Abstract
The form of Academic scepticism most amenable to the Baconians and experimentalists of the early Royal Society was Carneades’ doctrine of probablism. Carneades’ doctrine of probablism was understood in seventeenth century Britain as a falabilist account of practical knowledge. Carneades’ hierarchical strictures governing action and motivation fit the early Fellows’ conceptions of experience and hypotheses. It is suggested that they could have provided the early Fellows with resolutions to some conceptual problems that bedevil attempts to develop a workable eliminative induction. It is suggested that Carneades’ probablism could have provided the early Fellows with a proto-version of Confirmation Theory, which helps to ground their understanding of how experience and experiment ground hypotheses, experimental practices, and technological advancements.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
- 1.
Consider the work of Richard Popkin.
- 2.
See Michael Hunter, Establishing the New Science: The Experience of the Early Royal Society, (Wolfeboro, NH: Boydell and Brewer Press, 1989) and William Lynch, Solomon’s Child: Method in the Early Royal Society of London (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001).
- 3.
Peter Dear, “Totius in Verba: Rhetoric and Authority in the Early Royal Society,” Isis 76 (1985): 145–161; Sorana Corneau, Regimens of the Mind: Boyle, Locke, and the Early Modern Cultura Animi Tradition (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2011). See also Steven Shapin, Leviathan and the Air-pump: Hobbes, Boyle and the Experimental Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985) and Peter Dear, “The Meanings of Experience,” chapter 4 of The Cambridge History of Science, eds. Katharine Park and Lorraine Daston (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 106–131.
- 4.
Dear, “Totius in Verba,” 146 and 152–153. Dear’s analysis focused on the form that Fellows presented their research results and convincingly argued that their adoption of that rhetorical form was caused by the transformation of their conception of experience and observation to an epistemically authoritative one: The style of science espoused by the Fellows of the Royal Society was more important than the substance of that science. The form of their research reports, as well as prefatory and programmatic statements, demonstrates an ethic of investigation suitable to the ideal of cooperative research. This form also indicates that a fundamental change in concepts of experience and authority in natural philosophy had occurred in the seventeenth century, a change that underlay contemporary charges of scholastic vassalage to ancient authority,” (Ibid., 159).
- 5.
I am restricting this exploration to the pre-1687 Royal Society. That is of course the publication date of Newton’s Principia. Whether Newton’s “mathematical” natural philosophy represents a move away from the Baconian method of natural histories, or is simply the second, theory-development stage of that Baconian methodology is not something I am going to address. Patrick Connolly has recently powerfully argued that Newton’s method could (or should) be considered compatible with Locke’s clearly Baconian scientific method (presentation at the UWO-CUNY Workshop on Locke’s Natural Philosophy, London, Ontario, May 2015). For illuminating discussion of Newton’s distinctively mathematical methodology, see William Harper’s Isaac Newton’s Scientific Method: Turning Data into Evidence about Gravity and Cosmology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
- 6.
Francis Bacon, New Atlantis (London, 1660), 26. For discussion see Rose-Mary Sargent’s “From Bacon to Banks: The vision and realities of pursuing science for the common good,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 43 (2012): 82–90.
- 7.
For discussion of the significance of the practical for the early experimental philosophy, see Peter Anstey and Alberto Vanzo, “The Origins of Early Modern Experimental Philosophy,” Intellectual History Review 22 (2012): 499–518.
- 8.
Francis Bacon, De instauration magna, (London, 1620), I.99, 118–119.
- 9.
For discussions of Sylva sylvarum and its role in early Baconianism consider the work of Dana Jalobeanu. Consider also Guido Giglioni’s “Experimental Misunderstandings: The Precedent of Francis Bacon’s ‘Sylva Sylvarum’ and the beginnings of the Royal Society,” lecture given to the Royal Society, London 12 April 2013, https://royalsociety.org/events/2013/experimental-misunderstandings/
- 10.
Peter Anstey and Michael Hunter have identified the “dovetailing” of theorizing and natural histories as central to Robert Boyle’s conception of experimental natural philosophy: “For it is the dovetailing of speculative natural philosophy with the compilation of natural histories which provides the key to an integrated understanding of Boyle’s natural philosophical endeavours,” (“Robert Boyle’s ‘Designe about Natural History’,” Early Science and Medicine 13 (2008): 96).
- 11.
William Rawley, preface to Francis Bacon’s Sylva sylvarum: or A natural historie (London 1627), n.p.
- 12.
Bacon, Sylva, 1.
- 13.
For an introduction to modern forms of Confirmation Theory see Alan Hájek and James M. Joyce, “Confirmation,” in The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science, eds. Stathis Psillos and Martin Curd (New York: Routledge, 2008), 115–128 and Colin Howson, “Baysianism,” Ibid., 103–114.
- 14.
See: R.J. Hankinson, “Carneades and the Later Sceptical Academy,” ch. 4 of The Sceptics (New York: Routledge, 1998) 92–115; Lloyd Gerson, “Academic Scepticism,” in Ancient Epistemology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 116–124; Harald Thorsrud, Ancient Scepticism (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2009); idem, “Arcesliaus and Carneades,” in The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
- 15.
Thomas Stanley, A History of Philosophy (London, 1656), volume 2, part 1, 148.
- 16.
Ibid., 147.
- 17.
Ibid., 148.
- 18.
Ibid., 149.
- 19.
The example illustrating how a physician diagnoses illness is the clearest of the three: “And as some Physitians argue a man to be in a feaver, not from one symptom, as from a high pulse, or great heat, but from the concurrence of that heat with the pulse, as also from ulcerous touch, redness, thirst, and the like, all agreeing together,” (Ibid., 149).
- 20.
Ibid., 149–150.
- 21.
Ibid., 150–151.
- 22.
Bacon, Sylva, 1.
- 23.
Ibid.
- 24.
I develop the connections between Locke and Carneades’ probablism more fully in an article in Science et Espirit 65 (2013): 343–358.
- 25.
John Locke, Essay concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter Nidditch (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1975), IV.xvi.6, 661.
- 26.
Although many early Fellows use the language of “probable” to describe their provisional hypotheses and the rather sceptical language of withholding assent can also be frequently found in their critical reflections. Also, (perhaps?) Boyle’s decision to name his spokesman in The Sceptical Chymist Carneades is not accidental and unrelated. See Rose-Mary Sargent, The Diffident Naturalist: Robert Boyle and the Philosophy of Experiment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 50–56.
- 27.
Thomas Shirley, “Description of a Well, and Earth in Lanchashire, taking Fire by a Candle approached to it,” Philosophical Transactions 2 (1667): 482–484.
- 28.
“into which Error they suffered themselves to fall for want of a due examination of the following particulars,” Ibid., 483.
- 29.
Edmond Halley, “A Theory of the Variation of the Magnetical Compass,” Philosophical Transactions 13 (1683): 208–221.
- 30.
“it remains to shew how this Hypothesis makes out all the Variations that have been observed of late; and how it answers to our several remarks drawn from the Table,” (Ibid., 216–217).
- 31.
Ibid., 220.
- 32.
Ibid., 219.
- 33.
Martin Lister, “A Description of Certain Stones Figured like Plants, and by Some Observing Men Esteemed to be Plants Petrified,” Philosophical Transactions 8 (1673): 6181–6191; idem, “Some Observation and Experiments Made, and in a Letter Communicated to the Publisher,” Philosophical Transactions 9 (1674): 221–226; John Beaumont, “Two Letters written by Mr. John Beaumont Junior of Stony-Easton in Somerset-Shire, Concerning Rock-Plants and their Growth,” Philosophical Transactions 11 (1676): 724–742.
- 34.
Although, cf. Beaumont’s admission here: “I must own the knowledge of its being a radix to Mr. Lister’s hint, though I have Agricola by me, but did not well mind him,” (Ibid., 729). That Beaumont’s reasoning is an instance of the now well-known Confirmation Fallacy has no bearing on how Beaumont attempted to use the argument nor on its reception by Oldenberg and the early Royal Society Fellows.
- 35.
John Wallis, “An Extract of Letters from Dr. John Wallis to the Publisher concerning the Suspension of Quick Silver Well Purged of Air, much Higher than the Ordinary Standard in the Torricellian Experiment,” Philosophical Transactions 7 (1672): 5160–5170.
- 36.
“To the Pressure of this Purer matter (which they suppose so subtile, as to penetrate the Mercury, Marble, and Glass itself,) they adscribe the Suspension of the Quicksilver to so great an height,” (Ibid., 5161).
- 37.
Ibid., 5162.
- 38.
Ibid., 5164.
- 39.
Ibid., 5169.
- 40.
Ibid., 5170 and 5166.
Bibliography
Anstey, Peter, and Michael Hunter. 2008. Robert Boyle’s “designe about natural history”. Early Science and Medicine 13: 83–126.
Anstey, Peter, and Alberto Vanzo. 2012. The origins of early modern experimental philosophy. Intellectual History Review 22: 499–518.
Bacon, Francis. 1620. De instauratio magna. London: John Bill.
Bacon, Francis. 1627. Sylva sylvarum: A natural historie. London: J. H. for William Lee.
Bacon, Francis. 1660. New Atlantis. London: University of Minnesota Press.
Beaumont, John. 1676. Two letters written by Mr. John Beaumont junior of Stony-Easton in Somerset-Shire, concerning rock-plants and their growth. Philosophical Transactions 11: 724–742.
Connolly, Patrick. 2016. Locke and the methodology of Newton’s Principia. Presentation at The UWO-CUNY Locke Workshop, London, Ontario May 1.
Corneau, Sorana. 2011. Regimens of the mind: Boyle, Locke, and the Early Modern Cultura Animi Tradition. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Dear, Peter. 1985. Totius in Verba: Rhetoric and authority in the early royal society. Isis 76: 145–161.
Dear, Peter. 2006. The meanings of experience. In The Cambridge history of science, ed. Katharine Park and Lorraine Daston, 106–131. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gerson, Lloyd. 2009. Academic scepticism. In Ancient epistemology, 116–124. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Giglioni, Guido. 2013. Experimental misunderstandings: The precedent of Francis Bacon’s “Sylva Sylvarum” and the beginnings of the Royal Society. Lecture given to the Royal Society, London 12 April. https://royalsociety.org/events/2013/experimental-misunderstandings/.
Hájek, Alan, and James M. Joyce. 2008. Confirmation. In The Routledge companion to philosophy of science, ed. Stathis Psillos and Martin Curd, 115–128. New York: Routledge.
Halley, Edmond. 1683. A theory of the variation of the magnetical compass. Philosophical Transactions 13: 208–221.
Hankinson, Robert J. 1998. The sceptics. New York: Routledge.
Harper, William. 2011. Isaac Newton’s scientific method: Turning data into evidence about gravity and cosmology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Howson, Colin. 2008. Baysianism. In The Routledge companion to philosophy of science, ed. Stathis Psillos and Martin Curd, 103–114. New York: Routledge.
Hunter, Michael. 1989. Establish the New science: The experience of the early Royal Society. Wolfeboro: Boydell and Brewer Press.
Jalobeanu, Dana. 2015. The art of experimental natural history: Francis Bacon in context. Bucharest: Zeta Books.
Lister, Martin. 1673. A description of certain stones figured like plants, and by some observing men esteemed to be plants petrified. Philosophical Transactions 8: 6181–6191.
Lister, Martin. 1674. Some observation and experiments made, and in a letter communicated to the publisher. Philosophical Transactions 9: 221–226.
Lynch, William. 2001. Solomon’s child: Method in the early Royal Society of London. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Park, Katharine, and Lorraine Daston (eds.). 2006. The Cambridge history of science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Popkin, Richard. 1980. The high road to Pyrrhonism. San Diego: Austin Hill Press.
Popkin, Richard. 2003. The history of skepticism: From Savonarola to Bayle. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Psillos, Stathis, and Martin Curd (eds.). 2008. The Routledge companion to philosophy of science. New York: Routledge.
Rawley, William. 1627. Preface to Francis Bacon’s Sylva sylvarum: A natural historie. London.
Sargent, Rose-Mary. 1995. The diffident naturalist: Robert Boyle and the philosophy of experiment. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Sargent, Rose-Mary. 2012. From Bacon to banks: The vision and realities of pursuing science for the common good. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 43: 82–90.
Shapin, Steven. 1985. Leviathan and the air-pump: Hobbes, Boyle and the experimental life. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Shirley, Thomas. 1667. Description of a well, and earth in Lanchashire, taking fire by a candle approached to it. Philosophical Transactions 2: 482–484.
Stanley, Thomas. 1656. A history of philosophy. London: Moseley & Dring.
Thorsrud, Harald. 2009. Ancient scepticism. Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Thorsrud, Harald. 2010. Arcesliaus and Carneades. In The Cambridge companion to ancient scepticism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wallis, John. 1672. An extract of letters from Dr. John Wallis to the publisher concerning the suspension of quick silver well purged of air, much higher than the ordinary standard in the Torricellian experiment. Philosophical Transactions 7: 5160–5170.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2017 Springer International Publishing Switzerland
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Hill, B.D. (2017). Academic Scepticism and the Early Royal Society. In: Smith, P., Charles, S. (eds) Academic Scepticism in the Development of Early Modern Philosophy. International Archives of the History of Ideas Archives internationales d'histoire des idées, vol 221. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-45424-5_6
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-45424-5_6
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-45422-1
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-45424-5
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)