed pro-Moscow communist Nureddin Kianuri, who had all along advocated the pro-Khomeini line, was made its new leader. Lapsed or lingering communists and Tudeh sympathizers had by then spontaneously regrouped in cells that soon linked up with Leipzig.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Pravda on Iran, November 2, 1978, Rastakhiz, 13 Aban 1357/November 4, 1979.

  2. 2.

    U.S. Embassy in London to DOS, 19178, November 21, 1978, DSWL.

  3. 3.

    CIA intelligence report on Iran, 15 October 1978, in, “Iran: the Making of US Foreign Policy (1977–1980)”, 15 October 1978 DNSA; Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) director General Eugene Tighe, accompanied by the third-ranking CIA official Dr. Robert Bowie, traveled to Tehran late in November and discussed inter alia this topic, SAVAK files in Bazargan, enqelab Iran dar do harakat, 26–7.

  4. 4.

    Department of State to Sullivan, 282,818, November 7, 1978, DSWL.

  5. 5.

    Unofficial translation of the letter by General Secretary Brezhnev to President Carter dated 17 November, 1978, declassified on 14 September 1995; see also, Department of State to Tehran Embassy in Tehran, 293,685, November 18, 1978, DSWL.

  6. 6.

    Bernard Gwertzman, The New York Times, November 20, 1978.

  7. 7.

    U.S. Embassy Moscow to DOS, cable 30,080, December 7, 1978, DSWL.

  8. 8.

    Kuzichkin, Inside the KGB, 385.

  9. 9.

    For a specific reference to the Afghanistan model by Soviet intelligence officialdom, see Bahram Chubineh (Ed), Yadmandeh’ha va yaddash’hay’e parakandeh’e Iraj Eskandari, (Iraj Eskandri’s recollections and scattered notes), (Berlin-1986), (Electronic Version) 5.158–9.

  10. 10.

    Ibid., 1–37, 5–163.

  11. 11.

    Ehsan Tabari, Kazh Raheh; khaterati az tarikh hezb’e tudeh [Going astray: Reminiscences from the history of Tudeh Party] (Tehran: Amir-Kabir Publishers, 1386/ 2007), 182; Kianouri, memoirs, 376–778.

  12. 12.

    Peyk-Iran started its broadcasts in late-1957 from East-Berlin and was transferred to Sofia in 1960. On CCPU behest the Bulgarian government accorded all logistical needs and housing facilities for a dozen or so personnel, headed by Farajullah Mizani (Javanshir); for a brief background information see, Rah’e Tudeh web portal, http://www.rahetudeh.com/rahetude/Sarmaghaleh-vasat/HTML/dez-2005/radio-peikiran.html.

  13. 13.

    Kianouri memoirs, 381.

  14. 14.

    For earlier references to recruitment of Shahriari by SAVAK in 1963 see, ‘The Kurdish Jumble’ in Chap. 2.

  15. 15.

    The Shah accorded the Bulgarian government an interest-free credit line of 300 million dollars for a major cattle farming complex that would ensure meat and dairy product needs of Iran; the closedown of the radio was a spinoff, Kianouri memoirs, 486–7.

  16. 16.

    The name of the emissary was Jahangir Behrooz, a lapsed Tudeh party member who was then the publisher of the Echo of Iran. Premier Hoveyda’s message to the First Secretary, Iraj Eskandari, promised not just the legalization but also back retirement payments which in case of Eskandari—a fomer minister—amounted to a small fortune; see Iraj Eskandari, khaterat (memoirs), 417; Kianouri memoirs, 483–4; Milani: Persian Sphinx 198.

  17. 17.

    Eskandari had to travel to Moscow to explain the Party’s reasons to reject the offer to their Central Committee counterparts, Kianouri, 484.

  18. 18.

    Ibid., 492.

  19. 19.

    11For Sanjabi’s initial greenlight see his press conference shortly after Abadan Rex Cinema fire, in Sullivan to DOS, 08083, August 24, 1978, DSWL; for his retraction see, cable 08539, September 7, 1979 GNSA.

  20. 20.

    Bahram Chubineh, ed., Yaddashha va yadmandeh’hay …, 4.157–8.

  21. 21.

    Iran desk officer in the International Department Simonenko was in close contact with Tudeh leadership in Leipzig; Kianouri memoirs, 484.

  22. 22.

    Kianouri memoirs, 493–4.

  23. 23.

    Kuzichkin, Inside the KGB, 264, 285.

  24. 24.

    Ibid., 285.

  25. 25.

    Milani, The Persian Sphinx, 198; Kianouri memoirs, 380.

  26. 26.

    In a sweeping purge of the Tudeh Party in 1983, a network of military personnel including senior officers such as commander-in-chief of Naval Forces Captain Bahram Afzali and Iraq war field commanders colonels Bizhan Kabiri and Houshang Attarian were executed following summary trials by Islamic revolutionary courts.

  27. 27.

    Lieutenant Khosrow Roozbeh was one of the founders of the Tudeh military network in 1940’s. His colorful carrier as a hardline communist activist, combined with a rare versatility as mathematician, etymologist, military tactician and a master chess player came to a violent end in 1958. Following a gun battle with security forces he was arrested, tried and executed.

  28. 28.

    295; Kianouri memoirs, 474–5.

  29. 29.

    Kianouri memoirs, 474.

  30. 30.

    The unique impact of the Navid in reanimating dormant cadres has been universally acknowledged by cadres and leaders alike, see Tabari, Kazh Raheh, 295; Kianouri memoirs, 474–6.

  31. 31.

    Mohammad-Mehdi Forqani (ex-Kayhan journalist) in, “rouzi keh mamnou’ul-tasviri emam Khomeini shekast” [The day when the ban on publication of Khomeini’s photo was lifted], Jamaran website, https://www.jamaran.ir/, no. 98587, August 29, 2015.

  32. 32.

    Kianouri memoirs, 512.

  33. 33.

    Stemple-Bakhtiar conversation, Sullivan to DOS, 00060, January 2, 1979, DSWL.

  34. 34.

    U.S. Embassy in Paris to DOS, 01370, January 15, 1979, DSWL.

  35. 35.

    Ibid., 542.

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Bayandor, D. (2019). The USSR and the Iranian Revolution. In: The Shah, the Islamic Revolution and the United States. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-96119-4_15

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-96119-4_15

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