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Part of the book series: Contributions to Phenomenology ((CTPH,volume 128))

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Abstract

One of Patočka’s central examples in “The phenomenology of afterlife” is how to understand one’s relation to one’s dead father. Since relations of fathers and sons are not seldom difficult, also after the father’s death, a need for forgiveness might arise here, the need for the son to forgive and be forgiven by his father. This would be an interesting instance of the problems brought about by the loss of reciprocity that is a central theme of Patočka’s text. Pointing to the need to forgive and be forgiven is one way of showing why Patočka is right when he writes: “[I]t is only in relation to another […] that we become what we are, and yet other and otherwise than we were before.” This then raises the question whether the son’s relationship to his dead father will remain forever as difficult as it was at the time of the father’s death, whether its possible transformation is the result of a move on the son’s side only, or whether some form of reciprocity is still possible.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The numbers within slashes refer to the page numbers of the printed Czech text, included within slashes in the above English translation.

  2. 2.

    To this can be added that philosophers writing on forgiveness most often picture themselves as victims, not as perpetrators. As a result of this, the difficulty of asking one’s dead father’s forgiveness will not be taken up for discussion, at most only the difficulty of forgiving him. For this and the above description of contemporary philosophy of forgiveness, see Strandberg 2021, esp. ch. 1 and 7. (In order not to repeat myself, in this essay I approach the issue of forgiveness in a different, but hopefully not incompatible, way than I do in Strandberg 2021. Still, the discussions in that book are helpful to anyone who wants a deeper understanding of the questions I explore in this essay and who wants a critical discussion of the contemporary philosophy of forgiveness; references to Strandberg 2021 could have been added frequently here, and I have therefore abstained from doing so.)

  3. 3.

    Cf. Kierkegaard 1963, 328 (SKS 9:338).

  4. 4.

    In order to bring the real import of the experiences I am discussing into view, it is necessary to write and think in first-person terms. However, in case someone worries: my father is alive and my relation to him far from a bad one. In other words, my discussion is not autobiographical.

  5. 5.

    Cf. Buber 1958, 8–10, 31. As Buber points out, a proper understanding of human psychology is not to be had by abstracting from moral relationality. A “solely psychological” account is hence only on the face of it solely psychological.

  6. 6.

    Cf. Weil 2008, 154; Weil 1997, 426; Nykänen 2002, 224ff.

  7. 7.

    Cf. Levinas 2004, 160–161.

  8. 8.

    For many interesting examples of this, see O’Connor 1961.

  9. 9.

    Cf. Winch 1989, 150.

  10. 10.

    In a sense, Aristotle points this out, when he claims that the fortunes of their descendants will affect the happiness of the dead; see EN 1101a22–1101b9. A similar idea is to be found in Hebrew wisdom literature; see Sir 11.28 (LXX).

  11. 11.

    Cf. Gaita 2000, 32.

  12. 12.

    Cf. Weil 2019, 214.

  13. 13.

    Cf. Jaspers 1962, 366.

  14. 14.

    Cf. Holland 1980, 183–184. As Holland points out, this amounts to a rejection of the principle ab esse ad posse valet consequentia. Cf. also Marcel 1958, 54; Winch 1972, 185–186; Winch 1989, 155.

  15. 15.

    Jaspers himself seems to suggest something like this, although in a very different context. See Jaspers 2012, 92–93.

  16. 16.

    Pace Hägglund 2019, e.g. 12–13, 191–192.

  17. 17.

    An earlier version of this essay was presented at the research seminar in philosophy, Åbo Akademi University, Finland; thanks to those who participated in the discussion, especially to Lars Hertzberg and Olli Lagerspetz.

    This publication was supported within the project of Operational Programme Research, Development and Education (OP VVV/OP RDE), “Centre for Ethics as Study in Human Value”, registration No. CZ.02.1.01/0.0/0.0/15_003/0000425, co-financed by the European Regional Development Fund and the state budget of the Czech Republic.

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Correspondence to Hugo Strandberg .

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Strandberg, H. (2024). Forgiveness and the Dead. In: Strandberg, G., Strandberg, H. (eds) Jan Patočka and the Phenomenology of Life After Death. Contributions to Phenomenology, vol 128. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-49548-9_6

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