Abstract
Diverse considerations may be relevant to deciding what to do, and people may disagree about their importance or even their relevance. Reasonable ways of taking such diversity into account include comprehensive listing of considerations, assessment of the acceptability and relevance of each consideration, reframing, adjusting the option space, debiasing, estimations of importance, and allocating the burden of proof.
Bibliographical note: This chapter was previously published with the same title in Argumentation and reasoned action: Proceedings of the 1st European Conference on Argumentation, Lisbon 2015, Volume I, ed. Dima Mohammed and Marcin Lewiński (London: College Publications, 2016), 165–180.
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Hitchcock, D. (2017). “All Things Considered”. In: On Reasoning and Argument. Argumentation Library, vol 30. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53562-3_17
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