Abstract
Feminist critics of neuroscience have often focused on research that searches for a neural basis for purported sex/gender differences in behavior or psychological characteristics. Their analyses have shown that neither the differences themselves, nor the neurobiological explanations of how the differences arise, are well-supported by the evidence. To date, feminist philosophy of science has largely focused on changing these and other problematic research programs by changing the social practices of scientists (both the composition of science communities and the practices by which these communities produce knowledge). I argue that, instead, we should concentrate on developing ways to critically assess the way that social beliefs about gender permeate and shape empirical research. This will allow us to better understand why scientists to continue to draw on problematic research studies and theories in their search for sex/gender differences—in spite of both specific feminist criticisms and broader social changes in the way that we understand gender and gender differences.
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Notes
- 1.
Nelson (1995: 418) does, however, acknowledge that “scientists and philosophers of science may appropriately consider theories and results which those involved did not when evaluating a research hypothesis or theory”.
- 2.
Clough’s (1998) paper focuses on Longino’s work, as well as that of Sandra Harding and Evelyn Fox Keller; in a 2004 paper, however, she argues that Nelson’s Quinean approach runs the same risks. Similarly, Maya Goldenberg, whose work I will discuss shortly, shows that Clough’s criticisms also apply to Nelson’s feminist empiricism. Interestingly, Clough (2004) also identifies a split between evidence and framework in Bleier’s writing.
- 3.
Harding herself viewed feminist standpoint theory as the best way of developing such frameworks, though she did consider it possible that the “sophisticated” feminist empiricisms developed by Longino and by Nelson could also do so.
- 4.
Similarly, I have argued that current pop neuroscience books tend to give biological explanations for sex/gender differences in personality characteristics and preferences, in contrast with earlier work that viewed gender roles as biologically determined. This shift does not, however, prevent the current work from arguing that the social status quo is inevitable (Bluhm 2012).
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Bluhm, R. (2016). Values and Evidence in Feminist Philosophy and in Neuroscience. In: Amoretti, M., Vassallo, N. (eds) Meta-Philosophical Reflection on Feminist Philosophies of Science. Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, vol 317. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-26348-9_6
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