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PEGIDA in the Context of German Right-wing Populism

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PEGIDA and New Right-Wing Populism in Germany

Abstract

In this chapter the relationship between Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the Occident (PEGIDA) and other relevant right-wing parties and new right-wing currents in Germany and Europe is examined. While such movements and organisations have thus far failed to permanently establish themselves in German politics, PEGIDA, with its political demands and positions, ventured into a realm which over the previous years had already been marked out by other organisations and intellectuals and which the new protest movement was able to build on. Moreover, with the emergence of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) since 2013, its opening up for a clear-cut right-wing populist agenda in 2015 and its latest electoral successes in the Länder as well as the federal election in September 2017, it seems that for the first time there is now a party which has the prospect of becoming established long term. The relationship between PEGIDA and the AfD, nevertheless, was always unsettled and full of tension. In a competition for attention and recognition, the PEGIDA organisers also attempted to establish contact with well-known actors in other European countries early on. The goal of these efforts to make connections was to establish the protest movement as the German counterpart of these parties and movements.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The NPD only just failed to enter the Bundestag in 1969 with 4.3 per cent in the Bundestag elections.

  2. 2.

    The success of the AfD is mainly associated with its clear stance in certain policy fields, for instance its forthright Euroscepticism (Arzheimer 2015) and its ability to draw on groups of voters that were neglected by the other parties in Germany (Schmitt-Beck 2017). The German developments can be put into a European perspective, cf. Decker and Lewandowsky (2017).

  3. 3.

    Cf. data from the statistical offices of the Länder and the Federal Returning Officer.

  4. 4.

    For the debate about the classification of the AfD cf. Lewandowsky (2015). For the attitudes of AfD supporters and AfD candidates cf. Berbuir et al. (2015); Schmitt-Beck (2014, 2017). For similarities and differences between the right-wing populist parties in Europe cf. Mudde (2007, 2017) and Ennser (2012).

  5. 5.

    While at the height of the refugee crisis in autumn 2015 more than half of the population (53 per cent) were very worried about the refugee situation; this figure had sunk to only 31 per cent by autumn 2016 (Köcher 20.10.2016).

  6. 6.

    The basis for the calculation are the second votes cast as well as the voter migration flows ascertained on election day by Infratest dimap through post-election surveys. Cf. the data from the returning officers in the state statistical offices and also the overview of the data from Infratest dimap on the election pages of the ARD, which can be accessed at: https://wahl.tagesschau.de/landtag.shtml

  7. 7.

    It was particularly remarkable that former left-wing voters also defected to the AfD in large numbers. In Saxony-Anhalt the Die Linke party recorded the second highest losses after the CDU with 28,000 voters who changed their allegiance and in Rhineland-Palatinate the third highest losses after the SPD with 12,000 voters going to the AfD. The party chairwoman Sarah Wagenknecht had already attempted to confront these losses in the run-up to the elections by saying that refugees seeking protection who committed crimes in Germany would no longer have the right to hospitality (Küppers and Leithäuser 13.01.2016).

  8. 8.

    This was followed, some distance behind, by the losses of the SPD to the AfD (around 90,000 in Baden-Württemberg). Cf. the data of the returning officers in the state statistical offices and also the overview of the data from Infratest dimap on the election pages of the ARD, accessible at: https://wahl.tagesschau.de/landtag.shtml. As a reaction to their losses there were conflicts between CDU and CSU about the refugee policy, which was determined to be the cause of the election losses. Cf. the discussion paper of the Berliner Kreis in der Union (an association of members of the Bundestag from the CDU/CSU) at: http://dynamic.faz.net/download/2016/erklaerungberlinerkreis.pdf (Accessed 01.06.2017). The CSU, in turn, demanded a tougher asylum policy from Angela Merkel and the CDU, namely by the setting of an upper limit for the reception of refugees (Bannas 16.12.2016). These disputes also refer to deeper conflicts within the German Christian Democrats since 1990, cf. Green (2013).

  9. 9.

    This was advocated by the Thuringian state chairman Björn Höcke in a speech on 17.01.2017.

  10. 10.

    Cf. transcript of the speech by Lutz Bachmann on 11.05.2015.

  11. 11.

    With regard to the PEGIDA supporters who were still demonstrating at the rallies which had shrunk considerably by spring 2015 the party executive member Hans-Olaf Henkel stressed on 17.04.2015, that by now “even the most obstinate extreme right-winger in the AfD [must] recognise what kind of people they are”. The AfD should “look very closely at who is walking around there and keep at a distance from all these diffuse movements”. PEGIDA had now crossed a line and become openly xenophobic (Weiland 17.04.2015).

  12. 12.

    Cf. Bernd Lucke’s written statement regarding his resignation from AfD at http://bernd-lucke.de/austrittserklaerung-aus-der-alternative-fuer-deutschland-afd (Accessed 10.07.2015).

  13. 13.

    Cf. the summary of the various decisions made by the federal executive of the AfD on the relationship of the party with PEGIDA and the Identitarian Movement at: https://cdn.afd.tools/sites/75/2017/05/15144844/2017-05-15_afd-bundesverband_zusammenfassung-beschlusslage_gida-ib.pdf

  14. 14.

    The name of this new party was to be Freiheitlich Direktdemokratische Volkspartei (Liberal Direct Democratic People’s Party). The plans, however, came to nothing.

  15. 15.

    Cf. also the press release by the district executive of NPD Dresden made on 19.04.2015: https://npd-sachsen.de/dem-patriotischen-protest-in-dresden-eine-stimme-geben/

  16. 16.

    By this Festerling alluded to the fact that a recent effort to ban the NPD was unsuccessful because during the case at the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) it had turned out that the German domestic security agency (Verfassungsschutz) had been closely linked with the party through having recruited many party officials as secret informants. Hence, the FCC refused to consider a ban in 2003. Another attempt to ban the NPD failed in 2017. Cf. the relevant Facebook post made by Tatjana Festerling on 20.04.2015: https://www.facebook.com/tatjana.festerling/posts/882926931773664 (Accessed 08.06.2015).

  17. 17.

    These included, for example, the so-called “PRO” movement, which had been active since 1996 in Cologne and from 2005 further afield, mainly in North Rhine-Westphalia , and demonstrated against a supposed Islamisation (Sager and Peters 2008) or the so-called Hooligans against Salafists (HoGeSa), which agitated against Salafism predominantly on the internet, starting in spring 2014, and began to call for street protests at approximately the same time as PEGIDA (Gensing 2015).

  18. 18.

    The title involves an apparent play on words based on the German word eigentum meaning property.

  19. 19.

    Cf. the online blog “Sezession im Netz” (Secession on the Internet) at https://sezession.de as well as the online edition of “eigentümlich frei” at https://www.ef-magazin.de

  20. 20.

    For information about Götz Kubitschek cf. Kellershohn (2016).

  21. 21.

    Ein Prozent appears mainly on a professionally made website: https://einprozent.de

  22. 22.

    For the Identitarian Movement’s Greek lambda symbol and its origin cf. Sect. 1.3 in Chap. 1.

  23. 23.

    Cf. the work of Renaud Camus, who is renowned for his warnings of a forthcoming replacement of the French people by Muslim immigrants (Camus 2011). The presence of the concept of a replacement of a people by another can be observed in French politics and literature: party officials of the Front National refer to it (Farand 07.12.2015) as does Michel Houellebecq’s controversial novel Soumission (Submission).

  24. 24.

    According to ethnopluralism every single culture is worthy of preservation in its own right, and in order to protect itself from external, allegedly corrupting influences a culture is allowed to separate itself on its own home territory and should strive to maintain its own cultural purity (Strobl and Bruns 2016, p. 106).

  25. 25.

    Cf. Minkenberg 2011, p. 115f.

  26. 26.

    The Verfassungsschutz estimates the Reichsbürger scene at around 10,000 people in the whole of the Federal Republic (Federal Ministry of the Interior 2017, p. 97).

  27. 27.

    “BRD GmbH” (Federal Republic of Germany Ltd) is meant to indicate that the Federal Republic is not a sovereign State, instead it is a company with limited liability which is active in the economy. According to this the citizens of the Federal Republic are only employees of this ‘GmbH’, the shareholders of which are said to be the Allied Forces or global elites pursuing sinister interests.

  28. 28.

    The initiative We are Germany—it is only together that we are strong (Wir sind Deutschland—nur gemeinsam sind wir stark), for example, organised demonstration events in the Saxon towns of Plauen and Bautzen in 2015 and 2016, with up to 5000 participants in Plauen.

  29. 29.

    The “MV” in the name stands here for the federal state Mecklenburg-Vorpommern.

  30. 30.

    For information about Jürgen Elsässer cf. Lang (2016).

  31. 31.

    For example, Lutz Bachmann and Siegfried Däbritz took part in the New Year’s meeting of the Austrian FPÖ in Wels on 16.01.2016 and motivated their participation with the goal of international networking. At the same time, however, the FPÖ denied that Bachmann and Däbritz were official guests of the party (Die Presse 16.01.2016; Meisner 20.01.2016).

  32. 32.

    Vincenzo Sofo spoke for the Lega Nord , Marek Černoch for the Blok Proti Islámu, Filip Dewinter and Anke van Dermeersch for Vlaams Belang . Peter O’Loughlin represented Identity Ireland, Tommy Robinson, Paul Weston and Ann Marie Waters spoke for PEGIDA UK . PEGIDA Denmark was represented by Tania Groth . Gavin Boby, lawyer and representative of the Islamophobic Law and Freedom Foundation , also spoke at PEGIDA in Dresden . The Law and Freedom Foundation supports those who oppose the construction of new mosques in Great Britain . For further international PEGIDA offshoots cf. Sect. 1.1 in Chap. 1.

  33. 33.

    Festerling’s presentation of herself as such a “freedom fighter” is documented on her Facebook page with a report about her “deployment”. Cf. https://www.facebook.com/tatjana.festerling/media_set?set=a.1112401432159545&type=1&l=277a381b58 (Accessed 01.06.2017).

  34. 34.

    Speeches by members of Fortress Europe in Dresden also ended abruptly with the departure of Festerling, with the exception of Tommy Robinson (PEGIDA UK), who was obviously loyal to Bachmann. He continued to make short appearances at PEGIDA events in Dresden, for instance on the second anniversary of the protest movement on 16.10.2016.

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Vorländer, H., Herold, M., Schäller, S. (2018). PEGIDA in the Context of German Right-wing Populism. In: PEGIDA and New Right-Wing Populism in Germany. New Perspectives in German Political Studies. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67495-7_3

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