Keywords

14.1 Introduction

Youth policy is not a new topic for European discourse. It appeared in the 1970s and existed as youth dimension in various political contexts. However, since 2001, it is gaining a certain relevance, especially within “youth as a resource” rhetoric. European youth dimension, with the help of OMC , various financially supported youth programmes and youth researches, prepares ground for further integrated European youth policy . At the same time, it is closely connected with economic, demographic, political European agendas. Effectiveness of European youth strategies and actions, primarily, considers positive changes in the most problematic areas. Meanwhile, states with more effective youth policy performing either should prioritize their domestic aims of European youth dimension or be more active in influencing it with their best practices. If not, adaptation to standards of European youth policy may cause less effective domestic policy.

The article considers two cases – Finland and Norway. They, on the one hand, have similar features of belonging to the Nordic states, with dominating universalistic models of policy, demographical similarities. On the other hand, they have different experience of European integration. Finland joined the EU, and Norway is only a partner. Through these two cases, we consider the questions “how European integration appears in the youth policy?” and “are there causal relations between European and domestic policy changes?”

The tools for identifying causal relations and answering the questions above are process tracing based on reconstructed narratives. The analysis dominantly traces “top-down” Europeanization, which is a limitation for manageability of the research. The article compares reconstructed narratives of the European, Finnish and Norwegian youth dimension (accordingly, independent and two dependent variables). It also accounts time and sequence of events. Such approach helps to discover what effects of Europeanization are fare for each case: both in conceptualizing “youth” and in policy performance.

14.2 Is There a European Youth Policy?

Conceptualizing “youth” is quite heterogeneous. Probably it is due to high degree of domestic independency . It is one of aspects where Nordic states differ from the European thinking. In general, the Nordic states can perform as one unity with a common “welfare states” label. Existing particular studies of the Nordic states compare models and policies within this unity of countries. At the same time, close cooperation between the European states (and especially – EU members) in terms of policies, actions and programmes and the common strategies of future development makes Nordic countries a part of a bigger unity.

Youth policies do not belong to urgent European and national agendas . We cannot ignore the fact that this is a very “liberal” topic where national states are only advised to follow the recommendations of the EU. Despite the fact that in youth studies researches speak about “European Youth Policy” (e.g. Siurala n.d.; Wallace and Bendit 2011), there is still no coherent policy at the European level (and illustrates this comparison to CFSP or Environmental policy). Nevertheless, tracing Europeanization in the field of youth is an extremely interesting example of “soft” domestic changes. When the national states are not obliged to adapt their policies, but only advised, it will let us see how Europeanization appears to them. Do the states voluntarily follow the recommendations? Are there signs of Europeanization at all? What are the interests of states when they cooperate in this field?

The background of this research and hypothesis refers to the Nordic states. It is puzzling how one policy/strategy (in the article – European youth dimension and the EU youth strategy) can be realized by the member states, especially so different in internal social care mechanisms. The Nordic welfare states are considered almost the most successful in social guarantees, and many problems that are actual for Southern Europe are not that urgent for the Nordic states. It seems that European standards are aimed to set all member states equally developed, whereas this optimal level is lower than in some of the member states. It raises a question of how Europeanization is appreciated – as a positive or negative trend – and, in that circumstances, what is the influence of it on the national youth policies.

In the case of Finland and its youth policy, Finland is a member state of the EU and thus does feel the influence of the Europeanization and particularly EU-ization. The second case is Norway. Though it is not an EU member state, Norway is a member of COE and takes part in sharing its best practices of youth policy through Open Method of Coordination (OMC ) . It participates in strategy implementation and EU youth programmes. The latter evidences, besides the Nordic identity, unite these cases and create an interest towards them as to both Nordic states representatives and independent cases of European-domestic relations.

14.3 Europeanization of Youth Policy in Nordic States in Narratives

Youth policies and strategies can be conducted by groups, institutions and nations. They interpret political and social environment and agenda. Interpretations in forms of narratives affect perceptions of the others. Since Europeanization can be also viewed as representation of political reality , narratives are tools both for European integration bodies (to affect and distribute European values, policies, etc.), for the member states (f.i. when lobbying their interests) and for non-member states (who have to deal both with national states, the EU with its organizations, COE). All these actors make narratives and percept the narratives of each other. The negotiations between them result in diverse levels and degrees of interpretation (or analysis), with the best solution to keep a balance between over-interpretation and basic semantic level. It is essential to notice that the text is a written work of discourse, which endows it with particular characteristics such as being distanced and linear. These characteristics allow research the written texts by methods not applicable to speech (Eco 1995).

Thus, with Europeanization as a framework , we focus on the national states as the objects and youth policy evolution as a subject. This paper puts together the development of the EU youth strategy with the development of Finnish and Norwegian youth policies at the same period. European processes, key choices and cognitive models will serve as a “role model” of European youth field.

The first narrative is about the concept of youth and its needs. We start on the European level, as it functions as an independent variable. The narrative has been constructed with the help of primary sources , “European Commission White Paper. A New Impetus for European Youth”, 2001; “Follow-up to the White Paper on a New Impetus for European Youth: Evaluation of Activities Conducted in the Framework of European Cooperation in the Youth Field [COM (2004) 694]”; “European Youth Pact”, 2005; “European Parliament Resolution of 18 May 2010 on ‘An EU Strategy for Youth – Investing and Empowering’ (2009/2159(INI))”; and “EU Youth Report. Results of the First Cycle of the Open Method of Coordination in the Youth Field (2010–2012)”:

Once upon a time the European Union appeared. It was young and inhabited by serious economists and politicians; it lived among European States. The Union was growing, and soon children and adults started wondering where the states borders were disappearing. They looked for the borders: in the North and in the South, on the earth and in deep waters, looked in cabinets and institutions, papers and numbers. Nevertheless, they saw that all traditional borders were melting; and only people could create the new ones. Finally, people thought: ‘the EU must take shape with the people of Europe’. They decided to teach young generation of 15–25 years old with this wisdom: democracy, closer links between peoples, and participation of all. It was hard, because relations grew complex, and gap between generations enlarged. Europe needed citizens, and the youth needed motivation to participate in public affairs at all levels, better learn about the Union and its European neighbors, trust its work, and have more autonomy. Almost 5 years passed, young people grew up, and the Union saw that the youth was very vulnerable: it learnt to be Europeans, but it lacked skills and training to achieve prosperous European future. Then the Union decided to help the youth get better work, live in society and family, study and learn. Many other policies decided to join, and help the youth, too. Europe did not forget about teaching young people how to live together in diversity and cooperate.

Suddenly economic crisis hit Europe; it was scary and damaging. The Union was brave and defeated itself, and many dimensions of the Union offered their support to Economy (who was the main hero that time). The youth was offered to study and train abroad; Europe decided to invest in it and modernize youth work. Especially needed help those with fewer opportunities. To sum it up, when the European youth has good jobs and mobility, education is modernized, young people with fewer opportunities are socially included, Europe will become sustainable and welfare.

The European level narrative demonstrates a visible evolution of priorities . European integration here is very EU-centric in the beginning. Starting point here – “the EU must take shape with the people of Europe” (“European Commission White Paper. A New Impetus for European Youth” 2001) – became the key message of the first complex document in this field. It was a period when youth mobility, voluntary service and other areas were recognized at the EU level. Consequently, transparency and access to information were also on the list. Then focus was drawn to youth training and education. The European Youth Pact of 2005 openly speaks about a “better coherence across all policy areas that concern young people”. Of course, in 2009 the crisis and economic challenges enhanced a “youth as a resource” conceptualization. More such terms as “investment”, “smart” and ‘sustainable’ appeared in the youth discourse. Combating youth unemployment for many European states became a key task.

A different story was found in Finnish materials. Analysis and the construction of the narrative were based on youth policy documents : “Youth Work Act 235/1995 (Amendments up to 663/2002)”; “Youth work in Finland”, 2004; “Finland Youth Policy Decree”, 2006; “Child and Youth Participation in Finland ”, 2011; and “Youth Act 72/2006”:

In the year 1995, Finland joined the European Union. It was an important and responsible step, both for the authorities and for citizens. It was a year for revision of the Youth Act, too. The Finnish youth needed better living conditions and inspiration for civic activities. Finland also wanted them to learn ‘equality between generations, genders and Finnish regions, tolerance and cultural diversity and to ensure sustainable exploitation of nature’. Seven years passed, and some of youth workers decided to ask Finnish young people about their wellbeing. It appeared that social status, entrepreneurship and political engagement were not important for the majority of young people. Who were those young people? Little kids, children and young people under 29years old. Almost one third of the Finnish population! There were just few immigrants, and the population was dispersed in that Nordic country. Meanwhile youth unemployment reduced almost three times, young people wanted not just careers, but self-expression. They wanted more diverse education and training.

In 2005 another 10 years passed since the last Youth Act, and Finland had to update the document. It though what the youth needed, and created youth policy. It had to provide young people’s growth and better living conditions. No young person was to be excluded from any sphere of society and policy. Even children – as a child’s rights were very important. Youth (children and teenagers, and people under 29 years old) had opportunities to participate more.

Time passed, there was a crisis in Europe, and also in Finland , but the youth still had support. It was sad that with such dispersed population still many young people did not get more than basic education. School satisfaction rate was one of the lowest in Europe. What will be the measures of future youth work? Participation, non-discrimination and life management – these are the needs of the youth and objectives of youth policy makers nowadays.

The next narrative in this paragraph comes from the Norwegian youth agenda. The following documents led the analysis and narrative reconstruction (noticeably, three of them dated earlier than the European youth dimension is defined; however they are still relevant and hardly significantly reviewed): “The Children Act” 1981, “The Child Welfare Act” 1992, “Education Act” 2000, “Government’s Report to the Stoerting No. 39” 2001, “The Child Welfare White Paper (Report No. 40)” 2001, “Youth Policy in Norway ”2004, “Country Sheet on Youth Policy in Norway” 2008 and “Country Sheet on Youth Policy in Norway” 2012:

In the North of Europe there lived the prosperous and co-operative Norwegians. They cared about their children: taught parents to complete their duties and functions towards children under 18 years old, provided secure environment for children and young people with all essential services, provided education. When children reached 18, measures for them could change, but young persons received social guarantees until they were 23 years old. What children needed was ‘safe and meaningful everyday life’, and advancement of the rights of children. There was another important objective – to involve children, young people and their parents in the non-governmental sector (because many citizens lived in far regions and NGOs could report about local needs).

When COE offered youth policy review, Norway decided to invite foreign experts. It asked them to check whether children and young people participated at local and national level in activities; how effective criminal justice was; life of immigrant communities. Finally, Norwegians thought that integration of different policies was essential to evaluate. When the experts came, they received a ‘cold’ welcome. Autonomy and welfare state tradition, decentralization of policies, and weather, too, played their role. Nevertheless, the country was thankful for the work of experts. It thought that for young people (especially for those with fewer opportunities) in Norway would be useful to know and participate in European programmes: strengthen civil engagement, international understanding and solidarity, European co-operation.

To sum up, Norway is very inclusive society. Any deviation is a problem, including youth margins.

The three narratives reconstructed from policy documents witness several parallels in the youth agendas, as well as core differences in the conceptualization of ‘the youth’, objectives of youth policy and consequent action choices.

First thing, which is noticed immediately, is that “the youth” is defined differently. The age of “the youth” in every country of Europe can be different. In Italy, for example, a person of 34 years old belongs to the youth, whereas in Norway it is always “children and young people” who are in the centre of youth policy (in some sense united with childcare). Following the analysed documents, at European level from the very beginning, the youth was defined as 15–29 years old people. Finland has taken a way of changes: in the beginning, there was not a clear border between a baby, a child and a youngster in policies; on the contrary, at the moment, the Finnish definition of who “the youth” is corresponds with the European one. Interesting, that in Finnish case, there are more references on the EU as particular level of European integration, accordingly, more references at the EU youth strategy.

The story of Norway is very different: it still pays more attention to childcare. In Norwegian documents there are more references on European integration without specifying whether it is the EU, COE or others. Moreover, Norway explicitly mentions European dimension of youth and state’s active support of these debates and policies at European level.

Table 14.1 sums up the relevant objectives of the youth policies. The objectives in Finnish and Norwegian cases, which are close to the European ones for particular time, are bolded.

Table 14.1 “Keywords” of youth policy/strategy in the EU, Finland and Norway
Full size table

Whereas in Europe, youth employment seems to keep its “top-list” positions, it hardly has the same importance for the two Nordic states. Youth well-being and environment are mentioned by both Finland and Norway. It includes, probably, employment, too, but not so explicitly. Instead, the two Nordic states keep traditional priorities and, unavoidably, add new ones. Social involvement and participation, training and education seem to be quite common. Also in both cases, children’s rights are mentioned. There are typical national priorities like criminal justice and health in Norway (very unusual for the other states in context of youth policy).

When we analyse narratives within time, we see a tendency towards more “correspondence” between the European and domestic policies . Again, in the case of European youth strategy, cooperation appeared among the priorities. Similarly, Norway defines national priority in European cooperation.

Thus, the youth policy agendas of Norway and Finland seem to be very similar in the beginning, perhaps due to a common Nordic identity and the welfare state background, but then, in the middle of the research period, Finland turned more towards the EU choices. The economic crisis does not seem to change domestic youth policies significantly (unlike at European level); there is no great shifts in priorities and no new strategies and actions appeared. The period of 2008–2010 seems to be witnessing the biggest gap between youth policy priorities of European youth dimension and the domestic ones in my cases. Nevertheless, approaching to the year 2014, the differences decrease. A kind of agreement in agendas emerges.

The second narrative is focused on “actions ”. It is based on the stories of how actors plan to develop youth strategy/policy, which decisions they make and which mechanisms and institutions involve. This paragraph will include three stories, as the previous one; each story is accompanied with time line with the key dates when documents containing plan of actions appeared. Before passing to the cases, we start with a story about the EU youth dimension:

Once, when the European youth dimension had just appeared, someone asked: “How can the European Union tell its ideas to other countries? What if countries have better ideas and will not need ours?” The Union went thinking. The European Identity was very young, and there was a need to study youth agendas in different states better in order to understand who were European young people. Then the Open Method of Coordination was offered. Voluntarily, many states started to share their best practices and communicate. The Union thought again, and invented better information exchange. It also invited other policies through which to communicate about their youth policy ideas. Nevertheless, again, it was not enough; not all states participated, and few best practices were adopted. “Maybe I could add financial support for states?” – The Union thought, and started various youth programmes. The EU continued telling states about the actions and financial opportunities they could have. Meanwhile, the EU monitored domestic youth policy changes.

When, after crisis, the Strategy Europe 2020 appeared, youth dimension also got attention. The Union decided to invest in the youth and included it in its programmes. The European youth could use more grans for learning, training and studying. At that time, more countries every year wanted to submit their national youth policy reports. The COE even offered to send its scholars to review domestic youth policy; and a few states agreed and financed the researches. In their turn, researchers offered recommendations for how to improve states’ youth policies. No need to say, that more knowledge about the youth in Europe was accumulated. The Union had Youth Strategy; COE helped to form a collection of the best practices, and finally decided to unite all youth programmes into a big one. They left and expanded opportunities for grants and support for Member States; narrowed, but still left actions where non-member states could apply; and even invited socially responsible business. Then, the youth had more learning mobility, and states – more co-operation.

This narrative actually discusses instruments of the European level . They are the Open Method of Coordination with two directions of information flow; organizing youth information access for states; and financial support through the EU youth programmes.

The way the OMC operates in the youth dimension changes within time; it becomes more complex, with several parallel information flows. By that we mean four basic types of youth policy communications :

  • “The EU to all states” direction (which presents common European Youth strategies, programmes’ priorities and actions)

  • “Volunteering states to the EU” direction (states submitting annually youth policy reports)

  • “States to the EU research teams to the EU” direction (meaning complex youth policy reviews which are offered by the EU, financed by states and also used by the Union)

  • “The EU to particular states” (recommendations of the EU research teams to participating states)

The second instrument that was found is organizing information access for the states. It might be a part of the OMC communications , but it is also a part of general information environment of the EU. It includes Internet resources, financing conferences and non-governmental sector and involvement of other policies. The third instrument that I determined is financial stimulation. Those actions , which are the priority of the EU, are supported by grants (basically) through youth programmes: academic (“Leonardo”, “Erasmus”, etc.), sportive, educational and training (“Youth in Action” (2007–2013)), providing experience (“Youth on the Move” (2010)), finally, uniting the majority of them, “Erasmus Plus Program” (2014–2020).

Further, we move to the Finnish youth policy:

In the Nordic lands, there was a state of Finland. Its citizens lived in big cities and tiny villages; they inherited different Nordic ethnicities and lived in a close neighborhood with the other Nordic states. Local authorities, provinces and municipalities had much autonomy and cared about their children and youth. Regularly the government asked at local levels, consulted with NGOs, and renewed its Youth Work Act. In it, Government assigned funds to support youth work. In addition, to know better what their youth wanted, people started asking young Finns about their needs and concerns. At that time, there was no ministry or institution responsible for the youth policy, maybe there was not even youth policy as a term.

Finland was a good welfare state, but it also was a member of the EU and European state. When the EU asked, Finland among the first agreed to tell about its achievements in youth work to the other states and financed (among the very few) a Finnish youth policy review by COE. At the same time, it developed work on children’s rights, hosted a UN conference. Cooperation with the European Union became stronger, Finland started taking part in the European programmes, submitted annually reports to the Union where told about European youth dimension. Finland was thankful for recommendations, and it tried to follow European advice in youth policy. Thus, it worked out the social guarantee measures for youth employment. Traditional decentralization and autonomy stayed, but “Youth Policy” appeared officially (right as the Union advised) and Ministry of Education became responsible for it. It coordinated efforts of other ministries and introduced democratic mechanisms into youth work at local levels.

Before making evaluations about causality and dependency of Finnish youth policy on the European one, the third narrative of the Norwegian case will be introduced.

In the Nordic lands, there was the Kingdom of Norway. Its citizens lived in big cities and tiny villages in severe environment. Nearby, in the similar environment, there lived their neighbors from the other Nordic states. Children especially needed protection and care, so the Kingdom controlled their parents, developed children’s rights, cared about children’s health and development at governmental and local levels. People in the Kingdom lived well, and it was important that no deviations appeared. To that end, Legislation Acts were passed and followed. Government cared about children from their birth until they became adults. Besides, as people lived through the large territory, the Kingdom asked NGOs to help and provide children and youth policy at the local level. Nevertheless, there were still problems!

When Europeans started talking about the youth in 1972, Norway immediately became a partner, contributor and driving force. In 2001, Norway thought about domestic changes of child welfare system. Maybe we should let the state, for example, ‘taking over responsibility for institutional provision and the 27 local teams to work across municipalities’ − thought the Kingdom. Problems required solutions, deviations threatened to people’s and Kingdom’s welfare. To check the new action plans, Norway decided to listen to recommendation of European experts and invited them. Finally, action plans and strategies were launched, and they applied to working life and public services. Children and youth had long been one of priorities for Norway. For them there was infrastructure, protection and support. They also needed to know about European programmes, and Norway launched information portals and platforms about youth opportunities. Especially to build ‘universal design’ for youth with fewer opportunities, Norway supported 68% of the operating costs of ‘Youth in Action Programme’. A responsible ministry appeared for youth, and youth policy was still supported by governmental funds.

The OMC defined the character of relations between states within European youth dimension. Both Finland and Norway voluntarily participate, submit reports and finance youth policy reviews. As European researchers themselves say, among 46 (that time) member states of COE, there were few countries that “consider policy on children and youth a priority for the whole government” (Wolf et al. 2004, p. 5). It is true, that initially child and youth policy is important in both analysed cases. This can be a feature of the Nordic welfare state model, characterized by a high degree of universalism, thus, considering deviations a problem and trying to prevent margins since early age.

At the same time, there is a different vision of European youth dimension and state’s role in it. In Finland, there is a consideration of the EU choices (such as introducing social guarantees in accordance to the EU priority of combating youth unemployment). There seems to be a dependence between the EU Youth Pact, Finnish Youth Policy Development Programme 2007–2011 and Finnish revision of its Youth Act. The latter changed the terminology (“youth policy”, e.g. appeared as a term). There is a direct reference to the European Youth Strategy in the Child and Youth Policy Programme in Finland for 2012–2015.

Norway associates less its actions to the European advice and less refers to the EU particularly. There is rather a sense of an opposite direction – that Norway introduces more actively its own practices to the European level including the EU. The fact that since 1972, when the youth field has just appeared in European discourse, Norway was a partner of initiatives and discussions, leader of ideas. One of the examples of Norway’s practices adopted at the EU level is the institute of Child Ombudsman . Another thing that makes us state that Europeanization has another domestic effect on Norway: “Norway should reduce protection and prevention over the young people, so that they can build capacities themselves” – this is a conclusion of COE youth policy review for Norway. It witnesses a highly positive youth policy situation (especially comparing with the other COE and EU member states). At the same time Finland does not seen to be so different. Finnish case provides much more illustrations of youth policy changes closely after European acts or strategies appeared, that witnesses the EU-ization phenomenon. At the same time, there no such signs for Norway. It participated in “Youth in Action” and many other European programmes . However, it defined national priorities of such participation as better information of youth about opportunities, quality of training (“Country Sheet on Youth Policy in Norway”, 2008) and “inclusion of young people with fewer opportunities who are youth with disabilities, school ‘drop-outs’ and unemployed youth, youth at risk because of drug abuse, psychological problems, socio-economic deprivation, and youth with a minority background” (“Country Sheet on Youth Policy in Norway”, 2012). These are priorities, which are very typical for universalistic models. The EU initiatives then complete domestic youth priorities and do not make great changes in youth agenda.

It is remarkable, that Norway financed 68% of the operating costs for “Youth in Action Programme”. I would rather explain it again by the fact that such common programmes become a good instrument not only to complete domestic youth policy tasks but also to develop cooperation with other states within Europe and outside it.

Both Finland and Norway supported the development of information exchange about opportunities of youth programmes. The Finnish Youth Research Network took part in an EU youth research project the same year when Youth Portal was launched in Europe. Norway, in its turn, created its own web resource, where it defined the EUs and national priorities of youth work. In addition, both countries have cooperation in youth field with other actors. There is a strong cooperation within Nordic Youth Committee, where youth research takes great role. Then both states mention a priority cooperation with other adjacent areas: Russia, Estonia, the Baltic Sea Countries and Barents region. This line stayed within the Nordic Dimension of the EU too. The aims of the EU youth strategy are similar: cross-sectorial cooperation for the youth aspects and taking youth into account in decision-making.

One of the main objectives for European youth strategy became youth unemployment , while two Nordic states do not pay it that much attention. Their rhetoric is more education-oriented, although it is almost about the same matters (training and education, experience, mobility). Instead, for Finland and Norway, concept of youth environment and children environment has an important role. They support European initiatives and take active part not exclusively because the EU recommended practices and actions are required at domestic level. Rather, it is European and international cooperation and additional financial support for prioritized youth with fewer opportunities.

For the EU relations with other states in youth field are defined by the OMC. This is the EU instrument for communication, sharing, control and introducing domestic changes. Finland and Norway participate even more than majority of other states, including financial support of youth policy researches. But there are unclear expectations of these states from the OMC. Finland, apparently, tries to implement changes recommended by the EU, even if there might be different prioritizing. It refers to the EU choices in domestic documents and adopts new terminology. Norway leaves an impression of prosperous state where youth leaves “too great”. It seems not paying much attention to the EU advice. Instead, it tries to solve domestic youth problems but supports significantly European programmes explicating for them its national focuses.

14.4 Conclusion

The examined two cases belong to the welfare, historical models, which presumably have an influence on youth policy thinking as well. There is a mixture of Nordic identity, European identity and European Union identity (which I would like to set different from the preceding one). There are traditions of childcare, which “welcomes” a youngest citizen and brings a child up trying to avoid any marginalization (in family, at school, at social life, etc.). Youth is a state of transition from child to adult; the youth is a resource for well-being of country. Of course, with such a background, the Nordic states look more advanced in youth work than average European countries. Their priorities in youth policy are different from the European general choices, and it is fare. I would argue that in both cases upside-down Europeanization is very natural. Best practices, already working in analysed states, can be useful to the other actors (although not always applicable). Moreover, the analysis of instruments proved such cases.

Despite the two cases are similar, they witness there is a difference between Europeanization and EU-ization. In case of Finland, there are more parallels with the EU youth strategy: from adopting terminology and naming a youth-responsible ministry up to several direct references on European priorities in domestic strategies . It lets me conclude that the EU membership creates “goodness of fit” pressure for Finland, and it is less (or none) for Norway which is the EU non-member. There might be a state’s perception of rationality of the EU choices, growing European identity, foreseeing political benefits of cooperation, etc. In any case, the EU-ization process takes place within Europeanization and provokes domestic policy changes.