Abstract
This chapter begins on the note that pre-linguistic categorisation is central to the furnishing of the world. Thus, linguification becomes central only after we are cognitively anchored in reality. Hereafter, I address features central to language acquisition that I claim are crucial parameters in the explanation of abstract knowledge acquisition in derived embodiment processes. I discuss (1) the reality of the phenomenon, event, or object, (2) the attentional focus of the language learner, and (3) the interlocutor. Qualitative shifts in those components seem essential in the transfer from the first stage (concrete level) to the next stage (abstract level). Obviously, the reality of the referent of what one linguistically addresses changes from being immediately present (on-line) to absent (off-line). The off-line condition imputes a challenge to the second parameter, the learner’s imaginative abilities to which he or she must turn in order to understand to what language refers. When the referent is present, the understanding will get external support from perceptual processes. Contrariwise, in the off-line condition, the language learner relies on vicarious internal, self-sustained cues to attain understanding. The chapter deals primarily with the first parameter that leads to considerations about the imagination, the relation between imagination and re-enactments as well as the distribution of non-conscious and conscious processes and thus introduces the concept of first order linguification processes. Since phenomenally experienced imagery may play an important part in abstract language acquisition, space is devoted to further explorations of the question of the phenomenal qualities of re-enactments, which inevitably invites discussions on different notions of consciousness. The chapter closes with a presentation of different attention states and the moderating impact of the interlocutor.
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Notes
- 1.
The relative stability of the neural constructs that result from repeated co-activation may be illustrated by the continuous firing of amputated limbs in amputees. Even after the external stimulation in the form of touch to the removed limb is rendered oblivious, Hurley and Noë (2003, p. 133) refer to the stability as ‘cortical dominance’:
“Cortical dominance is illustrated by phantom limb cases in which there appears to be no change in the normal qualitative expression of activation of a given area of cortex, despite change in the source of input. Normally, tactile inputs from arm and face map onto adjacent cortical areas. After amputation of part of an arm, tactile inputs from the face appear to invade deafferented cortex whose normal qualitative expression is a feeling as of an arm being touched. When this area of cortex is activated from its new source, the face, it retains its normal qualitative expression, the touch-to-arm feeling”.
- 2.
According to Cleeremans, for such ‘direct’ representations to be conscious they must be themselves the target of other representations (ibid. p. 22):
“such representations are ‘first-order’ representations to the extent that they are representations in the system rather than representations for the system that is, such representations are not accessible to the network as representations”.
- 3.
Time windows exist in Hebbian learning, the neural mechanism behind concurrent stimulation of more neurons leading to sustained neural activity, which means that only if neurons are co-activated within a certain time span will their individual contributions significantly add up and multiply the original signal (see Keysers and Gazzola 2014 for an updated introduction to the neurophysiological basis of Hebbian learning). Crudely put, if stimulations from sight, for instance movement, resonates with stimulations from sound, i.e. tapping, and both neural paths feed into a common field, mutually they will have greater impact than either one alone. Though time limits exist, the redundancy strategy enhances and thus stabilises the pattern.
- 4.
The following paragraphs were originally published in Schilhab (2011).
- 5.
It is likely that the maturation (and control) of awareness during ontogenetic development is a co-determining factor (e.g. Kuhn 2000). Attentive processes in infants may be concerned more with external stimuli (exogenous attention see also later in this chapter).
- 6.
As discussed in the previous paragraph, this switch has clear phylogenetic and developmental components. However, my focus is in principle on what characterises the neural underpinning of knowledge of concrete and non-crete phenomena, and what mechanisms may endorse the switch. Thus, developmental considerations related to age of acquisition, individual differences, and so forth are beyond the scope of this account.
- 7.
Since the b-representation feeds into the t-representation [for instance, when odours in the environment grow strong to an extent where it is consciously recognised (Schnall et al. 2008)] there seems to be an overlap between b-representations and t-representations. As discussed in Chap. 3, the overlap is incomplete, however, and during development children also learn to ‘reality monitor’ (e.g. Marham et al. 1999), to detect differences between imagination and direct experiences. To clarify the effect of historicity and to analytically separate new from familiar activation, it may be necessary to apply a related distinction between b-re-enactment and t-re-enactment to distinguish between the acquisition phase (representation) and the employment of the representation (re-enactment) when it has been firmly established.
- 8.
In this context, I am not concerned with distinctions that assess the property of phenomena to abide by the natural laws. Thus, in dissociating concrete from abstract knowledge from the rather narrow perspective of interactional expertise-like knowledge, I acknowledge the non-existing category (mode of existence) just for the sake of argument. After all, interactional expertise-like knowledge concerns real phenomena and events abiding by natural laws. In other words, phenomena and events which somebody has actually experienced.
- 9.
Refers to the sense in which the referent relates to our senses phylogenetically. This condition presupposes the development of appropriate sense organs. Humans cannot sense in the spectrum of the ultra-red or perceive by echolocation. Thus, when we address ideas about ‘ultra-red’ perceptual corroboration is not uniformly linked to the actual phenomenon. Therefore the perceptual corroboration is idiosyncratic to the individual.
- 10.
Refers to the sense in which the referent relates to our senses ontogenetically, thus the historicity of individual encounters. This condition presupposes the modus of existence.
- 11.
Refers to the sense in which the referent is momentarily present or absent.
- 12.
Exists phylogenetically and is both ontogenetically and spatially present in terms of the notation of modus of existence, modus of historical presence, and modus of spatial presence (+, +, +).
- 13.
Exists phylogenetically and is ontogenetically present, but spatially absent. Condition 1 and 2 denote on-line and off-line cognition respectively (+, +, −).
- 14.
Exists phylogenetically but is both ontogenetically and spatially absent (+, −, −).
- 15.
Does not phylogenetically exist and is both ontogenetically and spatially absent. This category is concerned with phenomena, we have no perceptual qualifications for (−, −, −). Please note that the condition denoted by (+, −, +) is absurd, since no referent is both ontogenetically absent and spatially present.
- 16.
In Schilhab (2007b), in addition to the categories presented here, I included a category to which fabulous monsters such as unicorns and dragons belong. Such objects seem to be caught between two of the categories presented here. They come into existence in fairy tales, wallpaper, and children’s toys. In that form they materialise to a kind of ‘as if’ existence that physically instantiates the concept and materialises to a form accessible to the senses. I return to this in Chap. 8.
- 17.
As discussed above in relation to ‘as-if extensions’, the ability to assign, to the unrealistic conceptual material, some kind of substance as in the case of painted chimeras found in prehistoric caves that borrows reality by partial resemblance to real things, is to transform the unreal that would be completely inaccessible to the senses because of its non-existence to something real and perceivable. This process may have certain similarities to hypostasis and reification, see also Chap. 8.
- 18.
If following the strict interpretation of the introduced vocabulary the correct term would be; ‘t-reenactment’ as I infer that the representation has been established on-line and is now re-activated (see also the note on the distinction between the linguification process and the linguification product). In that sense, t-representations may be used only in case of linguistically mediated knowledge that is category 3.
- 19.
The representation elicited by carrying the egg may rely on previously acquired balancing expertise but the involved sensory modalities also contribute. However, Kim et al. (2011) offer an explanation as to why the motor system works despite mind wandering while walking down the street, which might also pertain to the egg example (p. 465): “motor systems can continue to accurately respond to current environmental contingencies when we are apparently attenuating the sensory inputs critical for these visually guided actions”. According to the researchers, processing of stimuli presented to the lower visual field (LVF) (p. 469): “may specifically resist tuning out so that our bodies can respond to current environmental contingencies regardless of where in time and space our mind may have wandered”.
- 20.
I use the notation of b-reenactments and t-reenactments about the neural correlates activated in category 2, in which focus is on the established representation, since there is reason to distinguish between the process of linguification and the product of linguification. When addressing the accessibility of the perceptual feel that originally (in)formed the undercurrents of linguification, the emphasis is on the product in the sense of processes that sustain the well-established concept. Thus, we must distinguish between representations in the developing linguification product and the re-enactment, which is more related to an already established representation. Since representations are always in a process of development, the distinction is disputable. In this context, however, it is important to make these analytical distinctions. Moreover, apparently, we may also need to distinguish between different phases in the linguification process insofar as repetition of experiences may induce implicit processes that function at an automatic level.
- 21.
What characterises imagery in the neural literature? According to Pearson, Deeprose, Wallace-Hadrill, Heyes, and Holmes (2013, p. 6), there are two distinct routes by which mental imagery is created (Pearson 2007): “First of all an image can be created directly from immediate perceptual information. For example, someone can look at a picture of a horse, create a mental image of the picture in their mind, and then maintain this mental image as they look away or close their eyes. Second, an image can be created entirely from previously stored information held in long-term memory. For example, someone can hear the word ‘horse’ and then create mental imagery based on their previous experience of what a horse looks like”. Please note that ‘imagery’ refers to perceptual impressions in general and is not dedicated exclusively to the visual modality.
According to Hall (2002, p. 467): “mental imagery shares neural networks with major cognitive functions such as language, memory, and movement depending on the nature of the imagery task. Hence, there is no unique mental imagery neural network”.
- 22.
The close association between on-line representation and imagination is also corroborated by the study by Stokes, Thompson, Cusack, and Duncan (2009) in which top-down mechanisms for visual imagery accessed the same distributed representations within the visual cortex that also underline visual perception. Similar findings are also reported in studies that demonstrate that imagining a visual scene activates the visual cortex (Kosslyn et al. 1995).
Obviously, the overlap between on-line and off-line networks is not confined to the visual modality. An fMRI-study on reactivation of previous experiences observed in auditory imagination seems to suggest that perceptual activity is true to modality. In the study, subjects were presented with both familiar and unfamiliar music that either included lyrics (as in ‘Satisfaction’ by Rolling Stones) or not (as in the theme of the ‘Pink Panther’). In the experiment, subjects listened to an excerpt that was followed without warning by a short interval of silence. In the familiar case, subjects showed increased activity in perceptual areas during the continuation of the song in imagination (Kraemer et al. 2005).
Despite these studies that demonstrate that the neural correlate of on-line experiencing and imagining overlap, the characterisations by Cleeremans (stability, strength, or distinctiveness) may still pertain more to on-line representations than re-enactments (see also Meyer and Damasio 2009; Prinz 2010).
Thus, it could be the direct control of the imagination that forced the re-enactment into consciousness and via this switch now in the possession of features such as stability, strength, or distinctiveness.
- 23.
Since A- and P-conscious states differ, merging them as one category may seem confusing. However, to avoid unnessecary complexity, they are contrasted only with non-conscious states and not with each other. Moreover, in this context the overarching focus is on a comparison between direct experiences and the re-enacment of experiences. Hence, it is the phenomenal aspect of the phenomenon that is of particular interest here.
- 24.
Apparently the position is not without problematic implications. According to Kirsh (2010, p. 447):
“How can a subject be sure that the mental image in mind at time t1 is the same as the one at t0? And how can a subject know whether the addition of another mental image, or a simple rotation of a mental image, has not changed the original image? The only reliable test is whether the image is caused by the same external structure on both occasions. If that structure is not present, there is no objective touchstone to decide sameness. There is just subjective belief. For Wittgenstein (1953), this was a source of scepticism concerning the possibility of knowing one’s mental state without outside referents to ground it. No inner state or inner process without outer criterion. Hence, without external support, there might be no way of knowing whether one has the same thought on two occasions”.
- 25.
Given that interlocutors are decisive with respect to the actual linguification result of especially derived embodiment processes as we attend to soon, one may wonder what informs the interlocutor. What makes him or her capable of assessing which direction to direct the conscious focus of the language learner? What controls his or her performance? It is outside the scope of this book to address this issue in further detail. However, it seems clear that to some extent interlocutors are inspired by private experiences. It is likely that varied experiences of derived embodiment conversations in childhood facilitate the ability to engage in derived embodiment conversations and thus pass on the ‘tradition’ (see also Chap. 8 and the acquisition of ToM).
- 26.
See Anderson (2014) for an elaborate discussion of how particular words in conversations may elicit full simulations in the sense of ‘Phenotypic reorganizations’.
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Schilhab, T. (2017). Concrete and ‘Abstract’ Knowledge. In: Derived Embodiment in Abstract Language. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-56056-4_4
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