Abstract
The way humans cope with breaches of legal order is through criminal law operated by the criminal justice system. Accordingly, human societies define criminal offenses and operate social mechanisms to apply them. This is how criminal law works. Originally, this way has been designed by humans and for humans. However, as technology has developed, criminal offenses are committed not only by humans. The major development in this issue has occurred in the seventeenth century. In the twenty-first century criminal law is required to supply adequate solutions for commission of criminal offenses through artificial intelligent (AI) systems. Basically, there are three basic models to cope with this phenomenon within the current definitions of criminal law. These models are:
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(1)
The Perpetration-by-Another Liability Model;
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(2)
The Natural Probable Consequence Liability Model; and
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(3)
The Direct Liability Model.
This paper was presented at the “International Conference on Autonomous Systems and the Law”, organized by CIDP, (Centro de Investigação de Direito Privado), University of Lisbon. I thank the organizers for inviting me to the conference and to the participants for their questions and interest in this issue. The Models are based on previous researches published around the world, including two of the author’s books: Hallevy (2013, 2015a, b).
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Notes
- 1.
Maxey v. United States, 30 App. D.C. 63 (App.D.C.1907); Commonwealth v. Hill, 11 Mass. 136 (1814); Michael, (1840) 2 Mood. 120, 169 E.R. 48.
- 2.
Johnson v. State, 142 Ala. 70, 38 So. 182 (1904); People v. Monks, 133 Cal. App. 440, 24 P.2d 508 (Cal.App.4Dist.1933).
- 3.
United States v. Bryan, 483 F.2d 88 (3rd Cir.1973); Boushea v. United States, 173 F.2d 131 (8th Cir.1949).
- 4.
Morrisey v. State, 620 A.2d 207 (Del.1993); Conyers v. State, 367 Md. 571, 790 A.2d 15 (2002).
- 5.
Dusenbery v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 770, 263 S.E.2d 392 (1980).
- 6.
United States v. Tobon-Builes, 706 F.2d 1092 (11th Cir.1983); United States v. Ruffin, 613 F.2d 408 (2nd Cir.1979).
- 7.
The AI system is used as an instrument and not as a participant, although it uses its features of processing information. See e.g. Cross and Debessonet (1986).
- 8.
- 9.
Lacey and Wells (1998).
- 10.
United States v. Powell, 929 F.2d 724 (D.C.Cir.1991).
- 11.
Clark and Marshall (1930); People v. Prettyman, 14 Cal.4th 248, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 827, 926 P.2d 1013 (1996); Chance v. State, 685 A.2d 351 (Del.1996).
- 12.
Hallevy (2012). See more at State v. Kaiser, 260 Kan. 235, 918 P.2d 629 (1996); United States v. Andrews, 75 F.3d 552 (9th Cir.1996).
- 13.
- 14.
The American Law Institute, Model Penal Code—Official Draft and Explanatory Notes 312 (1962, 1985) (hereinafter “Model Penal Code”); State v. Linscott, 520 A.2d 1067 (Me.1987).
- 15.
Cunningham [1957] 2 Q.B. 396, [1957] 2 All E.R. 412, [1957] 3 W.L.R. 76, 41 Cr. App. Rep. 155; Faulkner, (1876) 13 Cox C.C. 550; United States v. Greer, 467 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir.1972); People v. Cooper, 194 Ill.2d 419, 252 Ill.Dec. 458, 743 N.E.2d 32 (2000).
- 16.
- 17.
James (1890), von Helmholtz (1878); In this context knowledge and awareness are identical. See e.g. United States v. Youts, 229 F.3d 1312 (10th Cir.2000); State v. Sargent, 156 Vt. 463, 594 A.2d 401 (1991). The Model Penal Code, supra note 14, at subsection 2.02(2)(b) (p. 21) even provides as follows:
“A person acts knowingly with a respect to a material element of an offense when: (i) if…, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist; and (ii) if…, he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result” (emphasis not in original).
- 18.
- 19.
- 20.
Batey (2001); State v. Daniels, 236 La. 998, 109 So.2d 896 (1958); Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 120 S.Ct. 2159, 147 L.Ed.2d 203 (2000).
- 21.
For the Intent-to-Kill murder see in LaFave (2003).
- 22.
- 23.
See e.g. Minn. Stat. §9913 (1927); Mont. Rev. Code §10729 (1935); N.Y. Penal Code §816 (1935); Okla. Stat. §152 (1937); Utah Rev. Stat. 103-i-40 (1933); State v. George, 20 Del. 57, 54 A. 745 (1902); Heilman v. Commonwealth, 84 Ky. 457, 1 S.W. 731 (1886).
- 24.
- 25.
- 26.
Hale (1736) [Matthew Hale, History of the Pleas of the Crown (1736)]; McCormack v. State, 102 Ala. 156, 15 So. 438 (1894); Little v. State, 261 Ark. 859, 554 S.W.2d 312 (1977).
- 27.
- 28.
- 29.
- 30.
- 31.
Musmanno (1963).
- 32.
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Hallevy, G. (2024). The Basic Models of Criminal Liability of AI Systems and Outer Circles. In: Moura Vicente, D., Soares Pereira, R., Alves Leal, A. (eds) Legal Aspects of Autonomous Systems. ICASL 2022. Data Science, Machine Intelligence, and Law, vol 4. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-47946-5_5
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