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Self-defense on Five Fronts: A Reply to My Commentators

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Philip Pettit: Five Themes from his Work

Part of the book series: Münster Lectures in Philosophy ((MUELP,volume 1))

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Abstract

It is very challenging to be presented with such a wide array of commentaries on my work, many of which raise very fundamental questions. In this necessarily brief set of responses, I propose to divide the commentaries into five areas; to present my overall background view in each area; and then, against that background, to consider the main points made in the relevant commentaries. The five areas are: Epistemology and Semantics; Philosophy of Mind; Consequentialism; Group Agency; and Republicanism.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For an account of the views relevant to this section see CM as well as (Pettit 1990a, b, 1991c, 1998a, c, 1999b; 2002b; Jackson and Pettit 2002).

  2. 2.

    For our joint papers on the topic see (Jackson et al. 2004). And for work of my own on the topic see (CM; JD).

  3. 3.

    Notice that when Kim (1998, 74) considers whether the program model ought to relieve that worry, he mistakenly suggests that that was the model he had proposed in putting forward his views on supervenient causation in his 1984 paper.

  4. 4.

    Relevant papers include (CM; 2003c, 2004, 2007a; JD; 2008c).

  5. 5.

    See (Pettit and Smith 1990, 1996; TF; JD).

  6. 6.

    On the idea of property-desires, see (Pettit 1991b).

  7. 7.

    Relevant texts include (Pettit and Brennan 1986; Pettit 1984, 1987, 1988, 1989; NJD; Pettit 1991a, 2001b; Pettit and Braithwaite 1993, 1994; CP; R; 1997, 2000b, 2012; Pettit and Scanlon 2000; Pettit and Smith 2000, 2004).

  8. 8.

    The most important publications on, or in the background to, the topic of group agency are: (CM; TF; Pettit 2001a; List and Pettit 2002, 2004, 2005, 2006; Pettit 2003a, 2003b, 2005b, 2006b, 2007d, 2009a, b; Pettit and Schweikard 2006; GA).

  9. 9.

    Relevant works are: (Pettit 1996; R; 1998b, 1999a, 2000a; TF; 2002a, 2003a, 2005a, 2006a, 2007b, c, 2008a, b, d, 2010, 2011, 2013; Lovett and Pettit 2009; Marti and Pettit 2010; GA; OPT).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University Center for Human Values, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA

    Philip Pettit

  2. School of Philosophy, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia

    Philip Pettit

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Münster, Münster, Germany

    Simon Derpmann

  2. Department of Philosophy, University of Münster, Münster, Germany

    David P. Schweikard

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Pettit, P. (2016). Self-defense on Five Fronts: A Reply to My Commentators. In: Derpmann, S., Schweikard, D. (eds) Philip Pettit: Five Themes from his Work. Münster Lectures in Philosophy, vol 1. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-26103-4_13

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