Abstract
Non-legal disciplines increasingly are discovering the power of learning. Neither should the law, both in scholarship and regulatory practice, hesitate to tap this precious resource as well. Such an undertaking would seem particularly fruitful in environmental law. This chapter aims to contribute to this process by making six distinctive claims.
First, we show how environmental regulation has moved from traditional command-and-control regimes, then to market-based regulation, and now to green nudging. This development can be traced to a consonant evolution of the particular interdisciplinary theory on which the law draws. Command-and-control and market-based regulation are backed by rational choice theory , while green nudging incorporates behavioural economics into regulation. However, both neoclassical market theory and behavioural interventions often ignore the importance and preconditions of learning. Second, green nudging in particular suffers from a focus on short-term effectiveness . Although a number of studies empirically testing nudges have found that the lack of sustainability over time does not equally affect all types of nudges, it is apparent in green nudges such as notices, reminders, and graphic labels. The impermanence of behavioural change is a serious concern for these types of intervention. Learning theory could help remedy these problems. We therefore, third, argue that the methodological reach of behavioural law and economics should be expanded to include social psychology and behavioural game theory which have studied learning for decades. Moreover, fourth, the normative focus of nudging should be shifted, particularly for environmental law, from welfare to fairness, public good orientation, and concerns for the environment. With this in mind, fifth, institutions such as regulatory agencies or private companies could include specific structures to facilitate what we have called systemic learning , i.e., learning which takes the interdependence of individual and institutional learning seriously. Examples of such structures are regular feedback loops, both for nudgees and regulators, as well as institutional systemic learning facilities such as learning task forces. Finally, we call for the establishment of an Agency for Systemic Learning Management to coordinate learning efforts between different agencies and private players.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
Murphy 2002, pp. 115–40.
- 3.
Bennett and Howlett 1992.
- 4.
- 5.
Stiglitz and Greenwald 2014.
- 6.
- 7.
Dimitropoulos and Hacker 2016.
- 8.
Hacker 2016; more extensively, see Hacker 2016a.
- 9.
- 10.
Pettit 1996.
- 11.
See Article 3(3) of the Treaty on European Union.
- 12.
See also Dimitropoulos 2015.
- 13.
Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), establishing a European Chemicals Agency.
- 14.
See more information on “China REACH” under: http://www.cirs-reach.com/China_Chemical_Regulation/IECSC_China_REACH_China_New_Chemical_Registration.html.
- 15.
Draft National Chemical Policy (Draft NCP-2012), p. 18 and p. 24.
- 16.
See Gaia, Study on REACH Contribution to the Development of Emerging Technologies – Final Report, 19 October 2012, p. 144.
- 17.
See more information on “Korea REACH” under: http://www.cirs-reach.com/KoreaTCCA/Korea_Toxic_Chemicals_Control_Act_TCCA.html.
- 18.
Verordnung über den Schutz vor gefährlichen Stoffen und Zubereitungen (Chemikalienverordnung, ChemV) vom 5. Juni 2015 (Stand am 1. Februar 2016) AS 2015 1903.
- 19.
GAO, Chemical Regulation, Comparison of U.S. and Recently Enacted European Union Approaches to Protect against the Risks of Toxic Chemicals, GAO-07-825, Washington, D.C.: August 2007.
- 20.
See Title II of REACH.
- 21.
See Title VI of REACH.
- 22.
See Title VII of REACH.
- 23.
See Title VIII of REACH.
- 24.
- 25.
Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC.
- 26.
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998).
- 27.
On the use of market tools in environmental regulation, see Flatt 2016.
- 28.
For an overview, see Künzler and Kysar 2014, pp. 750–759.
- 29.
Thaler and Sustein 2008.
- 30.
European Commission, General Union Environment Action Programme to 2020: Living well, within the limits of our planet (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014).
- 31.
- 32.
While about 50–90% of participants in surveys state they prefer green energy and would be willing to pay a premium for it, green electricity only accounts for 0.5–2% of the market in many European countries where full choice of the energy mix is possible: Pichert and Katsikopoulos 2008, p. 64.
- 33.
Pichert and Katsikopoulos 2008, pp. 66–70.
- 34.
Allcott 2011, pp. 1083–1084.
- 35.
Allcott 2011, p. 1087.
- 36.
Allcott 2011, pp. 1091–1093.
- 37.
Cf. Allcott 2011, pp. 1090–1091.
- 38.
Ayres et al. 2013: energy consumption was reduced by 1.2 and 2.1% in the two experiments, respectively.
- 39.
Ferraro and Price 2013, pp. 68–69.
- 40.
Ferraro and Price 2013, p. 70.
- 41.
See also the contribution by Schubert and Stadelmann in this volume.
- 42.
Davis and Metcalf 2014, p. 1.
- 43.
For a critique of the Energy Star applied to green housing (Energy Star Certified Home), see Smith 2016.
- 44.
Council Directive 92/75/EEC of 22 September 1992 on the indication by labelling and standard product information of the consumption of energy and other resources by household appliances, OJ L. 297, 13.10.1992, p. 16.
- 45.
Directive 2010/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 2010 on the indication by labelling and standard product information of the consumption of energy and other resources by energy-related products, OJ L. 153, 18.6.2010, p. 1.
- 46.
Reisch and Sandrini 2015, pp. 97–98.
- 47.
Newell and Siikamäki 2014, p. 581 and pp. 589–590.
- 48.
Newell and Siikamäki 2014, pp. 590–591. It should be noted, however, that the study tested only an enriched version of the EU Energy Efficiency which provided additional information on estimated annual total operational costs; this combination had a “powerful effect”.
- 49.
Newell and Siikamäki 2014, p. 593; Schubert and Stadelmann nuance this result by finding that for some appliances (such as vacuum cleaners) with low absolute energy consumption the inclusion of monetary information may reduce the preference for energy-efficient appliances; they suspect that this is due to the salience of the low monetary effects of the environmental choice, making other factors seem more relevant; see the contribution by Schubert in this volume.
- 50.
Davis and Medcalfe 2014.
- 51.
Department of Energy and Climate Change 2014, pp. 10–11; Kallbekken, Sælen and Hermansen 2013, p. 3; see further see the contribution by Schubert in this volume.
- 52.
Sallee 2014.
- 53.
Kallbekken, Sælen and Hermansen 2013.
- 54.
Department of Energy and Climate Change 2014.
- 55.
Cf. Reisch and Sandrini 2015, p. 101.
- 56.
See the contribution by Schubert in this volume.
- 57.
Newell and Siikamäki 2014, p. 586.
- 58.
- 59.
See Marsden and Rye 2010.
- 60.
- 61.
For an overview of regulation in a range of countries, see Atabani et al. 2011, pp. 4596–4598.
- 62.
Codagnone, Bogliacino and Veltri 2013, p. 7: more than 40% think that more than 50% of the greenhouse effect is due to car pollution.
- 63.
Codagnone, Bogliacino and Veltri 2013, pp. 7–8.
- 64.
Jaffe and Stavins 1994.
- 65.
Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards: Final Rule, Part II, 75 Fed Reg 25,324, 25,510–11 (May 7, 2010), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2010-05-07/pdf/2010-8159.pdf.
- 66.
Id.; see also Sunstein 2015, pp. 201–202.
- 67.
Schubert and Stadelmann 2015 (noting insufficient information, limited attention, and inertia as the most likely causes).
- 68.
Codagnone, Bogliacino and Veltri 2013.
- 69.
Codagnone, Bogliacino and Veltri 2013, p. 9.
- 70.
Allcott 2011, p. 1088.
- 71.
Ferraro and Price 2013, p. 65.
- 72.
See Reisch and Sandrini 2015, pp. 111–113.
- 73.
- 74.
On social norms, see Sunstein 2011, pp. 1408–1410.
- 75.
See Thaler 1996.
- 76.
However, see for the so-called “boomerang effect” which denotes a simultaneous decrease of consumption by above-average households and an increase by below-average households: Fischer 2008, p. 99. The studies cited in this paper, however, were able to avoid the boomerang effect, either by introduction of injunctive norms (energy efficiency emoticons) or other tools; cf. Ayres et al. 2013, p. 993 and p. 1001.
- 77.
Goldstein et al. 2008.
- 78.
See the overview in Cialdini and Goldstein 2004.
- 79.
This part draws on Dimitropoulos and Hacker 2016.
- 80.
- 81.
- 82.
Dimitropoulos and Hacker 2016.
- 83.
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1103a15; 1144b14–17; cf. also Kraut 2014, under 2.
- 84.
Bandura 1986.
- 85.
- 86.
Beisbart 2012.
- 87.
- 88.
Camerer and Ho 1999; significant improvements can be found in Ho, Camerer and Chong 2007.
- 89.
- 90.
Fischhoff 1982, p. 437.
- 91.
Fischer 2008, p. 97 and p. 101.
- 92.
Wilson, Centerbar and Brekke, p. 200; this holds particularly true for investment decisions on the stock market: DellaVigna 2009, p. 365.
- 93.
Babcock and Loewenstein 1997, pp. 121–122 (on the self-serving bias).
- 94.
Grusec 1992, pp. 783–784.
- 95.
Sunstein 2014, p. 87 and p. 142 and generally Ch. 2; Thaler and Sunstein, p. 5 (providing the more vague goal of “making choosers better off, as judged by themselves”, which boils down to individual welfare/subjected expected utility as the normative standard.
- 96.
- 97.
See Hacker 2016.
- 98.
See Hacker 2016a for a detailed discussion.
- 99.
Hacker 2016a.
- 100.
- 101.
In a recent study (de Wijk et al. 2016), changing accessibility did not have an effect on the choice of bread (whole grain or wheat) in a field experiment in two Dutch supermarkets. However, we join the authors of the study (id., at 6) in suspecting that for factors over which people harbor weaker preferences than in the choice of their daily bread (such as the origin of food) an accessibility or salience treatment may well be effective; see, e.g., the studies cited in Sunstein 2016.
- 102.
Cf. also Künzler and Kysar 2014, p. 760.
- 103.
- 104.
Hardin (1986); Akerlof and Kennedy, pp. 36–38.
- 105.
Sunstein and Reisch 2014, p. 133.
- 106.
Egebark and Ekström 2013, p. 3.
- 107.
- 108.
Willis 2013.
- 109.
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and Kleimann Communication Group.
- 110.
The authors are grateful to Cass Sunstein for discussing these matters with them on the “Good Governance of Nudging” matinée in Berlin.
- 111.
Gneezy and List 2006.
- 112.
Landry et al. 2010, pp. 975–976.
- 113.
Allcott 2011, p. 1087.
- 114.
Ayres et al. 2013, p. 1015.
- 115.
Allcott 2011, p. 1087.
- 116.
Ferraro and Price 2013, pp.70–71.
- 117.
Fischer 2008, p. 87.
- 118.
Kallbekken, Sælen and Hermansen 2013, p. 10.
- 119.
Dimitropoulos and Hacker 2016.
- 120.
See, e.g., for the German Umweltbundesamt (Environmental Protection Agency): http://www.conpolicy.de/en/news-detail/gentle-nudges-towards-sustainable-consumption/; http://www.umweltrat.de/EN/TheGermanAdvisoryCouncilOnTheEnvironment/Council/mission_node.html.; for the US EPA, see https://www3.epa.gov/fueleconomy/regulations.htm; http://nudges.org/2010/08/30/new-stickers-for-car-buyers-do-they-get-an-a/; https://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/sabpeople.nsf/WebCommittees/BOARD
- 121.
Dimitropoulos and Hacker 2016.
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Hacker, P., Dimitropoulos, G. (2017). Behavioural Law & Economics and Sustainable Regulation. In: Mathis, K., Huber, B. (eds) Environmental Law and Economics. Economic Analysis of Law in European Legal Scholarship, vol 4. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-50932-7_7
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