Abstract
The old conception of logical form did not survive the problems that emerged in connection with the dichotomy between natural language and logically perfect language. After Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein, the ideal of logical perfection lost traction. However, the spirit of that conception did not die with its letter. Many philosophical works have been inspired by the thought that sentences must be paraphrased in a suitable language to elucidate their logical form. This chapter explains how the idea of logical form has evolved, as it dwells on two far-reaching developments that marked the analytic tradition. One concerns the characterization of the language that is expected to display logical form, the other concerns the understanding of natural language itself.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
Davidson’s program is outlined in Davidson (1984).
- 3.
Davidson (1968), p. 131.
- 4.
The assumption is explicitly stated in Montague (1970), p. 222.
- 5.
This is the method adopted in Montague (1973). The formal language employed by Montague is unlike L in many respects: it is higher order, it is intensional, and it includes the lambda operator. However, as far as the application of Tarski’s method is concerned, it is essentially like L.
- 6.
The categorial grammar adopted by Montague is a version of that originally proposed in Ajdukiewicz (1935).
- 7.
- 8.
Davidson (1967). Note that although it is plausible to assume that the inference from (5) to (6)–(8) is formally valid, that assumption doesn’t single out Davidson’s account of logical form uniquely. There may be alternative explanations that are no less formal.
- 9.
Davidson defends his view of logical form in Davidson (1970).
- 10.
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Iacona, A. (2018). Formal Languages and Natural Languages. In: Logical Form. Synthese Library, vol 393. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74154-3_3
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