1 Introduction

Energ y has been recognised by International Relations (IR) scholarship as an increasingly salient factor affecting domestic policies and inter-governmental relations and an essential part of security concerns. It has been acknowledged that political interventions into the economy of resource exchange can generate energy security solutions that might trespass “normal” politics and require extraord inary security measures (the so-called process of “securitisation” seminally elaborated by the Copenhagen School and discussed in Chaps. 2 and 6). The literature has explored how energy relations and domestic political processes can be securitised, especially as a response to several energy crises in Europe throughout the 2000s (Natorski and Herranz Surrallés 2008; Judge and Maltby 2017; Stoddard 2012), but has left the analysis of energy desecuritisation to sporadic research inquiries (Christou and Adamides 2013).

Largely, debates about the conditions under which desecuritisation could occur have been developed in the context of broader IR energy studies in line with “Western-backed neoliberal orthodoxies” of “a generalisable paradigm heavily influenced by ideas about liberalisation, deregulation , and competition ” (Kuzemko 2013, 1). These “pro-market orthodoxies” have implicitly expected desecuritisation of energy policies as an outcome of market reforms and, contrarily, securitisation of relations as a result of non-market policies, especially those of energy producers (Correlje and van der Linde 2006; Moran and Russell 2009; Goldthau 2012). Overall, these studies have viewed the “desecuritisation” of energy politics as an essentially rationalist-driven exercise where a choice of market reforms provides the necessary grounds for international cooperation and presupposes a non-securitised path of energy policies (Wilson 2015). To some extent, these ideas rely upon “the prevailing orthodoxy of economic liberalism in energy policy” (McGowan 2008, 91) which has been embraced by governments and international bodies since the late 1980s (e.g., Kessides 2004).

Indeed, open markets combined with rule-based market exchange may decrease the likelihood of politically grounded conflicts over resource exchange. However, this does not presuppose that market liberalisation and securitisation trends cannot occur simultaneously. Moreover, empirical examples, such as security concerns about the global oil market and the securitisation of the Euro pean Union’s gas policies, seem not to juxtapose market reforms and securitisation trends in policies. These observations raise a need of a clearer definition of relations between liberalisation and securitisation. This chapter does not contrast liberalisation as part of market reforms to political aspects of energy relations, and does not view securitisation as part of political p ractices, as endorsed by many studies. On the contrary, this study argues that market liberalisation per se is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the “normalisation” of energy politics.

This study also has a different understanding of energy commodification and liberalisation from the economic strand of the energy security literature, which supposes that “energy markets were meant to depoliticize energy supply and thus make it less vulnerable to the types of politically motivated disruptions that shaped the earlier thinking on energy security” (Che rp and Jewell 2011, 205). In this regard, market liberalisation is understood in this study as a specific set of institutions which relies upon certain perceptions and ideas and promotes certain paradigms in its domestic (“domestic liberalisation”) and international (“international liberalisation”) dimensions. Thus, the domestic dimension refers to the market liberalisation of states’ energy sectors , while the international one refers to the market liberalisation of international (global) and regional energy markets.

As market conditions and models would vary significantly, containing perceptions, ideas, practices, rules, and norms, this study suggests that linking a particular type of energy market governance (“market liberalisation”) with (de)securitisation processes requires the analysis of case-specific conditions, which create the environment where tendencies for either securitisation or desecuritisation could prevail. In this research, these conditions are identified as (i) the compatibility of domestic institutional models of the energy s ector, which refers to consensus regarding contractual forms, deliveries, and access to markets among actors, and (ii) the “non-strategic” socio-economic role of resources, which reflects actors’ perceptions about the importance of a particular resource for states’ economy, security, and policies. In short, the compatibility of domestic institutional models creates the environment for desecuritisation in the context of (regional) interactions and policy formation and perceptions about the “non-strategic role” of resources in the context of the desecuritisation of international governance patterns and policy formation.

These conditions allow for looking closer at combinations of the liberalisation and (de)securitisation processes (Fig. 8.1): (i) when the liberalisation of domestic energy sectors is accompanied by securitisation, (ii) when the liberalisation of domestic energy sec tors is accompanied by desecuritisation, (iii) when the liberalisation of international (regional) energy markets is accompanied by securitisation, and (iv) when the liberalisation of international (regional) energy markets is accompanied by desecuritisation. The proposed conceptual framework is supported with several examples throughout the text, which demonstrate the intricacies of market reforms and desecuritisation processes in energy markets. It shows that, contrary to neoliberal expectations (Helm 2007; Goldthau and Sitter 2015, 23–26; Wilson 2015), additional conditions are more likely to generate further securitisation of energy issues in domestic and regional contexts.

Fig. 8.1
figure 1

Domestic/international liberalisation and (de)securitisation: a typology

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In this way, this chapter aims at redefining a casual chain between liberalisation and desecuritisation. First, this chapter defines the concepts of liberalisation and securitisation and delineates their use in the current literature. Second, it establishes the conceptual links between them on the grounds of two factors introduced as omitted causal factors. This study advocates a need for a more thorough analysis of the scope conditions that might influence the desecuritisation pattern. It outlines causes affecting securitisation process regardless of the presence or absence of market reforms . The objective consists not in denying the possible impact of liberalisation but in providing a more comprehensive causal chain that frames energy policy analysis. It will result in a more methodologically robust definition of causes which takes a different path from economic determinism (including the views of one particular economic model leading to positive policy outcomes). Instead, the approach will contribute to securitisation theory by highlighting non-tangible causes of the complex social process.

2 Market Liberalisation and (De)securitisation: Delineating the Conceptual Boundaries

The major debate regarding the liberalisation of energy sectors has been whether energy policy should be an object of public policy deliberations, of extraord inary security measures , or of technocratic governance. While the reply would depend upon the paradigmatic stance one chooses, the recent literature has favoured the approach to depoliticisation as the reduction of the role of central/regional government in certain issue areas (Kuzemko 2015). This choice has been justified by a need for independent, politics-free decision-making which relies upon a transfer of decision-making to independent agencies and removes the issue from political deliberations. That model includes national regulators , which are designed as agencies independent of ministries and (at least in theory) of direct governmental pressure, and transmission system operators (TSOs), which operate as market actors and in many countries are private, for-profit entities. It has been widely acknowledged that the liberalisation of the energy industry decreases the sector’s politi cisation—the separation of activities in the sector and independent regu lation transform strategic assets subject to political deliberations into market-traded commodities. This also means that security choices are more likely to be made by market actors rather than by governments. A number of reforms have been endeavoured in the USA , the UK, and the EU across the sectors, including those of telecommunication, transport, and ener gy (Kuzemko 2013; Talus 2011).

Contrary to this, a rising “hunt for resources” and increasingly nationalist energy policies of producers have been often referred to as “politicisa tion”, and its extreme form, securitisation, of energy relations (Goldthau and Sitter 2015). B y this, politicisation has been often understood in energy-related studies as a process occurring in the situation of political conflicts and tensions over energy resources (Colgan 2013). Overall, there has remained a tension between the way International Rela tions and International Political Economy literature contrast “the usual economic activity” with “politics”—that is, everything that cannot be explained through usual market behaviour—where the latter also stands for securitisation (Moran 2009). In this regard, securitisation has been interpreted as a response to external shocks, producers’ resource nationalism and consumers’ domestic political concerns about security of supplies.

This study advocates a need for a more thorough analysis of the scope conditions that might influence (de)securitisation patterns and for establishing relations between the concepts. Showing that securitisation is possible in a liberalised context, it opens up rationalist neoliberal debates to discuss how liberalisation trends can become securitised due to states’ perceptions of security threats . What this chapter seeks is to problematise what seems to be a dominant perception in the literature of a causal relationship and to improve it by adding those missing scope conditions. It aims at establishing under what scope conditions (de)securitisation is likely to occur. A clearer typology of possible combinations provides for a better understanding of the interrelationship between liberalisation and (de)securitisation trends emerging in the current energy politics in various parts of the world.

2.1 The Domestic and International Dimensions of Market Liberalisation

Paradoxically, the domestic and international dimensions of market liberalisation have often been used interchangeably in the I R literature, referring to various combinations of regulati on and market openness in international energy markets and domestic energy sectors. While they are mostly interrelated, one does not necessarily presuppose the other. Domestic market reforms refer to government-led organised reforms of the energy sect or, its competition rules, and market access (Talus 2011), the international dimension is mostly concerned with the modes of governance that emerge in international markets as a result of various combinations of characteristics such as physical production, financial instruments, pricing mechanisms, and contract structures (Dannreuter 2015). In this regard, domestic organisation may define strategies and preferences for international markets, but this might not necessarily be the case.

2.1.1 Domestic Liberalisation

“Liberalisation of domestic energy sectors ” refers to a combination of measures directed at the enhancement of competition in the sector (primarily through unbundling of operations and access to networks) and deregulation (inter alia by the allocation of authority to independent regulatory agencies), often accompanied with various degrees of privatisation (Jordana and Levi-Faur 2004). As has been conventionally argued by various international bodies (Müller-Jentsch 2001), these reforms allow market competition , provide incentives for the di versification of supplies and infrastructure development, and thus enhance energy security (Kessides 2004). In a nutshell, market reforms are aimed at re-organising a domestic institutional model (DIM) of the energy sector, which has traditionally comprised restricted competition in the market of vertically-integrated companies. The DIM usually includes the following aspects (Rossiaud and Locatelli 2010, 10):

  • access to the market (property rights to resources and their protection), investment protection, and investment dispute settlement;

  • the organisational model (the level of state involvement and market freedoms, the role of state and private companies, and the access of foreign companies to upstream and downstream activities);

  • competition rules (the level of competition in production, transmission , distribution, and export and the role of a regulator).

While the neoliberal literature would tend to view DIMs as a combination of rules and regulations that prescribe certain market behaviour and market operation, this study approaches DIMs from a more institutionalist point of view, viewing them as a set of rules and norms that guide interactions in energy markets and encompass a broader vision about underlying principles of the organisation of the energy sectors . The domestic institutional model is thus defined as a set of underlying principles of the organisation of energy sectors, identified by formal rules, organisational and regulat ory frameworks, and informal rules and norms that provide the internal consistency of the model. In broader terms, a model reflects a paradigm or a set of ideas on the continuum between free markets and resource nationalism, which address the extent of state involvement (whether the state is an arbiter or a regulator) and the interplay between competition and regulation (whether a certain degree of competition is allowed and competition rules are indeed implemented and applied in practice).

2.1.2 Liberalisation of International (Regional) Energy Markets

The liberalisation of international or regional energy markets refers to the development of free, transparent, and rule-based markets. In such markets, contractual obligations are concluded at specific trading platforms and cover various time frameworks. Liberalisation of markets is usually referred to as global governance mechanisms, which are aimed at “foster[ing] efficient markets, deal with externalities (notably, but not only, climate change), extend access to energ y services to the billions of people not adequately served by markets, and address the many trade-offs involved with improving energy security” (Florini and Sovacool 2011, 57). These global governance mechanisms aim at shaping transactions and interactions, leading to more predictable and transparent interactions in regard to investment agreements, trade rules, and transport regimes (Goldthau and Witte 2010). In other words, these structures are viewed as “a positive-sum market that merely needs better institutionalization to overcome the fundamental problem of energy security” (Florini and Sovacool 2011, 59). Some studies have been more sceptical about this politics-free nature of liberalisation (Belyi and Talus 2015; Dannreuter 2015) and view “international liberalisation” as a strategy to promote a certain vision of markets, which could contrast the existing governance practices.

2.2 Establishing Links Between the Liberalisation and (De)securitisation Processes: The Domestic Institutional Models and the Socio-Economic Role of Resources

This brief overview reveals that both liberalisation and securitisation can be grasped in multi-level dimensions. Then, an important question is addressed about how the two processes overlap. The present theoretical model inspired by the securitisation theory implies two core components foregrounding the causal chain—the compatibility of models and the social approach to the resources.

There are certain links between greater market freedoms and more peaceful rule-based relations, and this study seeks to unpack these causal mechanisms. The processes of (de)securitisation and market liberalisation can affect each other in both directions—for example, domestic liberalisation may lead to the desecuritisation of domestic energy policies, but also the desecuritisation of political processes may invoke reforms. The proposed typology distinguishes four sets of relations between the processes which vary along (i) the type of market liberalisation, and (ii) the presence or absence of securitisation:

  1. (i)

    Liberalisation of energy sectors (“domestic liberalisation”) and desecuritisation;

  2. (ii)

    Liberalisation of energy sectors (“domestic liberalisation”) and securitisation;

  3. (iii)

    Liberalisation of international (regional) energy markets (“international liberalisation”) and securitisation;

  4. (iv)

    Liberalisation of international (regional) energy markets (“international liberalisation”) and desecuritisation.

Figure 8.1 illustrates this typology and provides examples for each set, which are elaborated below. In defining securitisation, this study refers to the methodological considerations identified in Chap. 6, thus not focusing on single security speech acts but including the analysis of contextual factors. It views extraordin ary measures in line with the definitions in Chap. 2, which include “breaking norms that otherwise bind […], shifting competences and power (towards the executive) and withholding or limiting information”, all legitimised by reference to security. This study introduces two factors that may intervene into this relationship in a non-linear, case-specific fashion: (i) the compatibility of DIMs and (ii) the socio-economic role of a resource. This analytical exercise by no means presupposes that causal links can be established; however, clarifying the complex relationship between liberalisation and (de)securitisation provides a clearer conceptual basis for future analysis.

2.2.1 Domestic Liberalisation and (De)securitisation: The Compatibility of Domestic Institutional Models

Domestic institutional models affect actors’ strategies depending on their institutional interests. They contain both formal rules for the organisation of the sector but also a variety of perceptions about the role of the sector in the economy, the role of actors, goals, approaches to trade, and strategies. Preferences might include, inter alia, ways to guarantee revenues, approaches to risk division, property and operating rights, and political and symbolic dominance. For example, revenues as economic benefits from cross-border trade can be secured by various mechanisms in commodity contracts, including flexibility of pricing and flexibility of volumes. Approaches to risk d ivision define how risks between producers (“resource” risks of upstream activity, exploration of new fields and infrastructure ) and consumers (“market” r isks of downstream activity, marketing, and sales) are divided in commodity contracts (Konoplyanik 2009). These preferences may generate a variety of strategies about resource exchange and investment including the issues of: (i) types of commodity contracts (a commodity purchase or a long-term investment contract), (ii) access to infrastructure (mandatory or negotiated), and (iii) investment protection.

Once differences in these aspects penetrate energy relations, it might be argued that tensions are more prone to occur. Compatibility of models—a consensus about most of these issues—is likely to provide stability in the interactions, and contrarily, once (unilateral) changes in energy markets are invoked, they increase a probability of conflicts. Differences in domestic institutional models might increase disagreements and result in diversificat ion policies, the absence of a common framework, and the prioritisation of physical aspects of energy security. In other words, liberalisation as a particular type of domestic institutional models is not a necessary and satisfactory factor of desecuritisation; instead, under certain conditions, it can generate further conflictual patterns in international practices.

Market ref orms could occur simultaneously in th e context of greater securitisation of policies and liberalisation may become a way to achieve securitisation, framed as a tool for enhancing resistance to (external) threats . Domestic market reforms do not always generate incentives for market openness in international relatio ns. Certainly, at the regional level, or at a certain stage of market development, states may opt to adapt to a new regulatory paradigm due to a wide range of reasons (Prange-Gstöhl 2009), but it is questionable whether non-liberalised models a priori result in conflictual patterns.

An example includes gas trade between Europe and Ru ssia that has become increasingly conflictual since the early 2000s—the period when a number of reforms regarding further liberalisation of the EU gas market were adopted (Eikeland 2011) and when a number of initiatives confirmed stronger adherence to the state-controlled natural monopoly model in Russia.Footnote 1 These EU reforms have significantly changed three major aspects of the models—how the market is accessed, to guarantee investment protection and to settle disputes; how the market is organised; and the interplay between competition and regulation in the gas sector . These changes have triggered a number of uncertainties for both domestic and external stakeholders both in the EU and Russia. For example, unbundling measures introduced by the EU as part of the so-called Third Energy Package in 2009 have further complicated EU-Russia gas relations. These measures included the Third Country Clause, which was “referred to in the press as the ‘Lex Gazprom’” (Boussena and Locatelli 2013, 32) and which was largely defined by Russian officials as hostile to Russia, and Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov (2013, 8) pointed to “de facto expropriation of Russian companies”.

While these reforms have been often referred to as a step towards the end of Russia’s energy leverage in political gas pricing and as “normalisation” of the gas sector , they further fuelled tensions as a result of the implementation of EU reg ulation by the members of the EU Energy Community Treaty, in particular Ukraine . While the implementation of EU energy provisions by Ukraine would approximate its domestic model to the EU internal energy market, the broader system of energy governance demonstrates the significant incompatibility of the EU models with institutional practices of Russia. After the transi t ga s contract between Russia and Ukraine expires in 2019, these profound gas sector reforms in Ukraine will provide a new impetus for political deliberations in a broader gas market in Eurasia. Further advancement of the EU-led reform in Ukraine and other countries of the Energy Community will inevitably raise the issue of the co-existence of these models.

2.2.2 Liberalisation of International (Regional) Energy Markets and (De)securitisation: The Socio-Economic Role of Resources

One could expect that if resources are exchanged in free markets, desecuritisation of relations would occur. This postulate relies upon the strand of the literature that views energy markets as those that “can deliver energy more efficiently and ensure necessary investment in energy infrastructure while the diversity of market actors would guarantee security of supply ” (Cherp and Jewell 2011, 205). From one side, open markets provide flexibility and liquidity, and may potentially invoke domestic transformations in the country’s sector as part of adaptations to the new market realities. For example, changes in contract practices in international energy markets facilitate changes of business practices and models (Rogers 2017). However, this does not presuppose desecuritisation. For example, notwithstanding the global and liberalised oil market , which can be only slightly distorted by non-market behaviour of market participants, oil is still widely considered a strategic commodity, and oil-related issues remain essentially a matter of securitisation by governments (Hughes and Long 2015).

Therefore, this study points to a need to consider the socio-economic role of the resource—that is, the importance attributed to a resource in the society, region, or the world. To some extent, this concept relies upon elaborations on “vital energy systems” by Cherp and Jewell—they view vital energy systems and their vulnerabilities not only as objective phenomena but “also political constructs defined and prioritized by various social actors” (2014, 419). This argument is consistent with the idea that the strategic nature—or “vitality”—of resources depends not only on objective factors such as trade liquidity, sector’s transformations, and regional/world prices but also on a wide range of securitised path dependencies and persisting thre at perceptions at domestic, regional, or global levels.

Accordingly, the level of international energy securitisation depends upon the considerations of states and market players about the role of a resource in their economies and politics. Economic developments, shifting market and industry structures, and changes in guiding paradigms can replace one resource with another as a strategic resource. In other words, it is not much about market structures (as the “liberalisation thesis” would argue) but about the degree of importance attributed by agency to this particular resource. This has occurred, for example, in the coal market, which nowadays plays only a marginal role in Europe both in economic and paradigmatic structures. Coal is no longer a crucial source for economies, an instrument for financial policies, or a crucial source of revenues. This contrasts to gas m arkets which are currently undergoing liberalisation and internationalisation. Gas ma rket liberalisation triggers a liquidity of gas trade and stimulates new market entry points in Europe. Yet, a process of desecuritisation did not occur in this issue-specific case. Indeed, gas is still perceived as a strategic commodity, which benchmarks the overall policies of the EU, Ukraine , and Russia. More particularly, in spite of current market reforms in line with EU energy regulation, a level of securitisation is observed since Ukrainian legislation opened a possibility to disrupt transit for security reasons. The Law “On Sanctions” adopted by the Ukrainian Parliament in 2014 allows Ukraine to apply 26 types of sanctions , including a complete or partial ban on t ransit of all kinds of resources (MENA Chamber 2014).

3 Conclusion

This chapter has not sought to challenge the argument that market reforms contribute to the stabilisation of resource exchange practices but aimed at scrutinising the interrelationship between the concepts of “(de)securitisation” and “market liberalisation”, which has remained under-elaborated in the IR literature. It has often been presupposed that the introduction of the elements of privatisation and commodification into energy sectors would change the logic of the market actors into a rationalist “Homo Economicus” in the way they should be expected to act as utility maximisers in a rational way. Contrarily, the absence of such reforms has been argued to invoke various political tensions and ineffective policies. This study has stressed there is a need to overcome this prevalent juxtaposition between market reforms and political deliberations about energy resources and has argued that market reform s are neither a necessary nor a sufficient factor for desecuritisation. In order to provide new insights into the relationship between the concepts, this study has complemented the existing rationalist-driven framework of energy deregulation and commodification with two context-dependent conditions grounded in the updated securitisation theory . A more robust methodological approach decouples liberalisation from policy outcomes and thus distances itself from an economic determinism providing a foundation to more social causes to the process. Two subjective factors to be taken into account have comprised (i) the compatibility of institutional models of energy sectors and (ii) the socio-economic role of energy resources.

This analysis has helped to demonstrate that “domestic liberalisation” is not a silver bullet for desecuritisation of energy relations—empirical inquiries demonstrate that both market reforms and securitisation of energy policies can occur simultaneously. “Market liberalisation” as a form of the organisation of the energy sect or may generate securitisation of relations and policies once it comes into conflict with the established modes of interactions regarding resource exchange among states. Moreover, liberalisation itself may become part of a securitisation disco urse, as shown in the examples of an LNG terminal construction in Poland (Chap. 3, in this volume). Conversely, the absence of market reforms does not necessarily imply securitisation of energy politics, the argument to challenge studies about the increasingly bullying policies of energy producers. States with various forms of domestic energy sectors and export models have proved to have stable relations over decades once their domestic models were compatible.

The liberalisation of international markets is not also a necessary condition for the desecuritisation of domestic policies. Thus, the security of oil supplies has dominated the political deliberations of many states as part of their national security strategies. In other words, these policies do not depend much upon the types of markets these resources are exchanged in but upon the (perceived) role of these resources in the society and economy. In this regard, desecuritisation is more likely to occur once the socio-economic role of the resource is viewed as non-strategic by participants (compare Chap. 6). “A strategic view” does not exclude the objective importance of resources for societies (e.g., the share in the national energy mix), but draws attention to policy ideas that persist about this particular resource. The perceptions about resources may change in time along economic developments and policy changes.

In conclusion, by subjecting the concepts of liberalisation and desecuritisation to greater scrutiny, this chapter has demonstrated that no deterministic and linear relationship between the two exists. Instead, the relationship is contingent and contextual; liberalisation processes at either domestic or international levels shape various interactions that may trigger desecuritisation depending on a particular context. In future research cases, beyond the present illustrative cases, scholars may need to take into account circumstance-based factors engendering either securitisation or desecuritisation.