Abstract
In this paper, I sketch and defend a thoroughgoing empiricist account of our knowledge of metaphysical possibility. I argue that our knowledge of Moorean metaphysical possibilities traces back to our knowledge of the actual world through empirical sources (such as observation and observation-sensitive theory). In this connection, I advocate a pluralist account, according to which deductive, inductive, and abductive inferences from actuality are all legitimate sources of our knowledge of possibility.
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Notes
- 1.
Lewis (1999, p. 418).
- 2.
Here I have given examples of Moorean de re possibility claims, but there are of course very many corresponding Moorean de dicto possibility claims as well.
- 3.
A notable recent exception is Williamson (2007).
- 4.
See, especially, van Inwagen (1998, 67–84).
- 5.
The following discussion is based on Van Inwagen (1998), reprinted Van Inwagen (2001). All references below are to the latter version.
- 6.
Van Inwagen (2001, 246).
- 7.
Ibid, 246–247: “My own view is that we often do know modal propositions, ones that are of use to us in everyday life and in science and even in philosophy, but do not and cannot know…modal propositions like [“It is possible for there to be a perfect being”, “It is possible that I exist and nothing material exist”, and “It is possible that there exist vast amounts of suffering for which there is no explanation”]. I have called this position “Modal skepticism”. This name was perhaps ill-chosen, since…I think that we know a lot of modal propositions, and…“skeptic” suggests someone who contends that we know nothing or almost nothing…however…there has been another sort of skeptic: someone who contends that the world contains a great deal of institutionalized pretense to knowledge of remote matters concerning which knowledge is in fact not possible…It is in this sense of the word that I am a modal skeptic.”
- 8.
The following discussion of Van Inwagen’s views about the sorts of modal knowledge we do have is based on ibid, 246–251.
- 9.
Ibid. Of course, one could rightly point out that mysteries remain here, but Van Inwagen’s point is that for a large class of modal claims to be individuated below, we lack even these preliminary sorts of answers regarding their sources of justification.
- 10.
Ibid.
- 11.
Ibid.
- 12.
Ibid.
- 13.
Here I have in mind Alvin Plantinga’s modal ontological argument. On this, see Plantinga (1974).
- 14.
Here I am referring to the famous argument in Descartes (1985, CSM 2:54) for the real distinction between mind and body.
- 15.
Chalmers (1996).
- 16.
See, for example, Shoemaker and Swinburne (1984, 12–19).
- 17.
Block (1976).
- 18.
Ibid, 250: “Although I do not doubt that we have some modal knowledge, I regard much of this knowledge as mysterious. Some modal statements, I have said, we know by reasoning from what I have called “basic” modal knowledge – simple, obvious modal statements whose truth we are somehow in a position to know –… But how do we get started in this reasoning? How do we know the “simple, obvious” modal statements to be true? What is the ground of “basic” modal knowledge? I do not know how to answer these questions.” Italics mine.
- 19.
A systematic investigation and presentation of his reasons for rejecting such accounts falls outside the bounds of our current inquiry. However, I discuss his reasons in some detail in “Van Inwagen on Modal Epistemology” (ms.).
- 20.
There are no doubt reasonable worries about the extent of application with respect to this route to modal knowledge, but it should be less controversial that it applies at least to cases involving inferences to the possible existence of intrinsic qualitative duplicates of observed tokens of the type of entity at issue.
- 21.
Timothy Williamson has independently appealed to our folk physics and folk psychology as at least a partial basis of our knowledge of possibility. The primary difference between his view and mine on this point is that Williamson ties our modal knowledge to our facility with counterfactual reasoning, whereas I make no commitment to such a connection. For a thorough exposition and defense of Williamson’s account of modal epistemology, see Williamson (2007).
- 22.
Of course, if our modal claims can be supported by our folk theories, then it’s natural to think they can be justified by our scientific theories about how the world works as well. See the chapters by Fischer and Hanrahan in the present volume for detailed accounts of how this might go.
- 23.
Van Inwagen (2001, 254).
- 24.
Ibid.
- 25.
See the chapters by Hawke and Roca-Royes in the present volume for excellent accounts of modal justification via analogy/relevant similarity.
- 26.
One could strengthen the justification here by combining different sources of modal evidence. So, for example, one could also appeal here to our folk theory of how the world works as well.
- 27.
Lehrer (1965, 168–175).
- 28.
For helpful comments on a previous draft of this paper, I am grateful to Bob Fischer, Sonia Roca-Royes, Anand Vaidya, Christian Nimtz, Antonella Mallozzi, and the wonderful audience at the Directions in the Epistemology of Modality Workshop at the University of Stirling.
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Leon, F. (2017). From Modal Skepticism to Modal Empiricism. In: Fischer, B., Leon, F. (eds) Modal Epistemology After Rationalism. Synthese Library, vol 378. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44309-6_13
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