Abstract
This chapter brings together all empirical insights gained in the previous chapters and introduces the most important explanatory approaches of the new right-wing populism in Germany. Here it is shown how the Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the Occident (PEGIDA) protests as well as the latest successes of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) are traced back to recent political developments, to transformations of the model of representative democracy in general and to global economic and social developments. Especially the profound feelings of political and social alienation as well as the perception of a latent political and moral paternalism by media-political elites had already been observable for some time in parts of the German population as well as in other Western democracies, because of which, for instance, the PEGIDA marches initially were compared with the American Tea Party movement. The differing amount of success of right-wing populism in different parts of Germany also referred to specific political-cultural lines of conflict within Germany and revealed a remarkable difference between different patterns of attitude and interpretation. It is argued that, here in general, the lines of a social conflict have become visible in terms of differences in the political culture between western and eastern Germans, between a cosmopolitan and a rather ethnocentric alignment of political orientation as well as between urban and rural regions. In light of the exceptional strength and longevity of the PEGIDA protests in Saxony, it is also examined in this chapter to what extent the movement resonated within a special environment offered by this southeastern German Bundesland.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
Cf. Eddy (25.01.2015). In fact, PEGIDA’s call for more government commitment mainly referred to a stricter control of immigration.
- 3.
Cf. with evidence of the quotations Reuband (2016, p. 166).
- 4.
Cf. Sect. 2.1 in Chap. 2 above. “Valley of the Clueless” (Tal der Ahnungslosen) was, in common parlance of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR), a controversial designation for those regions of the country in which one could not receive West German television channels and radio stations, and whose inhabitants were therefore reliant on the information from the GDR state media. This area also included parts of eastern Saxony, in particular the Elbe valley around Dresden. Kern and Hainmüller (2009) have however shown that the decoupling from the West German media’s news and entertainment options probably led less to political naivety or a willingness to adapt in the population, but rather to greater dissatisfaction with the GDR system.
- 5.
A memorable quote from the former Prime Minister of Saxony and CDU chairman Kurt Biedenkopf lingers as paradigmatic for this trivialisation. He declared in the year 2000 that the Saxons’ background made them “immune” to right-wing extremism (Sächsische Zeitung 28.09.2000).
- 6.
- 7.
The picture is similar for the prevalence of negative attitudes towards Muslims in Saxony cf. the data in Yendell (2016, p. 121).
- 8.
Own compilation of the findings from 2016’s Saxony Monitor (Infratest Dimap 2016b, p. 29ff.), Thuringia Monitor (Best et al. 2016, p. 92), Leipzig Mitte Study (Mitte-L: Decker et al. 2016, p. 30ff.) and Bielefeld Mitte Study (Mitte-B: Zick et al. 2016, p. 124ff.). When comparing the values it is not only the different methods of data collection (specified in the table header), which need to be taken into account, but also the scales, which in some instances are different. Although the same statements were presented, the respondents in both of the Monitor studies had only four possible answers, but in the Mitte Studies there were five possible answers, because here an intermediate category (“partly agree/partly disagree”) was also available. In order to make the findings still comparable the agreement figures from the Mitte Studies, as presented in Fig. 6.1, are an approximation calculated by adding half the share of the “partly” responses to the combined total share of the answers for “agree completely” and “agree for the most part”. The percentages shown in both the Monitor studies, on the other hand, are the aggregate share of those answers which indicated explicit agreement with the corresponding assertions on a four-step scale. Where there is a dash, no data were collected in the respective study. In the case of the statement “The Jews simply have something special and peculiar about them and are not really compatible with us”, when evaluating the figure from the Thuringia Monitor (8 per cent agreement) one must take into consideration the fact that here a conspicuously high additional 9 per cent was accounted for by the residual category “I don’t know”/not specified.
- 9.
The prepared data from the European Social Survey can be found in Reuband (2017, p. 104). The data collection was carried out between August 2014 and January 2015. The percentages shown are the aggregate share of those answers which indicated explicit agreement with the corresponding assertion on a five-point scale. In terms of “Acceptance of Muslim immigration” respondents were asked “to what extent Germany […] should allow immigration of Muslims from other countries”. The possible answers provided were: “allow many to come and live here”, “allow some”, “allow a few”, and “allow no-one”. The percentage shown here is the sum of the share for the first two answers mentioned. In the case of “Preferential treatment of immigrants over locals” respondents were asked whether the treatment “by the government and the country of immigrants who only recently came to Germany as compared to people […] who were born in Germany”, was “a lot better”, “a little better”, “the same”, “a little worse” or “a lot worse”. Shown here is the share made up of the sum of the first two answers
- 10.
- 11.
- 12.
The turnout at the state elections in Saxony in 2014 was just 49.1 per cent; cf. State Statistical Office of the Free State of Saxony (2014). Of the valid second votes 9.7 per cent went to the AfD and 4.9 per cent to the NPD.
- 13.
This is according to an inscription dating back to GDR times, which is still today prominently placed at the entrance to the Porcelain Collection in the Zwinger museum complex of the Dresden State Art Collections.
- 14.
Shaped by similar historical experiences—like the recent recovery of political self-determination, the continuing long-term effects of the socio-economic transformation or the lack of experience with (Muslim) immigration —comparable attitude patterns of ethnocentrism seem to be politically effective in many of the formerly socialistically governed countries of central and eastern Europe, for example in Poland , the Czech Republic, Hungary or the Baltic states . This can be seen not least in light of eastern and western European countries’ completely different positions on refugee policy.
- 15.
Cf. Bluhm and Jacobs (2016).
- 16.
Similarly, Patzelt and Klose (11.05.2015) also use the politico-cultural experiences of humiliation and deprivation after 1989 in their explanation of PEGIDA. They claim that the peaceful revolution after 1989 led to a massive “reorganisation of power structures in the whole society” of eastern Germany, which from the point of view of many eastern Germans “was connected with clear losses”. Because of a sweeping change in the elite as well as “the massive difficulty fitting East German biographies into West German probation and promotion schemata”, ultimately a whole generation of eastern Germans was “over a long period of time excluded from prominent economic, societal and political power”—which could for instance explain why in the case of PEGIDA, despite relative material wealth, an outright “dismissal of the political system” was repeatedly registered.
- 17.
Against the backdrop of these east–west sensitivities many episodes of the Dresden “PEGIDA winter” 2014/2015 can be explained—for example the outrage with which parts of the Dresden population reacted to the invitation made by the organiser of the “Dresden —place to be” concert on 26.01.2015, which was directed against PEGIDA. The doctor Gerhard Ehninger, originally from Baden-Württemberg , had declared to PEGIDA sympathisers that everyone was welcome “who was open and would let themselves be taught” (Bonß 17.01.2015).
- 18.
Cf. the similar formation of opposing camps, the charged atmosphere related to political identity, and heated discussion about urban planning issues like the Waldschlösschen Bridge (opened 2013) or the development of the Dresden Neumarkt around the Frauenkirche.
- 19.
- 20.
Due to historical reasons pronounced sympathies for Russia (as well as Russian language skills) are still widespread among the eastern German population. The criticism of so-called “gender mainstreaming ” in turn points to a view of emancipation that is shaped in no small part by experience of the GDR as well—a view, which is mainly orientated towards the picture of working mothers (with all-day childcare available even for young children who needed a crèche), and has little to do with the conviction (shaped primarily by the experiences of the western German emancipation movement since the 1960s), that equality of the sexes must manifest itself in a changed way of using and writing the language. Cf. PEGIDA’s 19 points as well as the Dresden theses. For an account of the PEGIDA participants’ perceptions of “speaking bans” cf. Vorländer, Herold and Schäller (2015, p. 68). Source: Infratest Dimap (2016a), survey period: 04–05.10.2016.
- 21.
At the demonstrations at the beginning of 2015, a sign repeatedly appeared which read: “Oh Angela, no Ossi [slang for East German] has disappointed us as much as you—actually yes: Joachim ” (12.01.2015). Around the turn of the year both the German Chancellor Angela Merkel and the then Federal President Joachim Gauck had strongly criticised the organisers and participants of PEGIDA.
- 22.
For the following see Vorländer et al. (2018).
- 23.
- 24.
- 25.
For this theory of a “representation gap” see Patzelt and Klose (2016, pp. 42–43).
- 26.
This was reinforced by numerous placards at the demonstrations. Cf. for example slogans like “Courage for democracy. Now” (01.12.2014); “Parties good night, citizens to power”, “Plebiscites into the Basic Law” (15.12.2014); “All politicians are elected SERVANTS of the people! And not the other way round” (12.01.2015) or “End the dictates of the EU —introduce direct democracy” (12.01.2015). Cf. also statements of PEGIDA supporters like “we citizens [are] the employers and the politicians the employees and if they [the politicians] don’t perform well, then they will be fired” (Observation protocol of the 2nd dialogue forum “Together in Saxony” on 10.03.2015).
- 27.
Cf. Jörke and Selk (2015, pp. 491–495).
- 28.
According to the data 78 per cent of AfD voters, 76 per cent of FN voters, 69 per cent of FPÖ voters, 66 per cent of Lega-Nord voters, 57 per cent of PVV voters, 58 per cent of PiS voters, 61 per cent of Fidesz voters, 50 per cent of Jobbik voters and 50 per cent of UKIP voters see globalisation as a threat. Cf. de Vries and Hoffmann (2016, p. 20ff).
- 29.
In the case of the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States on 08.11.2016 an analysis of the exit polls was already able to dismiss similar assumptions. Cf. http://edition.cnn.com/election/results/exit-polls (Accessed 05.07.2017).
- 30.
This seems to also apply to AfD sympathisers; for this cf. Bergmann et al. (2016).
- 31.
- 32.
State Chancellery Saxony (2016, pp. 37f., 81f., 83f., 91f.).
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Vorländer, H., Herold, M., Schäller, S. (2018). Right-Wing Populism in Germany: Classification and Explanation. In: PEGIDA and New Right-Wing Populism in Germany. New Perspectives in German Political Studies. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67495-7_6
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