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The Court of Justice has dealt with the gambling cases as a matter for the law on fundamental freedoms, and this book focuses on these provisions. Therefore, this chapter only briefly examines whether and to which extent other provisions could apply as well.

1 Primary Law

The Union’s primary law is codified in its Treaties. With the entry into effect of the Lisbon Treaty,Footnote 1 the Union’s primary law consists of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’),Footnote 2 the Treaty on European Union (‘TEU’) Footnote 3 and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘Charter’).Footnote 4 According to the TEU, ‘the Treaties’Footnote 5 and the Charter have the same legal value.Footnote 6 This section briefly inquires whether and to which extent provisions of primary law, other than those relating to the fundamental freedoms, could apply to gambling services.

1.1 Escape Gates

The chapter regarding the right of establishment contains two escape gates that exclude the application of this chapter’s provisions. First, Article 51 TFEU holds that the provisions on freedom of establishment do not apply to “activities which in that State are connected, even occasionally, with the exercise of official authority.” However, the exercise of official authority only includes core activities of the power monopoly of the state, such as police and justice.Footnote 7 Indeed, Advocate General Mazák expressly denied the application of this paragraph to the facts in his opinion in the gambling case HIT & HIT LARIX.Footnote 8

Secondly, according to the same article, the Parliament and the Council may rule that the provisions on the right of establishment do not apply to certain activities. However, this provision has not been used and its use today would be controversial.Footnote 9 In any case, this procedure would first require a proposal from the Commission,Footnote 10 and it is difficult to identify an interest of the Commission in taking this road.Footnote 11 With the initiation of the Green Paper process,Footnote 12 the Commission is more likely to suggest some form of regulation rather than an express exemption.

1.2 Competition and State Aid

There are situations where national gambling regulations may be assessed through the provisions on competition law and state aid. A couple of Advocates General have alluded to this possibility.Footnote 13 While state aid issues have received major attention in media and scholarship during the recent financial crisis,Footnote 14 this angle has so far received little attention in the field of gambling.Footnote 15 The potentially applicable provisions include Articles 101 (cartels) and 102 (dominant positions) TFEU. Article 106(1) TFEU extends the Treaty’s applicability to public undertakings and undertakings to which special or exclusive rights were granted. These provisions can apply both to private gambling operators as well as state monopolies.Footnote 16

Article 106(2) TFEU deals with “undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest or having the character of a revenue-producing monopoly.” It may be difficult to argue that gambling operators as such provide services of general economic interest. While the Court has not dealt with that issue, several Advocates General have answered in the negative.Footnote 17 This may be different in relation to a parafiscal levy.Footnote 18 Indeed, the Commission approved an amended French scheme for a parafiscal levy on online horse-race betting to finance a service to improve the bloodline and promote horse-breeding. The Commission based its decision on Article 107(3)(c) TFEU according to which state aid may be compatible if it “facilitate[s] the development of certain economic activities […], where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest.”Footnote 19

It is more plausible to qualify an exclusive right holder as such as having the character of a revenue-producing monopoly.Footnote 20 Gambling revenues from state monopolies are either integrated in the general state budget or directly allocated to certain public tasks, such as charitable causes. These undertakings may thus be subject to the Treaty rules.Footnote 21

State aid rules too can apply to gambling operators. A Member State may, for instance, grant to its national gambling operator(s) a more favourable tax regime than that granted to foreign operators, which would constitute a form of state aid.Footnote 22

Article 37 TFEU stipulates that state monopolies of a commercial character must be adjusted to avoid discrimination regarding the conditions under which goods are procured and marketed. The Court of Justice held that this provision can only apply to the free movement of goods.Footnote 23 This provision could therefore be applicable, for example, in a situation where a state or privately controlled undertaking enjoys the exclusive right to produce or distribute slot machines.Footnote 24

Competition and state aid provisions have received increased attention by the Commission in recent years. It opened infringement proceedings under the state aid rules,Footnote 25 including in a Danish case regarding an anti-competitive tax regimeFootnote 26 and a French parafiscal levy to finance horse racing companies.Footnote 27 , Footnote 28 The Zeturf case before the Court of Justice regarded competition issues too, but the judgment was ultimately argued with the law on fundamental freedoms.Footnote 29 Nevertheless, the aforementioned considerations show that competition and state aid provisions can apply to gambling issues and that the Commission has started to pursue this road.

1.3 Non-Discrimination

The aforementioned Article 106(1) TFEU expressly refers to Article 18 TFEU, which prohibits discrimination on grounds of nationality. However, the practical relevance of the provision is rather limited in the gambling cases. National measures in the gambling sector are often not discriminatory. In the case of a state monopoly for instance, no other operator can enter the market – irrespective of whether it is a foreign or national operator.Footnote 30 More importantly, the Court of Justice so far relied on mandatory requirements rather than on the express Treaty derogations. According to the relevant Gebhard formula, measures must be ‘non-discriminatory’.Footnote 31 Even in those gambling cases that involved a discriminatory measure, the Court of Justice did not refer to Article 18 TFEU. This practice is compatible with the perception that the codified non-discrimination provision is only of general use in relation to the fundamental freedoms.Footnote 32

1.4 Fundamental Rights

EU fundamental rights are prominently protected in the primary law. The Union is “founded on the […] respect for human rights”Footnote 33 and recognises the rights, freedoms and principles of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.Footnote 34 With the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, the Charter became a legally binding document.Footnote 35 For the first time, EU primary law enumerated legally binding fundamental rights. The Court of Justice had already recognised – long prior to the Lisbon Treaty – fundamental rights as forming ‘general principles of EU law’ and developed a rich jurisprudence on fundamental rights. In a separate excursus, this book explores to which extent EU fundamental rights could play a role in the gambling case law (see Chap. 11).

2 Secondary Law

The question remains whether there are also provisions from secondary law that can apply to gambling issues. The EU has a number of binding and non-binding legislative instruments at its disposal,Footnote 36 and the EU’s classic approach in reducing barriers to trade consists in the harmonisation of national laws through directives.Footnote 37 To date, the national gambling markets have not been harmonised. For the sake of comprehensiveness, this section inquires whether and to which extent other directives can be applied to gambling issues as well as the potential relevance of these directives, namely the Services Directive. Furthermore, it inquires to which extent directives expressly exclude (fully or partly) gambling from their scope of application. The order of presentation starts with the applicable directives, followed by those (increasingly) excluding gambling services from their scope of application.

2.1 Information Society Directive

Among the more important legal acts affecting national gambling regulation is the Information Society Directive.Footnote 38 The overall aim of the Directive is to avoid new barriers to trade caused by national technical standards and regulations. To this end, Member States must notify the Commission of any relevant draft legislation that may create such barriers.Footnote 39 Through means of consultation and administrative cooperation, draft gambling regulations may need to be adjusted along the principles established in the case law.Footnote 40 The Directive refers to ‘electronic means’,Footnote 41 which results in a wide scope of application. Gambling services and devices can fall within the scope of the Directive.Footnote 42 In relation to services, Advocate General Bot confirmed the Directive’s applicability in Liga Portuguesa where the exclusive rights of the state monopolist were extended to “all means of communication.”Footnote 43 Regulation relating to the use of gambling devices too has been found to fall under the Directive.Footnote 44

2.2 Distance Selling Directive

The Distance Selling DirectiveFootnote 45 aims to approximate the laws, regulations and administrative provisions concerning distance contracts between consumers and suppliers and confers certain rights on consumers.Footnote 46 According to its definitions of distance contract and distance communication,Footnote 47 online gambling services can fall within the scope of the Directive. Although the Directive provides that consumers cannot exercise their right of withdrawal in relation to ‘gaming and lottery services’ except otherwise agreed by the parties,Footnote 48 the remainder of the conferred rights applies to gambling services.Footnote 49

2.3 Anti-Money Laundering Directive

The Third Anti-Money Laundering DirectiveFootnote 50 replaced the two former anti-money laundering directives.Footnote 51 At the time of writing, a Commission proposal for a Forth Directive has been published.Footnote 52 To prevent money laundering and terrorist financing, the Third Anti-Money Laundering Directive imposes requirements of customer due diligence and supervisory obligations on certain institutions and businesses. The Directive is likely to be the sole directive that expressly applies inter alia to gambling, namely casinos.Footnote 53 It requires that “all casino customers be identified, and their identity verified if they purchase or exchange gambling chips with a value of EUR 2,000 or more.”Footnote 54 Notably, Article 36 somehow limits the regulatory choices of Member States in that it demands “casinos [shall] be licensed in order to operate their business legally.” Accordingly, Member States are obliged to devise some authorisation scheme that amounts to a licensing system for land-based and onlineFootnote 55 casinos.

In order to pursue a consistent and systematic policy, Member States relying on money laundering to justify restrictions of EU fundamental freedoms in sectors other than casinos should be expected, in this author’s view, to extend the national implementing act to these sectors. The Directive obliges Member States to extend its scope to activities “particularly likely to be used for money laundering or terrorist financing purposes.”Footnote 56

2.4 Data Protection Directive and Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communication

The Data Protection DirectiveFootnote 57 and the amended Directive on Privacy and Electronic CommunicationFootnote 58 provide for data protection in the EU. The obligations contained in these directives may be of particular relevance in the online gambling sector, considering electronic storage of user data, such as contact and financial information, or behavioural data, such as gambling frequency, wagered stakes and time of play.Footnote 59

2.5 Unfair Commercial Practices Directive

The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive,Footnote 60 which aims to protect consumers from unfair commercial practices that may harm consumers’ economic interests,Footnote 61 explicitly operates without prejudice to “those rules which […] relate to gambling activities.”Footnote 62 Still, the Directive is important in relation to the advertising and marketing of gambling.Footnote 63 It prohibits practices contrary to the requirements of professional diligence or those that (are likely to) materially distort the economic behaviour of consumers. An interesting question is to which extent national gambling regulations respect the social responsibility principles contained in the Directive: the latter prohibits misleading practices likely to deceive the average consumer, misleading omissions regarding information necessary to make an informed transactional decision as well as aggressive commercial practices.Footnote 64 Notably, it protects those “particularly vulnerable […] because of their mental or physical infirmity, age or credulity.”Footnote 65 This is directly relevant in that research has evidenced that adolescents show a heightened vulnerability to gambling disorders (see Sect. 9.1.3.5).

2.6 VAT Directive

The VAT DirectiveFootnote 66 exempts transactions from “betting, lotteries and other forms of gambling, subject to the conditions and limitations laid down by each Member State.”Footnote 67 In accordance with this degree of discretion, some Member States apply the exemption only to lotteries and limited forms of betting.Footnote 68 Disputes between operators and tax authorities regarding the (non-)exemption of gambling services have lead to a rich case law.Footnote 69

2.7 Audio Visual Media Services Directive and Television Without Frontiers Directive

The Audio Visual Media Services DirectiveFootnote 70 succeeded the Television without Frontiers Directive,Footnote 71 updating it to technological developments. The latter ensured the free movement of European television programmes and introduced a broadcasting quota that reserved half of transmission time for European works. While the preamble generally excludes gambling services,Footnote 72 the Directive nevertheless applies where a broadcasted programme is devoted to games of chance. Moreover, it is unclear whether a preamble recital can be relied upon to derogate from the main provisions of the Directive.Footnote 73 In any event, certain games of chance may qualify as ‘teleshopping’ within the meaning of the Television without Frontiers Directive.Footnote 74

2.8 E-Commerce Directive

The Directive on Electronic Commerce (the ‘e-Commerce Directive’)Footnote 75 aims to ensure the free movement of services of information society, involving a limited approximation of national provisions.Footnote 76 Gambling services are excluded from the scope of the Directive but their definition is narrower than in other directives.Footnote 77 The Directive applies to “promotional competitions or games where the purpose is to encourage the sale of goods or services and where payments, if they arise, serve only to acquire the promoted goods or services.”Footnote 78 The criterion of a mere secondary, promotional role reminds of the distinction made by the Court of Justice in Familiapress.Footnote 79

2.9 Services Directive

The Services DirectiveFootnote 80 excludes gambling services from its scope “in view of the specific nature of these activities, which entail implementation by Member States of policies relating to public policy and consumer protection.”Footnote 81 The original proposal included gambling services subject to a transitional derogation, and additional harmonisation efforts were made dependent upon the publication of a report and further consultations.Footnote 82 However, the European Parliament removed gambling services from the Directive’s scope; further consultations as foreseen in the initial proposal did not take place for many years. Even though the proposal contained a reference to future harmonisation,Footnote 83 it should be noted that Council and Parliament were not obliged to proceed to harmonisation. They could have limited their discussions for instance to further consultations regarding consumer protection issues. Considering the 2-decades-and-counting adversarial ‘dialogue’ between Member States and private operators in countless court cases, the question arises whether this controversy has allowed for a more coherent, structured and productive output. The debate could have taken place within a transitional legislative framework and it would have been a mere commitment of a continued discussion in the legislative branch. Ironically, a continued political discussion would have been likely to save Member States from countless court cases.Footnote 84 Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the current Green Paper process takes an approach that is quite similar to that suggested in the original proposal of the Services Directive: it establishes a “report by the Commission and a wide consultation of interested parties.”Footnote 85 By integrating gambling services in the Services Directive, the Member States could have preserved their broad regulatory preferences, including the option of entrusting a single operator with exclusive rights.Footnote 86 It was even argued that this integration would not have led to a liberalisation, and that the discussion would have taken place within the guidelines so far provided by the Court of Justice.Footnote 87

3 Results

This chapter established that competition and state aid provisions apply to the activities of both private and state gambling operators; the Commission has given increased attention to these rules. Article 106(1) TFEU extents the applicability of Articles 101 (cartels) and 102 (dominant positions) TFEU to public undertakings and undertakings to which special or exclusive rights were granted, such as state or private gambling monopolies. While Advocates General found that gambling monopolies hardly qualify as ‘undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest’, they can constitute ‘revenue-producing monopolies’ in the sense of Article 106(2) TFEU. Finally, favourable tax regimes towards national gambling operators can trigger the application of the state aid rules. Other provisions of EU primary law were found to be of minor importance. The significance of EU fundamental rights for the gambling jurisprudence is assessed elsewhere in this book.

A number of directives were identified that either apply to gambling services or (partly) exclude gambling services from their scope of application. While some of these directives are of direct relevance for gambling activities, none aims to facilitate cross-border gambling services. In particular were found to be relevant for the gambling sector (to varying degrees): the Information Society Directive, the Distance Selling Directive, the Anti-Money Laundering Directive, the Data Protection Directive and the Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communication. The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive specifically defines commercial standards that can be of relevance in relation to responsible gambling advertising, in particular when aimed towards adolescents.

Finally, it was noted that the exclusion of gambling services from the scope of the Services Directive might have produced undesirable results both for Member States and consumers. Ultimately, the European Commission with its Green Paper process pursues a similar road as initially foreseen for gambling services in the draft Services Directive.