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Beck presents an explanation of practical philosophy, that is, morality, in a continuous manner to his presentation of the theoretical part of critical philosophy, without resorting to the concept of a thing-in-itself. Beck attempts to elucidate the distinction between natural necessity and moral necessity. Through the distinctness on the one hand and the connection on the other between these two senses of the concept of necessity, Beck shows the integration of theoretical and practical philosophy. Since the concept of necessity, in both its natural and moral sense, is an original representing, the meaning of both kinds of necessity and the distinction between them can be made on merely subjective grounds without involving the problematic concept of the thing-in-itself.Footnote 1

As we have seen above, necessity was defined by Beck as the original positing of an object through the mere concept of another object. We merely assume the actuality of one concept and on behalf of this assumption we then posit another concept as an object. If I say that a stone held above the ground shall, when released, fall and rest on the ground below, this reflects the positing of an objective state of affairs – the stone as it is on the ground – on behalf of the mere concept of another state of affairs – the stone released above that point at which it is said to lie. This is the definition of natural necessity. It is important to notice that the assumed initial event, from which the second event is deduced, must be a part of the natural world. Although it may not actually be observed at this very moment, it nevertheless must be such an event that can be observed. Put in Beck’s terms this means that the concept, through which the positing of the necessary object is obtained, must be such that can be traced back (zurückgeführt) to the original-synthetic objective-unity of consciousness.

What should we then say of a very different kind of necessity which is found to be a fact of our being, a concept of necessity according to which one should refrain from doing some act, for example, one should not lie? What kind of necessity is expressed by the term ‘should’? According to Beck, this term expresses the moral necessity, which consists of the original positing of an object through a concept that cannot be traced back to the original-synthetic objective-unity of consciousness. In other words, the concept from which we deduce the moral necessity of an event is not a natural event. The necessity expressed by the term ‘should’ is deduced from the concept of freedom, which is not a part of the natural world. When we follow the meaningfulness of the moral ‘should’ we see that it consists of a concept of necessity that is totally independent of nature. This is exactly the meaning of the moral imposition, which is binding regardless of any actual event. Even if I did, as a matter of fact, lie, still I can say that I should not have lied. The moral ‘should’ is not dependent on actual events.

Any natural event has a cause determining it. The cause is in turn a natural event, which in turn has a cause, etc. No natural event is exempt from this general law. Human actions are part of this world. As natural events they are not free but determined by prior causes. Nevertheless, it is a fact that we have another different kind of law – the moral law expressed by the term ‘should’. Under the moral law we view our actions as determined by our free will. The free will is not a natural event and is not predetermined by any prior natural event. Freedom, according to Beck, is grounded not in the self as a thing-in-itself but in a unique concept of necessity, which expresses a unique kind of original representing.

If the concept of necessity was a property of things rather than a subjective mode of relating to things, then the two kinds of necessity could not exist side by side. Natural necessity would indicate that human actions are predetermined by prior natural causes while the concept of moral necessity would instruct us that regardless of natural events we should have acted in a specific manner. Necessity, however, is only a mode of our own capability of representing. It is a mode according to which cognition imposes order. As such there is no contradiction in us having two distinct ways of viewing the necessary connection of human actions.

According to one possible interpretation of the Kantian text, the apparent contradiction whereby the very same things are considered to be at once causally determined and free is resolved by the fact that the applicability of natural causality is limited to appearances while freedom is ascribed to things-in-themselves. However, this line of thought assumes two distinct domains of existing objects; the first is the common world of phenomenal objects while the second is the intelligible world of noumenal objects. It pulls us towards theoretical speculation regarding the nature of things-in-themselves (since we have acknowledged two domains of actual objects) which would run counter to the limitations Kant so meticulously set out for theoretical reason. This interpretation makes Kant vulnerable to the objection made against him that what he ruled out in the theoretical account is reinstated through the practical account. The flaw in this kind of interpretation is in the attempt to subsume practical reason under the requirements of theoretical reason. This tendency becomes obvious when we recognize that the above interpretation requires that freedom be realized in some actually existing object. Contrary to this interpretation, which relies on two distinct domains of objects, Beck’s interpretation relies on two distinct ways of relating to objects. Through the first we ask what is and through the second we ask what ought to be. It is simply a matter of fact that we have these two distinct ways of relating (EmS, 283, 284, 289). Beck’s view enables us to maintain the distinction between natural and moral necessity without requiring the concept of the thing-in-itself as a unique kind of object (EmS, 287, 290, 293, 300).