Abstract
This chapter argues that the two primary means of responding to the illegal drug problem over the last 30 years—the Kingpin Strategy and interdiction—have been unprecedented failures because drug smugglers and state agencies that serve to prevent drug smuggling actually for a state/non-state symbiosis where each one reinforces the profit/need of the other. Furthermore, the cockroach effect , whereby the elimination of heads of cartels, actually results in a splintering of drug cartels and increased violence. Meanwhile, the balloon effect , where drug traffickers simply move drugs through new geographic regions or by new means, makes interdiction ineffective. The singularity is unlikely to change these dynamics. In fact, it may exacerbate them in two ways. First, the replacement of current employment with automation will increase unemployment , making the illicit/illegal economy more attractive to more people. Second, the use of automated responses to defend borders tends to result in higher levels and more frequent applications of violence.
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Carey, E., Marak, A. (2018). Drug Smuggling and Automated Borders: A Losing Battle of Escalation or State/Non-state Symbiosis. In: Kiggins, R. (eds) The Political Economy of Robots. International Political Economy Series. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51466-6_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51466-6_3
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Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-51465-9
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-51466-6
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