Keywords

“NEW life is born

NEW hope is born

NEW future is born

NEW country is born”

On February 17th 2008, these slogans, together with the typographical sculpture “NEWBORN” , were revealed at the centre of Prishtina, marking Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence. Every year, tribute to independence is paid by having Kosovo citizens paint the letters of the monument to reflect major events that marked the past year. On its first anniversary, NEWBORN was painted on the flags of all countries that accepted Kosovo’s independence, thanking them for their support. However, on marking the 7th birthday in 2015, NEWBORN reflected a very different reality, after the glow of independence had worn off: It represented newborn Kosovo in bright multi-colours, with letter E completely painted in black to symbolise the gloom of the recent “Exodus” of about 10,000 Kosovo citizens who fled to European countries in just 1 month at the beginning of 2015 (Bytyçi & Than, 2015). The black E was also said to be reflective of the country’s gloomy “Economy”, one of the main reasons people seek a better life abroad.

Most of the people seeking asylum from Kosovo into European countries are young, as is Kosovo’s population. Demographically, it represents the country with one of the youngest populations in Europe, with over 60 % under the age of 35 (Kosovo Agency of Statistics [KAS], 2012). However, despite the potential and big dreams following independence, Kosovo remains one of the poorest countries in Europe (World Bank, 2010). Although the country has a lot of potential, one of its major problems is that it struggles with its history and the ethnic segregation among its population. The two largest ethnic groups , an overwhelming majority of ethnic Albanians and a much smaller minority of ethnic Serbs, have a conflicting past and now have to come to terms with one another in the new country. In the current chapter we present our first steps in a new research project that aims to uncover the difficulties of creating a new national identity based on these two highly segregated ethnic groups. In so doing, we first provide a short historical background of the territory and these ethnic groups to understand the particularities of the context. Then, we present a recent study into the identities of Kosovar Albanians and Kosovar Serbs with the goal of determining strategies to improve relations between them.

Historical Background

Located between Albania, Montenegro, Macedonia and Serbia, the tiny former Yugoslav territory that is now Kosovo ethnically comprises a majority of Albanians (93 %), with the remaining 7 % from other ethnic groups : Serbs, Bosniaks, Turks, Gorani, and Ashkali, Egyptian and Roma or RAE (KAS, 2012). The Serb ethnic group at 5 % is considered to be the largest non-dominant ethnic minority group in the country (Kosovo Government, 2015). As such, it has reserved rights, including a reserved 10 out of 120 seats in Kosovo’s Parliament.

In order to understand Kosovo’s ethnic groups today, one needs to consider the differences that construe Albanian and Serb identities in terms of religion and language (for more background information see Judah, 2008; Malcolm, 1998; O’Neill, 2002). For Serbs, identity is primarily moulded around their Orthodox Christian religion, and the Orthodox Church is strongly entwined with what is now a Serb identity in the Balkans (Judah, 2008). For Serbs , language, however, is not identity-defining as Serbs use the same language as Bosnians and Croats, although with regional variations (Judah, 2008). For Albanians , culture and language are identity-defining as they are distinctive and unify Albanians throughout the Balkans. Religion, however, is not defining of Albanian identity because, although the majority of Albanians is Muslim, there are also Catholic and Orthodox Albanians. In Kosovo, Albanians speak Albanian, and Serbs speak Serbian. Because of this difference, both Albanian and Serbian languages have been officially recognised as formal languages in the new Kosovo (Assembly of Kosovo, 2001).

Kosovo’s Significance in Albanian and Serbian Construal of History

Historically, Albanians and Serbs both groups feel entitled to Kosovo. Although mainly populated by Albanians, Kosovo has been a nationalist aspiration for both ethnicities. To Albanians, Kosovo represents the place where the Albanian national movement was launched in 1878 (in Prizren, East of Kosovo). Decades later, Kosovo’s territory was given to Serbia in 1912 and not included in today’s borders of Albania (Judah, 2008). On the other hand, for Serbs, Kosovo is viewed as the holy place where most of their historic churches are located. In essence, for Serbs Kosovo is what Jerusalem is to Jews (Judah, 2008). The discrepancies in what Kosovo means to each of the ethnic groups have always been problematic and continue to fuel the differences even today. While Albanians see Kosovo’s independence as historical justice finally being brought to the people, Serbs view it as unjust separation from Serbia, fragmenting the heart of Serbian identity.

There was a time when Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo coexisted peacefully. When the Yugoslav Federation was created and led by President Tito, his economic and diplomatic policies maintained peace within the Federation. However, following Tito’s death, his Serb successor Slobodan Milosevic (1989–2004) gave rise to Serb nationalism, annulling Kosovo’s autonomous status within the Federation. As the Yugoslav constituent Republics revolted against his nationalist politics and left the Federation, Kosovo became the site of uprisings, reprisals, and general shedding of blood (Malcolm, 1998). This eventually erupted in an armed conflict in 1998 that left more than 10,000 people dead and that only ended through international military intervention.

Kosovo Today

Today, Kosovar Albanians continue to live with the memory of the recent conflict, with over 1600 people still missing and mass gravesites being opened throughout Kosovo and Serbia (International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC], 2014). The Kosovar Serbs have settled in segregated “pocket regions” throughout the country and maintain allegiance to Serbia. Although there is Serb political representation, contact across ethnic lines is minimal. Both ethnicities have settled into parallel lives with very little to do with one another (Judah, 2008).

The secession from former Yugoslavia and the declaration of independence in 2008 led to the creation of the newest national identity in Europe , the Kosovar Identity, as an overarching identity that gathers various ethnicities and religions . In an attempt to provide a national identity that is free from ethnic-references (especially for Albanians and Serbs), symbols of the new republic have all been neutrally designed. This includes a text-free anthem that has only instrumental music, to exclude possible ethnic biases in wording. The flag is pale blue, resembling the European Union flag, with Kosovo’s map at the centre to symbolise the territorial compactness of the country’s fragile borders (see Fig. 16.1). The top of the flag is arched with six white stars, each representing a formally recognised ethnic group in the country. As such, these important symbolic means of representation for the Kosovar identity provide a vague identification for all ethnic groups.

Fig. 16.1
figure 1

Fischer, J. P. (2008, February 17). Flag of Kosovo, adapted 17th February 2008. Image created following written source [Image]. Retrieved from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Flag_of_Kosovo.png

Full size image

Despite the small but significant political progress, Kosovo remains a segregated society characterised by conflict. The potential of the country continues to be hindered by discrimination among ethnicities and poor quality of life (United Nations Development Program [UNDP], 2010). As a result, the lives of Kosovo’s people are far from normalised. Apart from daily hassles and struggles, people in Kosovo are now faced with yet another challenge: the creation of an overarching Kosovar national identity , as they need to adapt to their new national identity, re-evaluate old ethnic identities, and negotiate possible conflicts between old and new identities. Our work tries to shed light on this process in this context. The goal of our research is to examine how Kosovar Albanians and Kosovar Serbs shape their identity, and to find ways that bring them closer under a common national identity.

Building a Kosovar Identity for All Ethnic Groups

The new Kosovar national identity provides an opportunity for the improvement of relations between Albanians and Serbs. Past research on social categorisation and common in-group identity has already shown that if members of different groups can conceive of themselves as belonging to a common superordinate category (Kosovar national identity in this case), this improves attitudes toward out-groups (e.g. ethnic out-groups) because former out-group members are perceived as in-group members in the superordinate category (Brewer, 1979; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; McKeown, 2014). In this case, if Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo recategorise themselves more in terms of their national identity, then, despite ethnic differences groups may start to see themselves as part of a common national group and thus extend positive in-group attitudes to the ethnic out-group.

However, there are several reasons why a Kosovar national identity may not have this beneficial effect. Firstly, as posited by the in-group projection model (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999), the Albanian majority group is likely to perceive their ethnic group as being more representative of the superordinate identity. This means that they will project features of their own ethnic group onto the superordinate Kosovar identity, leaving little room for features of other ethnic groups. Although Kosovar Albanians may identify strongly with the superordinate Kosovar identity, this does not mean that this improves their perceptions of Serbs, as they may not see Kosovar Serbs as fitting the Kosovar identity.

Kosovar Serbs, meanwhile, may benefit from superordinate identification with the new Kosovar identity, but are less likely to do so as they may feel that their ethnic identity is insufficiently acknowledged in this new identity. Research from the social identity perspective has already shown that people strive to make their group positively distinct from out-groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and when this is not the case, a sense of social identity threat (i.e. “distinctiveness threat”) arises (Branscombe, Spears, Ellemers, & Doosje, 1999; Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002; Jetten, Spear, & Manstead, 2001). This threat is particularly pronounced among members of disadvantaged or low status groups like minorities, and especially among group members who strongly identify with the group (e.g. Branscombe et al., 1999). In Kosovo’s case, such threats are likely to create reluctance in Kosovar Serbs to identify with the Kosovar nationality, especially among those who identify highly with their ethnic identity . Indeed, previous research has revealed that while there is a positive relation between national and ethnic identification for majority groups, for minorities this relation is absent or even negative (Sidanius, Feshbach, Levin, & Pratto, 1997; Sinclair, Sidanius, & Levin, 1998). Given that distinctiveness threat has been associated with increased intergroup bias (Branscombe et al., 1999; Jetten et al., 2001; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; see Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006 for a review on intergroup threat), it seems unlikely that emphasising the new superordinate Kosovar identity will magically improve intergroup relations.

Because of the differences that these two ethnic groups were predicted to have in relation to national identity, the first goal of our research project was to examine the degree to which Kosovar Albanians and Kosovar Serbs identify with their ethnic and national identity. Knowing this allows us to understand how these groups define what it means to be Kosovar. Moreover, this allowed us to test whether the degree to which Albanians and Serbs identified with the common national identity predicts more positive intergroup attitudes.

Integrating Nationality and Ethnicity Through Social Identity Complexity

Apart from testing whether intergroup relations in Kosovo benefit from superordinate categorisation, we propose that it is also important to take into account the complexity of the Kosovar Albanian and Kosovar Serb identities. According to social identity complexity theory (Roccas & Brewer, 2002), simply belonging to different social categories that are cross-cutting (as is the case for Albanians and Serbs with Kosovar nationality) may not be sufficient for positive intergroup attitudes. Instead, intergroup relations may improve to the degree that people subjectively combine their multiple identities in complex in-group representations (Brewer, 2010). When people belong to different groups (e.g. ethnicity, religion, nationality), there often is overlap between these identities, i.e. members of one’s ethnic group are also part of one’s religious or national group. However, there are also parts of the groups that do not overlap, for example, when not all people from a national group are of the same ethnicity. People differ in the degree to which they manage the presence and absence of overlap in their identity, and this is what we refer to as “social identity complexity”. Identities are low in complexity when they reflect only the overlap between the multiple groups to which people belong (Brewer & Pierce, 2005; Roccas & Brewer, 2002). In our case, when Kosovar Albanians with low identity complexity think about Kosovars they think, for example, about Kosovar Albanians from their own region who share a similar religion (high overlap). We speak of higher identity complexity when people define their in-group not only with the people who share the different group memberships (e.g. Kosovar Albanian Muslims from the same region) but also with people who share one identity but not others (e.g. Kosovar Serbs from a different region). Based on shared nationality, Kosovar Albanians with higher identity complexity would include Serbs into their in-group, even though there is little overlap with them on other (e.g. ethnic and religious) identities. As a result, although all Kosovar Serbs and Albanians are part of Kosovo, only those with relatively complex identities are likely to perceive their ethnic out-group in a positive way.

Indeed, higher social identity complexity has been shown to positively predict a number of positive intergroup outcomes, including more favourable attitudes towards out-groups, more support for diversity policies and less distinctiveness threat (Brewer & Pierce, 2005; Miller, Brewer, & Arbuckle, 2009; Roccas & Brewer, 2002; Schmid, Hewstone, Tausch, Cairns, & Hughes, 2009). In this study we also examine whether, over and above the effects of superordinate categorisation, increased identity complexity is related to more positive intergroup relations. This will allow us to then predict ways in which relations between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo could be improved so that reconciliation between groups is achieved in the peace-building process of the new country.

Based on these principles we predict that Kosovar Albanians and Kosovar Serbs will differ in social identity complexity. We expect Kosovar Albanians to be low in identity complexity and to perceive more overlap between ethnicity and nationality (most Kosovars are Albanian). Serbs, on the other hand, are more likely to have a more complex identity as they need to reflect the fact that many Kosovars are not Serbs in their identity. However, even within the reality of their minority status, Kosovar Serbs will vary in how much overlap they perceive between the groups to which they belong (e.g. ethnicity, nationality, religion). Indeed, attesting the subjectivity of complexity research on minority groups in Australia (Brewer, Gonsalkorale, & Van Dommelen, 2013) found that minority members showed significantly lower complexity (high overlap) than majority members, despite them being objectively less represented in the population (Brewer et al., 2013). We aimed to test whether for both ethnic groups higher identity complexity predicted more positive intergroup attitudes, including higher warmth towards the ethnic out-group, more willingness for intergroup contact and more positive evaluations of out-group members (Brewer & Pierce, 2005; Miller et al., 2009; Roccas & Brewer, 2002; Schmid et al., 2009). We also wanted to examine how social identity complexity relates to distinctiveness threat for these groups as previous research showed that higher distinctiveness threat is associated with lower social identity complexity (e.g. Roccas & Brewer, 2002; Schmid et al., 2009).

Kosovar Identity Among Albanian and Serb Nationals: First Evidence

What follows, is our research findings on the ethnic and national identification and identity complexity among Kosovar Albanians and Kosovar Serbs. Our main aim was to test the two ways of improving intergroup relations described above—superordinate categorisation and social identity complexity—and examine which of the two would prove most effective in improving intergroup relations between Kosovar Albanians and Serbs. To our knowledge, no research exists examining social identity and its association with peace and conflict in Kosovo and we are thus pioneers in this context. Apart from practical relevance, our work is important because of the unique characteristics of the intergroup situation. Not only is there limited research on the intergroup dynamics between groups that are as different in size, as segregated and as unwilling to have intergroup relations as the two groups under investigation here, the situation of Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo is unique because their new national identity is a very recent development. Therefore, our research uniquely contributes to existing research on identity development, superordinate categorisation and intergroup relations because the content of the new identity is still under negotiation.

In the following section we give a review of our initial results from a survey among 229 Albanian participants from the University of Prishtina “Hasan Prishtina”, and 80 Serb participants from the University of Prishtina in North Mitrovica (see Maloku, Derks, Van Laar, & Ellemers, 2015 for details). We first present our findings on ethnic and national identification among Kosovar Albanians and Kosovar Serbs. Then we provide an initial picture of how complex identities are for these groups. Finally, we discuss current intergroup attitudes and examine which strategy, i.e. superordinate categorisation or social identity complexity, seems most promising in improving intergroup attitudes.

To What Extent Do Kosovar Albanians and Kosovar Serbs Identify with Their Ethnicity and Nationality?

As predicted, for Albanians the Kosovar identity was almost equivalent to Albanian identity: Kosovar Albanians identified to the same degree with both their ethnicity and their nationality. The strong correlation between these two measures suggests a high degree of overlap between ethnic and national identification. Similarly, Albanians felt just as warm towards Albanians as towards Kosovars, again suggesting the psychological similarities of these groups to Albanians. For Serbs however, nationality and ethnicity appeared to imply very different constructs: Whereas they identified with their ethnicity to the same degree as Kosovar Albanians did, they identified much less with their Kosovar nationality. Also, Serbs felt warm towards other Kosovar Serbs but neutral towards Kosovars in general. For Serbs, there was no relationship between ethnic and national identification, consistent with previous studies on American ethnic minorities (e.g. Sidanius et al., 1997; Sinclair et al., 1998). Combined, these results suggest that superordinate categorisation does not yet function as a conflict reducing mechanism as for Albanians the superordinate national identity is conflated with ethnic identity, while it is a non-identity for the Serb minority.

How Complex Are the Identities of Kosovar Albanians and Kosovar Serbs?

As in previous work (see, for example, Brewer & Pierce, 2005) social identity complexity was assessed by measuring perceived overlap between four categories (apart from ethnicity and nationality, participants self-selected their two most important groups from a list; for most participants this was their religious and student identity). Our findings reveal that, as predicted, Kosovar Albanians indeed have identities that are low in complexity (e.g. high perceived overlap between Albanian and Kosovar identities). Reflecting their minority status Serbs are slightly higher in identity complexity (i.e. lower perceived overlap between Serbs and Kosovars). Comparing the means with previous work with majority-minority groups (e.g. Brewer et al., 2013; Brewer & Pierce, 2005) revealed that it is not so much the case that Serbs have a more complex identity. Rather, Albanians have identities that are extremely low in complexity.Footnote 1 Finally, replicating previous work, for both ethnic groups lower complexity was related to higher national identification. Although this finding may seem counterintuitive it may suggest that lower identity complexity allowed Albanians and Serbs to identify with Kosovo more strongly (e.g. Albanians projecting their in-group on national identity, see Brewer et al. (2013) for a similar argument).Footnote 2 However , even when lower complexity makes it easier to identify with nationality this does not necessarily benefit the quality of the national identity or the relations between the two ethnic groups. Therefore, it is important to test the independent effects of the national identification and identity complexity on intergroup outcomes.

How Do Kosovar Albanians and Kosovar Serbs Differ on Intergroup Outcomes?

We also found that Albanians and Serbs are equally warm towards members of their ethnic in-group and equally cold towards members of their ethnic out-group. Similarly, they show comparably high evaluations of their group’s morality, sociability and competence. Out-group evaluations on these three dimensions gave us insight into the content of the stereotypes that Albanians and Serbs have of each other (i.e. warmth and competence; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). Whereas Albanians’ stereotype of Serbs emphasises low warmth (low sociability and morality) but relatively high competence, Serbs’ stereotype about Albanians is one of both low competence and low warmth. According to the stereotype content model (Fiske et al., 2002; also see Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007) this suggests that whereas Albanians might feel envious towards Serbs, resulting in negative and even destructive behaviour, Serbs’ responses towards Albanians are more likely to reflect contempt, leading them to reject or even harm Albanians. This pattern is intriguing and atypical in light of the status of Serbs relative to Albanians. When examining perceptions of group status, both Albanians and Serbs indeed perceive Albanians as having higher social status than Serbs. However, Serbs perceive this social hierarchy as less legitimate, less permeable and more stable than Albanians do. Finally, as expected, Serbs also experience more distinctiveness threat than Albanians: They report more concern for the acknowledgement of differences between Albanians and Serbs within Kosovar identity. Combined, Serbs perceptions of their low social status as illegitimate and stable with little opportunities for individual advancement, their contemptuous stereotype of Albanians and their experienced distinctiveness threat make for a rather volatile intergroup climate in which Serbs may revolt and choose disruptive forms of collective action if they perceive opportunities for improvements of their group’s status as hopeless (Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990).

Our data also reveal that there is generally little contact between ethnic groups, although Serbs, being a minority, have more contact with Albanians than vice versa. More importantly, both ethnic groups are equally unwilling to have contact with one another (e.g. talking in the street, working together, being neighbours or friends).

Which Identity Process Predicts More Positive Intergroup Attitudes?

Next, we examined which of the two presented models for improving intergroup relations—increasing superordinate categorisation with nationality or increasing identity complexity—best predicted positive intergroup outcomes in each group. To this aim we performed hierarchical regression analyses in which we predicted intergroup outcomes from strength of superordinate identification and social identity complexity simultaneously, while also taking into account participants’ ethnic identification.

For Albanians, we found positive relations between intergroup attitudes and social identity complexity, but not with stronger superordinate categorisation. Results show that Albanians with more complex identities experienced less distinctiveness threat, had more positive evaluations of the competence of Serbs and were more willing to have contact with Serbs. However, although superordinate categorisation with the Kosovar nationality predicted more warmth towards Albanians and towards Kosovars in general, other relationships suggest negative effects for intergroup relations. When we ran hierarchical regression to predict intergroup outcomes from superordinate identification and social identity complexity only, we found that identification with Kosovar nationality among Albanians predicted more positive evaluations of the in-group (i.e. more competence and morality for Albanians) but reduced warmth towards Serbs. Together, these findings suggest that whereas complexity may benefit Albanians’ attitudes towards Serbs, identification with the “common” national identity does not.

For Serbs, we found a very different pattern. As predicted, their ethnic identification predicted more negative intergroup outcomes, i.e. more positive evaluations of their own group, less warmth towards the out-group (Kosovars and Albanians), and more distinctiveness threat. However, over and above these effects, there were positive relationships between identification with the superordinate Kosovar identity and intergroup outcomes. Identification with nationality was found to predict more warmth towards the Kosovars and Albanians, more positive stereotypes of Albanians in terms of morality, sociability and competence, and more positive in-group evaluations (only on morality of Serbs). We found no relationships whatsoever with social identity complexity. This suggests that although national identification among Serbs is currently low, finding ways to increase identification with the superordinate national category might be a way to improve their perceptions of Albanians.

Combined, these results suggest that in order to improve intergroup relations in Kosovo different strategies may be effective for different ethnic groups . Whereas for Kosovar Albanians a more complex and inclusive identity definition is related to more positive intergroup outcomes, for the Serb minority identification with the superordinate Kosovar nationality predicts more positive perceptions of Albanians.

Conclusions and Future Directions

Our initial work (Maloku et al., 2015) has shown that majority Albanians and minority Serbs in Kosovo continue to be highly segregated, with very little interaction, negative intergroup evaluations and little willingness to establish contact. This situation is problematic because segregation has been found to maintain and exacerbate intergroup tensions by mutual ignorance and suspicion (see Whyte, 1990; Gallagher, 1995; for segregation in Northern Ireland) , but also reinforce other forms of segregation (e.g. Boal, 1969) like separate schooling systems or different kinship networking . Such separation creates space for prejudice and stereotypes to flourish even more (Whyte, 1990) thereby maintaining negative intergroup evaluations between Albanians and Serbs in our case. In our first study we examined which of two models of improving intergroup relations—the common in-group identity model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) or social identity complexity theory (Roccas & Brewer, 2002)—would offer most opportunity for improving intergroup relations between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo. Our findings suggest that both superordinate identity and social identity complexity are needed depending on the group under examination. We found that Albanians are low in identity complexity, so for them increased identity complexity predicts more positive intergroup outcomes. On the other hand, Serbs are low in superordinate identity, so for them strengthening the superordinate identity is related to more positive intergroup perceptions. Regarding the Albanian majority, we found that their intergroup attitudes and perceptions were more positive to the degree that they defined their multiple identities in a more complex way, with lower overlap between people belonging to their national, ethnic and other identities. Albanians with more complex identities were more positive about Serbs and were more willing to have contact with them, for example, by chatting with them in the street, working with them, and even becoming friends. Moreover, higher identity complexity was related to less concern for the distinctiveness of Albanians from Serbs in Kosovo. By contrast, among Albanians higher superordinate categorisation with Kosovo predicted only negative outcomes, possibly because, consistent with the in-group projection model (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999), for Albanians national identity was highly similar to ethnic identity. As a result, the more strongly Albanians identified with Kosovo, the less warmth they felt towards Serbs.

By contrast, we found that social identity complexity was unrelated to intergroup relations for the Serb minority. Instead, their negative perceptions of the out-group (i.e. low warmth for Albanians and Kosovars) and concerns for maintaining the distinctiveness of their group within Kosovo were predicted by their high ethnic identification. Interestingly however, over and above the effects of ethnic identification, identification with the superordinate identity of Kosovo positively predicted warmth towards Albanians and Kosovars, and more positive stereotypes of Albanians (i.e. warmer and more competent). This suggests that finding ways to increase Serbs’ identification with Kosovo would be a second avenue towards improving intergroup relations in Kosovo. Moreover, the independence of Serbs’ identification with their ethnic and national groups suggests that identification with the superordinate national category does not have to come at the expense of identification with the ethnic group.

Based on these first correlational insights, future work should examine how to increase identity complexity among Kosovar Albanians and test whether increasing the complexity of Albanians’ identity indeed improves their perceptions of Serbs and their willingness to interact with them. Work on the antecedents of social identity complexity has suggested that identities tend to be more complex when people become more aware of the non-overlapping parts of their identities, for example, when they interact with ethnic out-groups or live in more diverse neighbourhoods, and when they experience lower distinctiveness threat (Brewer & Pierce, 2005; Schmid et al., 2009; Schmid, Hewstone, & Al Ramiah, 2013). Indeed, in the current study we also found that Kosovar Albanians displayed higher identity complexity to the degree that they reported less concern for the distinctiveness of their ethnic identity within the Kosovar identity. In future work we plan to examine whether inducing Kosovar Albanians to focus on parts of their national identity that do not overlap with their ethnic identity , while simultaneously satisfying distinctiveness needs (for example, by enabling Albanians to affirm the distinctiveness of their group) will increase their identity complexity and subsequently result in more positive attitudes towards Kosovar Serbs.

Similarly, future research should establish the beneficial effects of national identification for the intergroup attitudes of Kosovar Serbs. Previous research has established that identification with a superordinate category only improves minority group members’ out-group attitudes when they perceive their group as prototypical for the overarching group (Ufkes, Otten, Van der Zee, Giebels, & Dovidio, 2012). Moreover, for Serbs the common in-group may pose threats to the distinctiveness of their ethnic group. More recent developments in the common in-group identity model have related the importance of emphasising dual identities—an emphasis on the superordinate identity as well as the subgroup identities—especially for minority group members (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Saguy, 2009). By focusing on dual identities attention is paid to the distinctive features of both groups, but the connection with the former out-group is improved through the common superordinate category. In future research we aim to test whether a dual identity approach will also improve national identification among Kosovar Serbs, and whether this will subsequently improve their perceptions of Albanians and willingness to interact with them.

Although our investigation sheds light on the intergroup dynamics between Kosovar Albanians and Serbs, and offers some suggestions for how to improve their relations, our investigation also uncovered two unsettling aspects of current intergroup dynamics in Kosovo that may limit any attempt to improve the peace-building process in the country. Firstly, in terms of intergroup stereotypes, our findings show that both groups have quite a negative stereotype of each other that seriously limit opportunities for positive intergroup contact. Albanians’ stereotype of Serbs can be characterised as envious, depicting Serbs as low in warmth but competitive because of their high competence. This stereotype has been associated with harmful and ambivalent behaviour, involving both resentment and respect (Cuddy et al., 2007). Moreover, out-groups that are perceived as high in ability but low in warmth tend to be scapegoated when societies experience instability (Glick, 2005). Given the instability of Kosovo in terms of economic outcomes and intergroup relations, the way Kosovar Albanians perceive Serbs does not bode well for future intergroup relations.

At the same time Serbs’ stereotype of Albanians is one of low warmth and low competence. Based on the stereotype content model (Fiske et al., 2002), this stereotype predicts contempt and disgust of Serbs towards Albanians, which may motivate Serbs to distance themselves from Albanians by excluding and demeaning them (Cuddy et al., 2007). In combination, the content of the stereotypes Albanians and Serbs have of each other may prove to seriously limit opportunities for improved intergroup relations. On a positive note, among Serbs superordinate identification with Kosovo was also related to a more positive out-group stereotype on both warmth and competence dimensions. However, among Albanians higher identity complexity was related only to more positive perceptions of the competence of Serbs, but not to their perceived warmth. Consequently, attempts to enhance identity complexity among Albanians may actually result in even more envious stereotypes of Serbs as more competent but still cold. As such, the increased willingness to have contact with Serbs among Albanians with more complex identities found here may reflect an increased passive facilitation of Serbs that fits interaction with an envied out-group (Cuddy et al., 2007), rather than cooperative intergroup interactions that are associated with out-groups that are perceived as high in both competence and warmth.

Secondly, our findings reflect another disturbing quality of intergroup dynamics in Kosovo, namely the illegitimacy, impermeability and stability of the social hierarchy that ethnic minority Serbs perceive. Our measures of perceptions of the status hierarchy revealed that Serbs not only perceive their ethnic group as having much lower societal status than the Albanian majority, they rate this situation as extremely unfair, and unlikely to change in the future. From a social identity perspective (Wright et al., 1990), this situation reads as a recipe for underground resistance, subculture gang formation, and non-normative collective action, especially with so many young people, the high unemployment rates in Kosovo and the perception that this is unlikely to change. In order to improve intergroup relations in Kosovo the first step therefore seems to be to distribute opportunities and outcomes more fairly between Albanian and Serb Kosovars. The fact that the Albanian students in our sample acknowledged to a certain degree the illegitimacy of the higher status of their ethnic group might be a first step towards improving the opportunities of Serbs in Kosovo and moving towards more positive intergroup relations in Kosovo. However, given the current hostile climate, improving positive intergroup relations may prove to be a long process.

To conclude, the research project reported in this chapter provides first insight into the intergroup dynamics that operate when two ethnic groups who have been involved in one of the deadliest European wars since World War II, seek peace, reconciliation and integration. The first results suggest that, even when intergroup relations are tense and actual integration between former conflicting groups is far away, current models of intergroup relations such as the common in-group identity model and the social identity complexity perspective help to describe and explain current intergroup processes. Moreover, even in these tense and highly segregated circumstances these two models can aid in developing a more stable and less conflictuous future for post-conflict societies.