Abstract
In his chapter, Steve Sapontzis presents a discussion of morality focusing on its origin and purpose in human psychology. Contrary to what might be expected, a humanistic idea of morality need not limit moral concern to inter-human relations. This is because, he argues, the purpose of morality is to reinforce our other-centered feelings in their struggle with human selfishness, and the class of others whose well-being motivates us is not limited to human beings. The chapter concludes with some practical inferences for nonhuman animal liberation from this idea of morality.
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Notes
- 1.
The mocking description of natural rights in Bentham (1816).
- 2.
For a discussion of the relation of morality to natural principles, see Sapontzis (1995).
- 3.
See Sartre (1956), Part 3, Chapter 3: Concrete Relations with Others.
- 4.
From John F. Kennedy’s moralistic Inaugural Address as President of the United States, January 20, 1961.
- 5.
As noted in section 4.2, this coupling differs from prudence, which might direct someone to tend to others’ well-being not for their sake but as a means to his, as when a pimp keeps his girls healthy in order for them to work profitably for him. In such prudential cases, other-centered feelings are not being bolstered by self-interest; rather, the agent’s actions are motivated entirely by self-centered feelings, while other-centered feelings are absent.
- 6.
See Kant (1959), footnote beginning on page 16.
- 7.
This outcome is neither surprising nor a criticism. These imaginative scenarios are not intended to discover moral principles but to defend the moral principles of the philosopher’s community by demonstrating their “rationality,” that is, their deducibility without recourse to sentimentality. However, as we shall see, the starting point for such deductive moralities includes more than logic and a tough-minded view of human nature.
- 8.
For an extensive discussion of the inadequacy of enlightened self-interest as a theory of morality, see Sapontzis (2012), Chapter 4, “A Phenomenology of Morals.”
- 9.
Joel Feinberg (1970) emphasizes this function of rights.
- 10.
For an extensive discussion of this common attempt at a reductio ad absurdum of animal liberation, see Sapontzis (1987), Chapter 13, “Saving the Rabbit from the Fox.”
- 11.
- 12.
Controversy seems to arise when people are committed to the idea that natural selection requires that all human motivation be self-centered. However, biological scientists disagree about the level where selfishness reigns supreme; it could be genes or species rather than individual organisms. Also, if evolution through natural selection refers to change through natural mechanisms without supernatural purpose, then it is logically compatible with our having other-centered interests. Acknowledging such interests may violate some sort of biological nominalist imperative against multiplying basic motivations beyond necessity, but it does accord with everyday experience and provide for less convoluted explanations of many of our actions than does trying to trace everything we do back to self-centered motivations. See Dawkins (1976) for examples of convoluted “explanation” of altruistic behavior by tracing it back to a “ruthlessly selfish,” genetic élan vital.
- 13.
Morality can be similarly used to accomplish the opposite of its purpose. As Nietzsche (1956) contends, priests and other moralists who are unable to satisfy their selfish interests forthrightly have craftily pursued the fulfillment of those interests by convincing other people to inhibit their selfishness in ways that help the priests and moralists to satisfy theirs.
- 14.
Actually, not self-evident for everyone. Immoralists like Nietzsche challenge whether we should do what God directs on the grounds that it is what God directs. “Better to rule in hell than serve in heaven,” says Lucifer in Paradise Lost. The human need to dominate—or will to power—has motivated a small but persistent philosophical and literary, proudly immoralist tradition pushing back at moral limitations on selfishness by portraying selfishness as rare and heroic, rather than adolescent and pervasive.
- 15.
For an extensive discussion of these issues, see Sapontzis (1987), Part II: “Animal Rights”?
- 16.
See Hume (1740), Book II, Part III, Section iii, Of the Influencing Motives of the Will.
- 17.
Contexts of intellectual debate among people who are devoted to being logical are obviously exceptions to this conclusion, but those contexts are not that common. Since logic is on the side of the liberationists, increasing the frequency of such contexts can benefit nonhuman animals, though not as much as teaching children to feel disgusted by lamb chops.
Bibliography
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Feinberg, J., 1970. The Nature and Value of Rights. The Journal of Value Inquiry, 4(4), pp. 243–257.
Hume, D., 1740. A Treatise of Human Nature.
Kant, I., 1959. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. Trans., L. W. Beck. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
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Sapontzis, S.F. (2017). Evolution to Liberation: Political Reflections on Morality and Nonhumans. In: Woodhall, A., Garmendia da Trindade, G. (eds) Ethical and Political Approaches to Nonhuman Animal Issues. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-54549-3_4
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