Abstract
This contribution clarifies and further elaborates the complex nature of the relationship between emotion and reason in Aristotle’s philosophy. A lexical-conceptual analysis of key-concepts in De Anima (sensation, affection, fear/pity, appetite/desire and impulse) highlights Aristotle’s view on the role of emotions in cognitive processes. Aristotle’s assumption of continuity between mind and body (ontological continuity) and his view on the cognitive relevance of emotion (teleonomy) are foundational for his complex model of reason merging biological and cognitive processes (circular anthropology). The interaction between evaluative levels and emotive factors in cognitive processes as conceived by Aristotle is fundamentally different from the modernist Cartesian perspective, but is surprisingly modern when compared with particular contemporary perspectives.
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Notes
- 1.
Sidgwick (1966), p. 482. More recently Campos et al. (1989), p. 395: emotions “are processes of establishing, maintaining, or disrupting the relations between the person and the internal or external environment” (emphases in the text). Furthermore Keltner and Gross (1999), pp. 468–470: the authors define “emotions as episodic, relatively short-term, biologically based patterns of perception, experience, physiology, action and communication that occur in response to specific physical and social challenges and opportunities.[…][F]unctions are a certain sort of consequence of goal-directed action.[…]Functional accounts most generally assume that emotions are adaptations to the problems of social and physical survival” (the authors emphasize the implications of a functional account of emotion).
- 2.
Frede (1992b), pp. 93–94: “[T]he conception of the soul which Descartes adopts in place of an Aristotelian notion itself historically is a descendant of a conception Aristotle rejects; and Descartes’ notion shares with the conception Aristotle rejects precisely the feature Aristotle is objecting to. The conception Aristotle rejects is a Platonist conception.”
- 3.
Lloyd (1996), pp. 138–139: “Aristotle’s concept of analogy plays several distinctive and important roles in his metaphysics and his zoology especially.[…]The two principal uses of analogy he makes are[…]the metaphysical and the zoological.”
- 4.
Edition used: The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, edited by Jonathan Barnes.
- 5.
Oksenberg Rorty (1992a), p. 7: “The scope of De Anima is much broader than that of either contemporary philosophy of mind or contemporary philosophical psychology. It is a metaphysical inquiry[…], a philosophical psychology[…], an investigation of the teleologically organized functions that are common to living bodies.” (and the footnote 1: “Because it carries many post-Cartesian connotations, “mind” is not a felicitous translation of Aristotle’s nous”).
- 6.
- 7.
A point related to the enmattered accounts (logoi enuloi) (DA 403a 25): as regards this topic I completely agree with the analysis proposed by Stefano Fuselli in this volume: Fuselli (2018); See also Everson (1997), pp. 96–102 and 236 about the relation between soul and living body (especially DA 424a 17–25 with the idea of ratio) with a criticism of the Cartesian perspective.
- 8.
Witt (1992), pp. 171–78: “[S]ouls do not undergo the same kind of motion that material substances (or organism) do[…].[G]iven [Aristotle’s] analysis of motion[…]it makes no sense to say that the soul moves” (emphases in the text; pp. 181–182 for the nexus perception/motion).
- 9.
Wilkes (1992), pp. 116–22: “[psyke]is theoretically superior to the mind [because] it provides a better framework within which contemporary study should proceed.[…]Aristotle paid absolutely no attention to consciousness per se”; Hardie (1976), p. 405 (in a non-Cartesian perspective): “[Aristotle] affirms in his own idioms, and never doubts, that animal behavior is accompanied by consciousness and that human conduct and human planning is prompted and guided by consciousness.”
- 10.
Witt (1992), pp. 178–179: “In rejecting the harmonia theory, Aristotle is rejecting the idea that the soul could be defined as being a composition of the four elements or a ratio of their mixture”.
- 11.
Matthews (1992), p. 187 who highlights seven acceptations: thinking, perception, local movement and rest, movement (with respect to nutrition and decay and growth or self-nutrition), touch, appetite (or desire and passion and wishing), reproduction.
- 12.
- 13.
Tracy (1982), p. 112: “The sentence at 413a 8-9 marks the end of Aristotle’s sketch of the soul as “first act”, substantial form or entelechy of the body – its “static” aspect- and introduces the subsequent discussion[…]of the soul’s dynamic function as efficient cause of all “second acts,” the organic reactions involved in nutrition, sensation, appetition, local motion, and even intellectual cognition.” The relation pilot-boatman-soul is also discussed in Descartes (2006), pt. V.
- 14.
“[W]hat has soul in it differs from what has not in that the former displays life. Now this word has more than one sense, and provided any one alone of these is found in a thing we say that thing is living – viz. thinking or perception or local movement and rest, or movement in the sense of nutrition, decay and growth. Hence we think of plants also as living, for they are observed to possess in themselves an originative power through which they increase or decrease in all spatial directions; they do not grow up but not down – they grow alike in both, indeed in all, directions; and that holds for everything which is constantly nourished and continues to live, so long as it can absorb nutriment. This power of self-nutrition can be separated from the other powers mentioned, but not they from it – in mortal beings at least. The fact is obvious in plants; for it is the only psychic power they possess. This is the originative power the possession of which leads us to speak of things as livings at all, but it is the possession of sensation that leads us for the first time to speak of living things as animals” (DA 413 a 21-413b 3, emphases in the text, trans. Smith).
- 15.
Damasio (1994), pp. xii–xiii and 70 who criticizes the Cartesian separation: “[C]ertain aspects of the process of emotion and feelings are indispensable for rationality[…]Both “high-level” and “low-level” brain regions[…]cooperate in the making of reason. The lower levels in the neural edifice of reason are the same ones that regulate the processing of emotions and feelings[…].[…][T]here appears to be a collection of systems in the human brain consistently dedicated to the goal-oriented thinking process we call reasoning, and to the response selection we call decision-making, with a special emphasis on the personal and social domain. This same collection of systems is also involved in emotion and feeling, and is partly dedicated to processing body signals”; DeSousa (1997), pp. XV and 333: “Despite a common prejudice, reason and emotion are not natural antagonists. On the contrary [w]hen the calculi of reason have become sufficiently sophisticated, they would be powerless in their own terms, except for the contribution of emotion.[…]The ideal of emotional rationality is adequate emotional response.” (emphases in the text; see also chapter 7).
- 16.
Putnam (1975), pp. 362–385; Fodor (1978), pp. 201–202 in a more problematic manner: “[S]ome of the most systematic[…]kinds of mental events may be among those about whose etiology cognitive psychologists can have nothing at all to say.[…][T]he mere fact that creative mental processes are mental processes does not ensure that they have explanation in the language of psychology under any of their description.” (emphases in the text); Crane (2003), p. 231: “[O]ur investigations into the mechanical mind have[…]yielded one broad and negative conclusion: there seems to be a limit to the ways in which we can give reductive explanations of the distinctive features of the mind” (emphasis in the text).
- 17.
Code and Moravcsik (1992), pp. 129–138 on teleology and non-teleology underlying Aristotle’s framework; Everson (1997), pp. VII–VIII, 5 and ff. about the incompatibility functionalism-teleology in order to understand Aristotle “in his own terms” and some references to Descartes and to the contemporary debate; Burnyeat (1992), p. 16: “[The Putnam-Nussbaum functionalist thesis] fails to notice that Aristotle’s conception of the material or physical side of the soul-body relation is one which no modern functionalist could share[…].”; Nussbaum and Putnam (1992), pp. 55–56: “[W]e can have non-reductionism and the explanatory priority of the intentional without losing that sense of the natural and organic unity of the intentional with its constitutive matter that is one of the great contributions of Aristotelian realism.”; Cohen (1992), p. 72: “The apparent success of the functionalist seems to me to depend on whether the apparent role of psyke as efficient cause can be satisfactorily explained away. I am not convinced that it can be.”; Kafetsios and LaRock (2005), pp. 639–40, 642–43, 647–50, and 654: “[Different from functionalism]Aristotle [includes] as part of his analysis of the essence of cognition and emotion the biological material and the characteristic operations associated with it[…].[Aristotle’s theory of cognition and emotion is based][…]on the integration of form and matter (hylomorphism) and the hierarchical organization of the biological world.[…][For Aristotle] the soul is organized-organizer of biologically based organisms.[…][T]he material type plays an essential role in defining the nature of a substance and its peculiar activities.” (emphases in the text). In this volume I partially disagree with Brito’s position within which teleonomy and functionalism are substantially put on the same level and assimilated, Brito (2018). See also hereinafter the last paragraph.
- 18.
Whiting (1992), pp. 88–89: “Aristotle does not distinguish potentiality as capacity from potentiality as matter[…].[T]he sort of potentiality Aristotle associates with energeia proper can exist simultaneously with its own actualization.”
- 19.
Everson (1997), pp. 3–4: according to Everson Aristotle does not define the concept of soul (psuche) because it is based on a capacity for activity.
- 20.
Edition used: The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, edited by Jonathan Barnes.
- 21.
Furthermore: “the function of man is an activity of soul in accordance with, or not without, rational principle.” (EN 1098a 7–8, trans. Ross and Urmson).
- 22.
Maturana and Varela (1980), especially pp. 59–134 for a similar notion of autopoietic and spontaneous processes (although in a mechanistic and not teleological manner: see also hereinafter); Lloyd (1996), p. 104 and ff.: “One thing that emerges from[the]study of Aristotle’s treatment of spontaneous generation and metamorphosis is the robustness of his views on nature.”
- 23.
Leighton (1982), p. 168: “Aristotle is quite able to call upon the notion of emotion when needed, and related notions when they are needed. By this ability to wield the features that distinguish these notions, by his sensitivity to the different notions and their place, we see an extremely subtle philosopher at work.”
- 24.
Frede (1992b), pp. 94–95, 99, and 104–105 about the concept of essence as a formal organization; for the similar concept of homeostasis as a dynamic process related to the equilibrium of the organisms Damasio (1994), p. 135; Damasio (2010), pp. 55–60; and Damasio (2003), pp. 166–169. Furthermore Damasio (1994), p. 139; Damasio (2010), pp. 89 and ff. for the complex nature of emotion which is based on a mental evaluation and a dispositional response placed between brain and body: emotion (or feeling) is the experience of these changes similarly to Aristotle’s soul; Everson (1997), pp. 9 and 11: in a non-Cartesian perspective within Aristotle’s theory “particular acts of perception and nutrition require explanation in material terms[…][Aristotle distinguishes]different determining relations[…]as different relations[…]rather than relations between property – or event-types which are then instantiated by token substances or events[…][A] method for the explanation of natural changes, including what we would call mental changes, which can provide a proper role for the determination of a substance’s changes by the changes undergone by its material parts”.
- 25.
Lloyd (1996), pp. 126–137: “Aristotle’s doctrine of perception plays a key role at the intersection of a number of his deepest concerns” (I agree with Lloyd’s analysis which encompasses knowledge and ethics); Everson (1997), pp. 4–5: sensation is “the clearest example of an Aristotelian explanation of the mental behavior of material beings and [is] a test-case for the application of the principles of Aristotelian physics to the study of the mind.”; Hamlyn (1959), pp. 6 and 16: “[Aristotle tries]to develop a new [transitional]view of aesthesis”; Gregoric (2007), p. 28: “Aristotle’s account of the perceptual capacity of the soul is considerably longer and more worked out than his account of the other capacities. This is hardly surprising, given the internal complexity of this capacity.”
- 26.
Lloyd (1996), pp. 205–222 who underlines the multiple variations of the concept of metaphor and some certain deep-ambivalences within Aristotle’s outlook.
- 27.
Frede (1992a), pp. 279, 282, and 294 who emphasizes the problems of a unified concept of imagination and its role as synthesizer: “all phantasiai are motions in the soul caused by sense-perceptions”; White (1985), especially pp. 483–488, about the nexus between soul and imagination and then the close interaction among sensation, imagination and (human) thought; Watson (1982), pp. 100, 106, 108, and 113: “There is no general agreement among scholars that Aristotle had a unified concept of phantasia”; Watson underlines the relation between sensation, imagination and thinking and concludes: “[Aristotle’s phantasia was] a deliberate and stubborn correction of Plato.” See also hereinafter about Aristotle’s theory of language.
- 28.
Everson (1997), pp. 78–89: starting from the paradigmatic nature of the sense of touch (including a comparison between plants and animals) Everson underlines the potency within the sensible knowledge.
- 29.
Freeland (1992a), p. 228 and ff. about a comparison with contemporary models based on neural cells, the relevance of inter-subjectivity in the Aristotelian theory of perception (with the priority of touch) and the role of dynamic forces within the natural bodies; Lloyd (1996), p. 127 and ff.: “The fundamental mode of perception is touch”; Damasio (2000), pp. 25–26: touch is a specific kind of wordless because the “consciousness begins as the feeling of what happens when we see or hear or touch.”
- 30.
- 31.
See also DA 424a 34–35; furthermore the previous references to plants and the mentioned notion of enmattered accounts.
- 32.
Furthermore DA 426a 30-426b 3 about the sense as a ratio.
- 33.
Gregoric (2007), p. 125 who offers a survey about the Aristotelian occurrences of this locution and concludes: “I am inclined to think that the phrase “common sense” has not[…]crystallized into a technical term with Aristotle”; Everson (1997), chap. 4, especially p. 157: “[E]ven the perception of a proper sensible of an individual sense requires the exercise of the common capacity for the perception of perception and so the activity of the controlling organ as well as that of the relevant primary sense organ”; Hamlyn (1968), pp. 195 and 208: “[Within De Anima the locution “common sense”] is used explicitly to deal with perception of the koina, the so-called commonsensible.[…]Aristotle does speak of a common sense, but only in connection with the perception of the koina” (emphases in the text).
- 34.
Gregoric (2007), pt. III, p. 205. The author underlines the multiple functions of the common sense: he opposes common sense (koine aisthesis) and rationality but admits the cognitive role of the common sense (“high-order non-rational power”).
- 35.
- 36.
Edition used: The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, edited by Jonathan Barnes. About this topic: Schofield (1992), p. 256: the Aristotelian imagination is “a loose-knit, family concept”; Everson (1997), pp. 157–186 concerning the relation between the sensation and imagination (the capacities of the perception), the nexus between perception and thought, the activity of the senses as a whole, the common sense as a perceptual awareness and the relation between imagination and perception; Damasio (1994), pp. 147–148 for some contemporary analogies: “Receiving a comprehensive set of signals about the body state in the appropriate brain regions is the necessary beginning but is not sufficient for feelings to be felt. [Similarly to images] a further condition for the experience is a correlation of the ongoing representation of the body with the neural representations constituting the self. A feeling about a particular object is based on the subjectivity of the perception of the object, the perception of the body state it engenders, and the perception of modified style and efficiency of the thought process as all of the above happens.”
- 37.
Everson (1997), pp. 1–2 who underlines the relation between the De Anima, Little Physical Treatises and Physics regards the point here discussed.
- 38.
Frede (1992a), pp. 282 and 292 concerning the nature of practical and theoretical thinking.
- 39.
Edition used: The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, edited by Jonathan Barnes.
- 40.
Sorabji (1992), p. 195, moreover 196 and ff.
- 41.
Edition used: The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, edited by Jonathan Barnes.
- 42.
See also Mem. 449b 25–30. Annas (1992), pp. 297 and 311: “[Aristotle’s outlook] is[…]more like that of the modern psychologist than of the modern philosopher[…].[This perspective]raises issues relevant to philosophy of mind[…][and]marks the boundaries for a developing empirical psychology.”; Lang (1980), pp. 379, 387, and 393: “[Different from Plato]Aristotle’s shift to a positive relation between body and soul enables sensible objects to serve as the origin of sensation and to provide the content of mental images” (emphasis in the text); Sorabji (2006), p. xxiii: “It is the existence of time, not the perception of it, that[…]introduces a requirement of counting, and even this is only[…]the possibility of counting.” (emphases in the text); Wedin (1988), pp. 136–141: “[Aristotle construes]imagination[…]as what supplies certain items essential to thought, namely, devices for [re]presentation.[…]There simply is no such thought to be intuited, grasped, or touched apart from the image. Thus, images really are essential for thought.”
- 43.
Schiller (1975), pp. 285 and 295–296: “[Aristotle’s outlook]suggests a fruitful approach to the analysis of the concept of sense perception.[…][H]is attempt to account for awareness ultimately breaks down.[…][Anyway] he clearly grasped the complexity of the phenomenon of perception[…].”
- 44.
“[T]he soul is analogous to the hand; or as the hand is a tool of tools, so thought is the form of forms and sense the form of sensible things.” (DA 432a 1–2, trans. Smith).
- 45.
See the capital (DA 433a 9 and ff.).
- 46.
Sorabji (1992), pp. 197–198: “Propositions are[…]involved in phantasia, which in Aristotle’s De Anima is perceptual and post-perceptual appearance”; Sorabji (2006), pp. XIV–XX about the distinction between imagination and image and thinking as an image which involves soul and body: “The picture-like thing is in the soul as well as the body[…]”. About the circle imagination-image see also (DA 431a 16-431b 2; 432a 3–14).
- 47.
Sorabji (2006), p. XX who develops this image.
- 48.
Annas (1980), p. 285 starting from Nicomachean Ethics 7 and 10: “The accounts in Books 7 and 10[…]agree in the thesis that pleasure is not a bad thing. In the good life it is something to be pursued, not shunned”; Wilkes (1980), p. 355: “[T]he ethical demand[…]is[…]to cultivate to the utmost the excellences required by the life chosen by each man as being best for himself.”
- 49.
See also the following lines in the Aristotelian text about the finalistic dimension of faculties of the body of animals.
- 50.
The words emotion and pathos are treated in the text as the same. It will be explicitly indicated when a modern use of the concept is made.
- 51.
Descartes (1978), pp. I:331–344: “There is nothing in which the defective nature of the sciences which we have received from the ancients appears more clearly than in what they have written on the passions[…]. [Passions are] perceptions, feelings, or emotions of the soul which we relate specially to it, and which are caused, maintained, and fortified by some movement of the spirits” (quotation from Descartes’ The Passions of the Soul).
- 52.
Edition used: The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, edited by Jonathan Barnes.
- 53.
Edition used: The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, edited by Jonathan Barnes.
- 54.
I agree with the analysis developed in this volume by: Rapp (2018).
- 55.
Fortenbaugh (2002), pp. 11–12 who discusses the nexus between emotion and cognition starting from Plato and Aristotle; Koziak (2000), p. 15: “In the Rhetoric, Aristotle identifies three aspects of an emotion-a thought or belief, a feeling of pain or pleasure, and a desire for some event, action, or situation”.
- 56.
Campos et al. (1989), p. 400 with any ambiguities. Furthermore see the footnote 1.
- 57.
Nehamas (1992), p. 297: “the nonrational parts[…]are still to be distinguished from reason”, but “all desire, rational and nonrational, involves both thought and evaluation”, with the discussion about the concepts of wish (boulesis), impulse (thumos) and appetite (epithumia); Gross (2006), pp. 40–41: according to Aristotle’s Rhetoric “passions condition our very ability to evaluate the world.[…]For Aristotle it would be untenable to distinguish[…]between emotions that are socially constituted and those that are not.” (Gross explicitly refers to Damasio).
- 58.
Irwin (1982), p. 266: “[There is a connexion]between Aristotle’s views on signification and his other philosophical interests. Inquiry into words and their signification is part of inquiry into the world and the real essences in it.”
- 59.
Coseriu and Narr (1975), p. I:80.
- 60.
Edition used: The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, edited by Jonathan Barnes.
- 61.
Lo Piparo (2003), pp. 187–193. Lo Piparo criticizes the traditional (linear or semiotic) interpretation which is based on the binary or denotative relation between the linguistic sign and the meaning (objects, reality) and on a semiotic notion of symbol. According to Lo Piparo Aristotle’s linguistic theory relies on a dynamic and threefold scheme (vocal units, logical-cognitive operations, natural-linguistic systems): the vocal units and the script (grammata) are the typical human physical signs of language, i.e. the symbolic correlation between the articulations of the human voice and the logical-cognitive operations of the soul. This relation is expressed through the various linguistic-natural systems, that is to say the natural languages.
- 62.
Edition used: The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, edited by Jonathan Barnes.
- 63.
Lloyd (1996), p. 184 and ff. for the complex idea of nature in Politics also compared to Hume’s perspective.
- 64.
Bombelli (2013), pp. 275–287.
- 65.
- 66.
Vernant (1992), p. 33: “Greek tragedy is strongly marked of characteristics: tension between myth and the forms of thought peculiar to the city, conflict within[…] the domain of values[…].[…][T]he play startlingly reveals that the divine intervenes even in the course of human action.”
- 67.
Sommerstein et al. (1993), p. 12: “[Tragedy and comedy]were performed in the same thoroughly public, civic external setting.”
- 68.
Freeland (1992b), pp. 125–126: Freeland identifies “three central assumptions of the Poetics”: aesthetic naturalism, moral realism and an account of literary tragedy “as a naturally occurring phenomenon with intrinsic necessary properties and a specific aim”: hence “Aristotle’s teleology of plot presupposes an active, responsible hero who has a definite social context.”; Blundell (1992), p. 155: “[Ē]thos and dianoia [i.e. character and intellect]form two of the essential “parts” of tragedy, following only plot in significance. Their presence and importance follow directly from the definition of tragedy as the imitation of praxis.”
- 69.
Oksenberg Rorty (1992b), pp. 2–3 about the contrast between Aristotle’s outlook and the-Dionysian origins; Nussbaum (1992), pp. 273 and ff. for the relation between rhetoric, the cognitive value of fear and pity, the Homeric roots and a comparison with Plato; Woodruff (1992), p. 87 concerning the cognitive power of emotions.
- 70.
Lear (1992), p. 334 who highlights the key-concept of pathos as emotional possibility and criticizes the interpretation of catharsis as a mere purification of the emotions; Janko (1992), p. 341 about the relation between catharsis and virtue and the continuity underlying representation and catharsis; Koziak (2000), pp. 143–147: according to Koziak catharsis means “to coax the thumos to react habitually well in political situations”.
- 71.
Oksenberg Rorty (1992b), pp. 12–17: “[Pity]involves an affective understanding of the proper domain of philia[…][related to the] common civic project (koinonia)[…][Catharsis is]a cognitive term, referring to an intellectual resolution or clarification that involves directing emotions to their appropriate intentional objects.[…]When pity and fear are appropriately felt[…]according to the logos and the measure that is appropriate to them, they can play their natural psychological and civic functions[…].[Hence]the distinction between intellectual clarification and emotional rectification is[…]spurious and tendentious.[…]The distinction between theory and practice is a distinction between types of activities – both of them cognitive – as characterized by their methods and aims[…]towards a larger, common civic philia.”; Koziak (2000), pp. 134–138; Belfiore (1992), pp. 44 and ff.; 70–ff., 82, 181, 226, 246, and chapters 8–10; Nussbaum (2001), pp. 388–394.
- 72.
Freeland (1992b), pp. 122–125 contra cognitivist and emotivist interpretations.
- 73.
Halliwell (1992), pp. 241–256: “[pleasure, understanding, emotion]form an interlocking set of elements in Aristotle’s interpretation [of representational art]” which is based on two types of aesthetic pleasure: the first one is “mediated through the artist’s skilled accomplishment”, the second one is “restricted to the material and sensual properties of the artifact[…]. [E]motion and recognition[…][are]somehow fused in aesthetic experience” (emphases in the text, with a parallelism between Politics, Rhetoric and Poetics in stark contrast to the Kantian line); Nussbaum (2001), pp. 383–388: according to Nussbaum pity and fear are irrational but valuable sources of recognition; Nussbaum (1992), pp. 281–287 and 308 who condemns the idea of catharsis as a homeopathic purification.
- 74.
Golden (1992), p. 381: “Aristotelian comic theory requires the representation of action that is “ridiculous” and that such action evokes[…]a form of “indignation” whether or not that indignation is accompanied by laughter.”
- 75.
- 76.
Cooper (1980), p. 302.
- 77.
- 78.
Fortenbaugh (2002), p. 63.
- 79.
Newman (1950), I, pp. 369–374.
- 80.
- 81.
Bombelli (2013), pp. 327–340 with particular attention to the relation between community and education.
- 82.
Koziak (2000), pp. 104 and 111–125: “Aristotle does not hope merely to replace disagreeable emotions with rational behavior, but to stimulate citizens to feel more affection[and]to become more reasonable with the aid of this emotion” (with regard to the relation between middle class and the political role of friendship).
- 83.
- 84.
Nussbaum (2001), p. 275: through the word appetition/desire (orexis) Aristotle “selects (or, very probably, invents) a word well suited to indicate the common feature shared by all cases of goal-directed animal movement.[…][Boulēsis, thumos, and epithumia are all forms of orexis and[…]some orexis is involved in every animal movement”; Charles (2011), pp. 84–86 (about De Motu Animalium): “[Aristotle applies the term “desire” (orexis)] more widely than to sensual desire alone[…]”; Pearson (2011), pp. 111–113: “epithumia is pleasure-based, whereas boulēsis is good-based in a narrower sense of “good” than that in which all desires (orexeis) are good-based[…].[T]he faculty of desire (to orektikon) is the part of us in virtue of which we are moved to intentional action[…].”; Segvic (2011), pp. 176–177: starting from Nicomachean Ethics 1139b 4–5 “choice is characterized as “desiderative understanding” (orektikos nous) or “rational desire” (orexis dianoetikē), which comes closer to suggesting that choice is a state of the soul that is sui generis, and not merely a combination of a desire and a belief.”
- 85.
Edition used: The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, edited by Jonathan Barnes.
- 86.
Edition used: The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, edited by Jonathan Barnes.
- 87.
Nussbaum (2001), pp. 276–282: “The connections among orexis, cognition, and motion are logical or conceptual”.
- 88.
See the fundamental and previously quoted EN 1102b 13–31, which synthesizes the interaction between reason and emotion.
- 89.
If we cautiously accept the position expressed in Koziak (2000), p. 38: “[Thumos] is the key to understanding[the] philosophical psychology of politics [in Homer, Plato and Aristotle]”; furthermore Bombelli (2016), pp. 10–11, 16, and 23–27 for the relation between Greek literature and the Aristotelian perspective.
- 90.
Berns (1984), pp. 345–346: “[Aristotle does not provide a] thematic analysis of spiritedness.[…]Spiritedness manifests itself most conspicuously in anger and courage [and fear and hope] seem to be the primary passions of spiritedness.[…]Not only is spiritedness the temperamental condition of political freedom, but in social and political life it is the indispensable temperamental basis for the fight against injustice.”; Lord (1991), pp. 52, 59–60, and 72: “[T]he “spiritedness”[…]is central to Aristotle’s analysis of civic solidarity and political rule.[…]. [P]olitical society[…]comes into being through a discontinuous act[…][and]the human soul uniquely combines reason with “spiritedness”[…].[…][Spiritedness provides]a critical link between man’s biological and psychological nature and the structures of human society.[It]is one of the features of classical political philosophy[…].”
- 91.
Sokolon (2006), especially Part III concerning the Aristotelian relation between emotion and the political community as the specific horizon of impulse (thumos); Koziak (2000), p. 2: “Aristotle’s treatment of thumos[…]represents a theory of political emotion available to contemporary challenges to rationalistic explanations of political community.”
- 92.
Nussbaum (2001), pp. 359–361 about the vulnerability of friendship (philia): “[T]he best sort of love between persons is highly vulnerable to happenings in the world.”
- 93.
Koziak (2000), p. 110: “With Aristotle’s final word on the best regime, thumos in its most complex sense loses its meaning of one emotion or of one drive or instinct, becoming instead the soul’s capacity for emotion.”
- 94.
About this point I share the perspective offered by Nuno Coelho’s contribution in this volume. Coelho (2018).
- 95.
Berns (1984), pp. 346–348: “Aristotle refers to spiritedness as rising more powerfully against intimates and friends[…]than it does against those it does not know.[…]There is[…]a [common]substratum to both friendship and enmity-care.[…]Thumos, or spiritedness, would then be the source of those feelings directed primarily to the care for one’s own[…].[…]The love of one’s own and its spiritedness[…]reach fulfillment when together they are shaped and disposed by reason as material for virtue. One’s own and the cherishable come together[…]in the friendship of the virtuous.”
- 96.
Edition used: The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, edited by Jonathan Barnes.
- 97.
Lloyd (1996), pp. 158–159 on the importance of the pair potentiality-actuality and its application to the “form-matter dichotomy [which is highlighted by]the intelligible matter of mathematical entities and the genus in relation to its differentiae [or similarly the investigation about]what connects [animals]as all members of the multifarious animal kingdom, and the recognition of their variety [in the light]of proportional analogies” (emphases in the text).
- 98.
Wilkes (1992), pp. 123–125: “Aristotle is in advance of many contemporary “cognitive scientists” in understanding that both the “dialectician” and the “student of nature” can contribute to the study of human competences[…][with reference to] the sheer possibility of so-called ‘multiple realizability’[…][or]at best ‘variable realizability’: form sets very substantial constraints on matter, and on the organization of matter.[…][W]e should return from the mind to the psyke [but]indirectly and without realizing it we have in fact been doing so for some time” (emphases in the text).
- 99.
For a similar perspective Kafetsios and LaRock (2005), especially pp. 640 and 650–654: “[Aristotle supports]an integrative view of affect and cognitive processes of emotion.[…]For Aristotle[…]emotion is a complex, yet unified, form-matter activity.[…][R]ecent developments in the cognitive neuroscience and social-cognitive neuroscience research[support]the Aristotelian thinking of emotion.[…]Aristotle’s commitment to the hierarchical organization embedded in the biological world intimates a biologically based psychology that bears affinities with emotion research in cognitive neuroscience. [For Aristotle]the human body exhibits many levels of living organization[…]because of the causal activity of form.[…][F]orm is understood to be a metaphysical principle of life embedded in and expressed at various levels of organizational complexity in the world of biological entities.”
- 100.
Maturana and Varela (1980), p. 7, emphases in the text.
- 101.
Ibid., p. 13, See also pp. 22–26 and 29–38 for the concept of representation and the model of thinking, natural language and memory.
- 102.
Ibid., pp. 42 and 45.
- 103.
Maturana and Varela (1980), p. 49: the living organization is “a circular organization which secures the production or maintenance of the components[…].[Accordingly]a living system is an homeostatic system [and] living systems are a subclass of the class of circular and homeostatic systems” (original emphasis: see also pp. 50–51).
- 104.
Maturana and Varela (1980), pp. 57–58. In particular “The ultimate truth on which a man bases his rational conduct is necessarily subordinated to his personal experience[…].”
- 105.
It is based on a network of process of production: Ibid., pp. 78–79 and 82 (the concept of autopoiesis “is necessary and sufficient to characterize the organization of living systems”: emphases in the text).
- 106.
Ibid., pp. 85–87.
- 107.
Ibid., pp. 88 and ff.
- 108.
Ibid., p. 94 (different from autocatalytic processes). Furthermore Freeman (2000), especially pp. 7, 10, 15, 129, 154, and 211. The nuclear thesis: “a neural basis for goal-oriented actions[…]is common to both humans and other animals”. Nevertheless “[h]uman intentionality is not optimally productive and effective until it has been acculturated through a long educational process, by which the capacity emerges for cooperative social action[and]knowledge.”
- 109.
Maturana and Varela (1980), p. 96.
- 110.
Ibid., p. 111.
- 111.
Ibid., p. 117.
- 112.
Ibid., p. 118.
- 113.
Ibid., p. 123: “Autopoietic systems define the world in which they can exist in relation to their autopoiesis, and some interact recursively with this world through their descriptions, it being impossible for them to step out of this relative descriptive domain through descriptions. This demands an entirely new cognitive outlook: there is a space in which different phenomenologies can take place; one of these is autopoiesis: autopoiesis generates a phenomenological domain, this is cognition” (see also pp. 121–122).
- 114.
Edelman and Tononi (2000), p. 3.
- 115.
Edelman and Tononi (2000), p. 51 with an explicit reference to Aristotle’s position.
- 116.
Ibid., p. 125.
- 117.
Ibid., pp. 139–140.
- 118.
Ibid., pp. 164–170 and ff.
- 119.
Ibid., p. 207: “[T]here is no judge in nature deciding categories except for natural selection[…], consciousness is a physical process embodied in each unique individual[…]this embodiment can never be substituted for by a mere description. Our embodiment is the ultimate source of our descriptions and provides the base of how we know – the proper concern of the branch of philosophy known as epistemology.[…][E]pistemology should be grounded in biology, specifically in neuroscience.[…][Hence three consequences]: being is prior to describing[…], selection is prior to logic[…]in the development of thought, doing is prior to understanding.”
- 120.
Ibid., p. 193: “Three mysteries [ongoing awareness, the self, the construction of stories/plans/fictions] can be clarified if not completely dispelled by considering a combined picture of primary and higher-order consciousness.”
- 121.
Ibid., p. 200.
- 122.
Lakoff and Johnson (2010), pp. 561–563: “Your body is not[…]a mere vessel for a disembodied mind. […][C]ognitive science shows that our minds are not[…]disembodied[and]explains why we think that our minds are disembodied.” (emphasis in the text: see also the entire Part IV).
- 123.
Prigogine and Stengers (2005), para. 8.
- 124.
Maturana and Varela (1980), p. XXIV.
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Bombelli, G. (2018). Emotion and Rationality in Aristotle’s Model: From Anthropology to Politics. In: Huppes-Cluysenaer, L., Coelho, N. (eds) Aristotle on Emotions in Law and Politics. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 121. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66703-4_4
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