Abstract
Abstract knowledge acquisition inevitably challenges contemporary embodiment theories of knowledge. Beneath this challenge subsists the bigger question of humanity’s place in a real natural world. This latter tension is the actual driver that defines and ignites all discussions throughout this book. In this chapter 1 introduce the notion of interactional expertise-like knowledge (linguistic knowledge that is not based on direct experiences) to accentuate the controversies every biologically inspired theory of linguistic knowledge is bound to stir up. If conceptual knowledge consists of perceptual and motor-sensory activities as suggested by contemporary neuroscience results, the idea that knowledge is graspable by language and may bypass direct experiences seems quite bold. In this chapter I focus on how and especially why we should reconcile the biological bottom-up activity with the social top-down activity. My approach is to unravel essential properties of language acquisition, the character of the knowledge involved, and especially the mechanisms that render interactional expertise-like knowledge possible. The challenge is to unfold how abstract knowledge is possible in the light of the natural origin of man.
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Notes
- 1.
In scholastic education, the cornerstone of modern western civilization, transfer of information of not directly experienced knowledge is crucial (e.g. Wackerhausen 1996), whereas experienced knowledge is downplayed. The anthropologist Tim Ingold phrases how this (in the scholastic perspective) underrated knowledge source helps us ’read’ in the world:
Why do we acknowledge only our textual sources but not the ground we walk, the ever-changing skies, mountains and rivers, rocks and trees, the houses we inhabit and the tools we use, not to mention the innumerable companions, both non-human animals and fellow humans, with which and with whom we share our lives? They are constantly inspiring us, challenging us, telling us things. If our aim is to read the world, as I believe it ought to be, then the purpose of written texts should be to enrich our reading so that we might be better advised by, and responsive to, what the world is telling us (2011, p. xii).
- 2.
The emphasis on language is not an attempt to ignore that body language, chemical transmission, facial expressions, pitch of tone, and motor activity to be copied, are on-line signals that probably systematically accompany those intersubjective information exchanges, where people physically or near physically (over skype or telephone) meet, hence also contribute productively to the linguistic exchange (e.g. Havas et al. 2010). As this account unfolds it may become increasingly clear that as a consequence of the pointing to the embodiment of language acquisition, all of these non-verbal components have to be assumed whenever we refer to language as vehicle of knowledge.
- 3.
According to Shapiro (2011), embodied cognition research has not yet matured to the level of an actual school, since most approaches diverge with respect to methodology, framework, and outspoken claims. However, embodied cognition approaches all agree to confront cognitivist claims. They object to a representationalist conception of cognition that neglects the inseparable co-determining of mental representations from bodily sources. Chemero (2011) on the other hand holds that cognitive science on the whole is immature and still caught in the ‘preparadigmatic stage’ as described by the Kuhnian terminology. For reviews on the fundamentals of the embodiment hypothesis, see for instance Meteyard et al. (2012), Pulvermüller (2013), and Wellsby and Pexman (2014).
- 4.
‘Simulator’ refers to the neural correlate that sustains processes that refer to categories.
- 5.
Please note that two aspects of expertise are at stake here. The argument concerns expertise at an individual level, in which knowledge of a particular sensation of pain or contraction is questioned. At the professional level, male midwives and dentists are all contributory experts with or without the direct experience supporting the conceptual knowledge.
- 6.
Intermediate varieties of learning that are neither direct nor indirect also exist. An example is so-called ‘physical contiguity’, which is a concept developed by Ribeiro (2007a, b). See also Schilhab (2007a) for a neuroscientific exposition based on mirror neuron studies. In Chap. 8 we return to that particular issue.
- 7.
How applicable is a sensorimotor explanation to linguistic meaning? Even researchers who agree on the relevance of re-enactment and simulation in language seem to differ on this issue. At the one extreme, some researchers hold that simulation is a constituent of all aspects of language (see Chemero 2011), whereas other researchers hold that both amodal and modal representations are involved. For instance, Barsalou et al. (2008) propose the Language and Situated Simulation (LASS) Theory, which posits that concepts are represented either in linguistically or in situated sensory-motor simulations. Whereas the linguistic system is associated with relatively shallow processing of language, the deeper conceptual processing elicits activity in the simulation system. Some researchers believe that concepts are primarily amodal (Mahon and Caramazza 2008, p. 10), however “sensory-motor information colors conceptual processing, enriches it and provides it with a relational context”.
- 8.
Anatomical (Squire 2004, 2009) as well as neuropsychological research (e.g. Berry and Dienes 1993; Berry 1996; Underwood 1996; Weiskrantz 1997; Stadler and Frensch 1998) unambiguously supports the existence of at least two independent learning systems. However, disagreement on how theoretically to demarcate non-conscious, implicit from conscious, explicit learning has prevailed (e.g. Berry and Dienes 1993; Frensch 1998; Reber 1967, 1993). Moreover, distinctions in terms of consciousness have dominated explanatory attempts, i.e., the presence or absence of awareness, as manifested by the ability or inability to report with confidence on learned material, is crucial to most research paradigms (e.g. Berry and Dienes 1993; Berry 1996; Underwood 1996; Weiskrantz 1997; Stadler and Frensch 1998).
As commented upon by many observers, creating a distinction by subjective report might not be feasible in that the distinction is operationally unclear (e.g. Berry 1996; Frensch 1998). It is clearly impossible to show that lack of report is due to non-conscious awareness of learning. For a modified suggestion, see Butler and Berry (2001).
- 9.
Sections of this chapter has been modified and extended with basis in my paper (Schilhab 2015b).
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Schilhab, T. (2017). Introduction to the Book. In: Derived Embodiment in Abstract Language. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-56056-4_1
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